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The ideal of moral perfection is rejected by most modem moral philosophers.
This is because of a confused and superficial understanding of what perfection 
means, created largely as a result of influences from modem liberalism, which dis­
counts the importance of character in moral conduct. However, rejecting the ideal 
of moral perfection diminishes and devalues what it means to be a human being.
To clarify our moral thinking, we should turn to a re-evaluation of Aristotle’s ethics, 
a sound and coherent morality that is grounded on the belief that the ideal of moral 
perfection is an attainable good in human life.
Perfection etymologically means "completion." Aristotle’s ethics understands 
moral perfection as human completion, or happiness and human flourishing. Moral 
perfection is attained through the achievement of moral virtuosity, the habituation of 
virtuous actions that aims toward a mean in moral conduct, expressing the human 
best for any individual. Aristotle’s emphasis on character gives a valuable depth and 
meaning to moral goodness, while striving toward an ideal of perfection is what 
gives quality and worth to human activity and character, even more so perhaps than 
actually reaching the goal.
Tragedy gives us clear examples of moral imperfection that can be explained in 
terms of Aristotle’s ethics, supplemented by moral concepts in his treatise on trag­
edy, the Poetics. Examination of scenes from two Greek tragedies, the Antigone 
and the Agamemnon, illustrates Aristotle’s ethical principles, revealing just how dif­
ficult moral choice is and the value of an ideal of moral perfection to human life and 
worth. Tragedy then becomes a useful tool for ethical reflection and insight; it 
forces us to re-examine what it means to be a human being and to focus on what is 
truly important in living well. Aristotle’s ethics and Greek tragedy are, therefore, 
complementary, both concerned with moral depth. A careful study of both may 
serve to aid in the development of moral depth in ourselves.
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Moral Perfection and the Tragic Sense of Life 
Introduction
In Homer’s Iliad Achilleus recounts a myth to king Priam of Troy, who has 
endured more sorrow and misfortune than any mortal alive and has now come to beg 
for the body of his son Hector from Achilleus, the man who has slain all of Priam’s 
sons.1 The myth describes how good and evil come to the human being as a chance 
gift from the gods. There are two urns, Achilleus says, that sit on the threshold of 
Zeus, one filled with good fortune, the other with evil. The one to whom Zeus 
gives a mixture from the two urns suffers both evil and good. But, to the one who 
receives from the second urn alone, evil only comes, driving him over the earth, 
reviled and without honor, a failure in the eyes of men and the gods. Socrates 
refers to this myth in Plato’s Republic, rejecting its theme.2 Only good comes from 
the gods, he says, evil comes from some other cause. In his Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle states that chance can mar our complete happiness by bringing a lack of 
such things as beauty or wealth (NE 1.8 1099a31-1099b9). Nevertheless, Aristotle 
insists that everyone whose capacity for goodness has not been maimed can acquire 
happiness. Happiness, the ultimate human good, he says, although a truly divine 
and blessed thing, is best attained by human effort. Aristotle firmly maintains that 
since nature is ordered in the best way possible it would be too "discordant"
(irXrjpsXsg) for human happiness, the best and greatest of all things, to be turned 
over to chance; it would be entirely contrary and out of tune with how nature is best 
ordered (NE 1.8 1099bl9-24).
Thus, we have two views of good and evil, one that resigns our human good to
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an unpredictable chance, beyond human control, and another that gives hope that 
happiness is possible through human effort. This thesis examines how good and 
evil comes to the human being, the ultimate value of striving to be good and the best 
we can be as human beings. I shall argue that we must take the ideal of moral 
perfection seriously, as did Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. By aspiring 
toward such an ideal, it is indeed possible to attain happiness, enriching our lives 
with the meaning and purpose of what it truly is to be a human being.
In Chapter 1 we find that perfection is commonly rejected as a standard for 
human goodness by modern moral philosophers. In a survey of a selection of views 
from a few of these philosophers, it becomes clear that their conception of the ideal 
of moral perfection is distorted and superficial. Moral perfection is described in 
terms of an unattractive, unhealthy moral sainthood, and as implying heroic action 
lying outside the realm of everyday morality. Human imperfection is hailed as 
admirable and even wonderful, while morality itself in its complexity and diversity 
is deemed too difficult to understand and define adequately; hence, it is dismissed as 
unfit to be used by the human being as a guide to a good life. Moral philosophy 
appears to have turned itself upside down; the ordinary, flawed and base life has 
become the ideal and the morally superior bad. This erroneous rejection of moral 
perfection has been influenced by Christianity and its saintly images of moral 
goodness. It also appears to have been influenced by liberalism, the modem 
political theory that has brought ideals of justice and individual rights to the 
forefront in moral theory. This has resulted in a loss of a consideration of the 
importance of character and character development in the definition of a good 
human life and being a good human being. We thus lose much of what it means to 
be a human being in this modem view of human morality; for the person who acts 
out of a depth and quality of character gains moral depth and greater self-worth, his
3
life’s choices have a greater impact and value.
Aristotle’s concept of moral perfection arises out of a much more substantial 
and complete understanding of perfection and a consideration of the whole human 
being. Perfection is more properly understood as human completion and 
flourishing in Aristotle’s moral theory. Chapter 2 examines Aristotle’s version of 
perfection in his Nicomachean Ethics—in his definition of happiness, in its 
relationship to the development of parts of the human soul, and in its connection to 
quality in human character and action through the development of virtuosity in being 
a human being. We find that Aristotle’s moral vision is based on certain 
metaphysical assumptions that give it a special coherency and stability which is 
lacking in modem moral theory.
Moral virtuosity is achieved in Aristotle’s ethical theory through habituation of 
virtuous actions and attitudes, and in the practice of the doctrine of the mean, an 
ideal of moral goodness that is individualized within an individual’s own capacity 
for human completeness, yet defined by absolute limits of vice that do not accept 
mediocrity or allow corruption of the moral good. This allows for a certain degree 
of variability in moral perfection that defends Aristotle’s theory from many of the 
objections voiced by modem moral thinkers against perfection. Since Aristotle’s 
ethics is an agent-emphasis theory, he describes moral conduct as arising from 
character. This gives much of the depth and meaning to moral goodness that is 
valuable in his ethics, but it also creates a certain ambiguity, since character and 
one’s "humanness" are difficult to define. Nevertheless, many scholars do support 
the validity of Aristotle’s theories; they believe his ethics does have relevance in 
today’s world since his ethical thought is centered around human universals and have 
a flexibility that allows application to the particulars of changing circumstances of 
time, culture, and place.
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To understand fully Aristotle’s views on moral perfection, it is necessary to 
review his theory of moral error, or moral imperfection. Aristotle discusses a 
broad range of categories of moral error, showing that human error is most often the 
result of varying degrees of ignorance about what constitutes the moral good, the 
target toward which moral virtuosity, or perfection aims. The extent to which 
Aristotle discusses moral error in his ethics indicates that error is a prominent factor 
to be considered in living successfully as a human being. Aristotle admits that the 
acquisition of moral Virtuosity is not easy, but that this makes moral perfection that 
much more valuable a goal toward which the human being aspires. According to 
Aristotle, ultimate human perfection is achieved in Oeupiot, the theoretical, or 
contemplative life, a life which touches upon the divine in the human being. This 
creates confusion in Aristotle’s account of moral perfection; yet, the controversy 
over what exactly Aristotle intends by the contemplative life does not detract from 
his theory as a whole. In fact, Aristotle gives even greater value to striving for our 
human completeness with his connection of human perfection to the divine.
Aristotle implies that it is the heroic striving for the ideal that is most important, 
more important than actually achieving our goal. The struggle toward moral 
perfection is ultimately what gives greater quality to human character and activity; 
by reaching for perfection (completeness in human flourishing) and the divine in the 
human being, a deeper meaning, purpose, and value is gained for human life as a 
whole.
Chapter 3 links Aristotle’s ethics and Greek tragedy through Aristotle’s theory 
of tragedy in his Poetics. Aristotle’s views on moral imperfection lead naturally 
into a discussion of tragedy and the tragic sense of life where moral imperfection is 
dramatized as the cause of human downfall and suffering. The modem 
understanding of tragedy as nihilistic appears to contradict Aristotle in its
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implication that human virtuosity and goodness are not sufficient for human 
happiness, that the world order may actually be opposed to happiness and the moral 
aspirations of humankind. However, we find that these modem views on the tragic 
are not quite like the ancient Greeks’, whose tragic drama is grounded in the belief 
that there is order and purpose and meaning in the world, despite human error and 
suffering. We also find evidence in Aristotle’s treatise on tragedy, the Poetics, of 
numerous echoings of concepts in Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle’s ethics are therefore 
compatible with Greek tragedy, while his views on the requirements for constructing 
the proper tragic plot complement and amplify his ethical principles with many 
moral elements of its own. Although Plato rejected tragedy because of its tendency 
to promote immorality, Aristotle does not. Aristotle sees tragedy as a true imitation 
of human life, which provides some kind of moral benefit to its spectators.
However, there is intense debate and controversy over Aristotle’s theories of tragedy 
because he does not fully explain his various concepts, making it difficult to 
interpret exactly what he means.
Nevertheless, tragedy vividly illustrates how difficult moral choice is and the 
value of moral perfection in human life. As such tragedy can be used as a valuable 
tool for reflection on the human condition and ethical values encountered in life. 
Therefore, in Chapter 4, scenes from two Greek tragedies, Sophocles’ Antigone and 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, are discussed in detail to demonstrate more fully the 
significance of Aristotle’s theories and provide a better understanding of what 
morality is all about. Antigone highlights what it-means to choose to do the deeply 
right in life. Using Aristotle’s ethics, we see how the principal characters,
Antigone and Creon, are deficient in moral goodness, how their character vices 
contribute to the destruction of their lives. In the Parodos of the Agamemnon we 
witness in full detail the emotional turmoil of moral choice, the agonizing dilemma
6
of deciding what one ought to do when confronted with choosing between two 
seemingly valid rights, or between two evils. This scene of the elders recounting 
the story of Iphigeneia’s sacrifice demonstrates a sense of the tragic as a distinct 
world view and emotional tone, as a tension between hope and despair. In the 
characters of Agamemnon and Clytaemestra we see further evidence of how moral 
imperfection leads to death and destruction.
I conclude my thesis in Chapter 5 with a more in depth discussion of the issues 
raised by the tragedies outlined in Chapter 4 as they relate to moral perfection and 
Aristotle’s ethics. The one who does what is deeply right must choose to act from a 
moral goodness that has been developed completely, where goodness of character is 
united with appropriate action. However, modem moral philosophers usually 
describe morality in terms of rules and principles that require only certain actions of 
the human being, not a certain character, or way of being. This is an incomplete 
understanding of morality. These Greek dramas show us that a virtuous character is 
necessary for making moral decisions and living well as a human being. In 
conjunction with Aristotle’s ethics, tragedy reveals more fully the value of moral 
depth in living a life which is morally true, true to the particulars of our life and true 
to ourselves as human beings. This thesis is therefore fundamentally about moral 
depth, a depth and truth in moral action that can only come from accepting a 
standard of moral perfection as a means of attaining a human flourishing and 
completeness that will give nobility and honor to human life and, ultimately, make 
life worth living for the human being.
Chapter 1
Perfectionism in Modern Moral Philosophy
John Rawls, a prominent contemporary moral and political philosopher, defines 
perfectionism as the maximization of human excellence in art, science, and cultural 
pursuits. Rawls accepts such a standard of excellence in cultural activities, but he
strongly rejects the principle of perfectionism in his theory of justice on the grounds
/
that, as a governing principle of society, it is unjust, since perfection requires that 
the rights and resources of a society be unequally directed toward the cultivation of a 
few highly talented people at the expense of the many. Maximization of the good 
in human excellence would, Rawls argues, claim a higher value than equal rights, 
jeopardizing our individual liberties. Furthermore, he explains, since criteria for 
standards of excellence vary greatly among different individuals, classes, and groups 
of people, the application of perfectionism as a political and social standard of value 
would be too imprecise, unsettled, and idiosyncratic.3
Although John Rawls’ thoughts on perfectionism are not representative of that 
of all modem moral philosophers, it is, nevertheless, rare to find whole-hearted 
support of perfection in modem moral thought. This seems strange when one 
considers that morality essentially involves conformity to standards of right and 
wrong and good and bad. One would think that there might be a need for a 
standard of the perfectly moral to refer to and affirm and that, without it, the 
significance of moral thought and behavior would be diminished or degraded. Yet 
there now is often a reluctance to embrace the goal of perfection in conduct or 
character as a good in moral philosophy, or even outright repudiation of the ideal of
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human perfection; consequently, there are those who argue against the value of such 
a standard, as will be shown below. These arguments reveal a confusion which is 
due to the fact that many modem moral philosophers, such as John Rawls, are 
operating out of an act-emphasis, egalitarian, modem liberal tradition. Their 
rejection of moral perfection indicates that they are also just simply confused about 
what moral perfection means. In contrast, however, there is a clear and sound 
concept of moral perfection to be found in Aristotle’s ethics.
Elizabeth Anscombe, in her influential essay "Modem Moral Philosophy,"4 
and Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book After Virtue,5 have criticized the confusion that 
exists generally throughout modem moral theory. Both of these scholars hold that 
modem moral thinking is in complete disarray, the incoherence of its discourse due 
to a misunderstanding and misuse of moral vocabulary. Moral terms, they say, 
have been distorted through time with the accretion and fragmented overlay of 
different philosophical traditions. There is, therefore, according to MacIntyre, 
little chance of resolving moral issues because we are so unaware of the moral 
disorder created by this confused conglomeration of moral philosophies and 
traditions which has become the foundation of qur moral thought. These scholars 
furthermore suggest that in order to regain clarity in our moral thinking and a true 
understanding of morality we return to the origins of modem ethics and moral 
thought; that is, we should turn to a reflection upon and re-evaluation of Aristotle’s 
ethics and the ancient Greek moral tradition. Their suggestion, thus, implies that 
Aristotle’s moral philosophy is much more accurate and sound than modem moral 
theory. But, since Aristotle’s ethics is founded upon a belief that moral perfection is 
attainable and a good in human life, such a return to Aristotle must mean a return as 
well to the ideal of moral perfection as a good.
In this thesis I shall argue that the rejection of the ideal of moral perfection by
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modem moral philosophers arises out of a superficial understanding of morality; to 
discard this ideal as a standard for moral behavior devalues and diminishes what it 
means to be a human being. As Anscombe and MacIntyre suggested, I shall also 
argue my thesis by way of a return to Aristotle and the ancient Greeks. I shall 
explore the ideal of moral perfection through a consideration both of Aristotle’s 
virtue ethics and ancient Greek tragedy, a study of which will defend Aristotle’s 
ideal of moral perfection against charges that it is unattainable and undesirable for 
living well as a human being, and will demonstrate the significance of moral 
perfection through the dramatic depiction of human suffering.
First, 1 wish to survey briefly what I consider to be the distorted picture of 
moral perfection in a selection of views from a few modem moral thinkers. The 
most prominent and well-known of these is the essay "Moral Saints" by Susan 
Wolf.6 In her essay Wolf paints a very curious picture of what it is to be as 
morally good as possible-a "moral saint," by Wolf’s definition. She defines a 
moral saint as one who commits his life totally to improving the welfare of others, 
or society as a whole, and thereby gladly sacrifices his own happiness for the 
happiness of others. Wolf gives as examples Mother Theresa and St. Francis of 
Assisi. Such a moral saint would be virtuous to a superlative degree in the effort to 
treat people as justly and as kindly as possible. The moral saint is thus so 
preoccupied with being and doing good that, according to Wolf, he has no time or 
opportunity to develop other non-moral virtues and pursuits which would round out 
and enrich his personality and life in a healthy way. Wolf notes these neglected 
pursuits include such things as gourmet cooking, an interest in fashion design, and 
the fine arts. The moral saint’s sense of humor would also be affected so that he 
would not be able to appreciate a cynical or sarcastic wit, and thus be unable to 
laugh at a Marx brothers’ movie or a George Bernard Shaw play.
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By sacrificing all interests to such a single-minded devotion to morality, the 
moral saint, who is just too good and nice for his own well-being, would end up 
dull-witted, humorless, and bland, unable, Wolf says, truly to love the small 
mundane joys of life such as a fishing trip, one’s own stereo, or a hot fudge sundae. 
Such a person would, in short, be a moral fanatic and, by W olfs implication, a 
moral freak as well—a thoroughly unattractive person whom no one would want to 
be around. Finally, Wolf suggests that individual perfection, the point of view 
from which we evaluate "what kinds of lives are good and what kinds of persons it 
would be good to be," may actually lie outside of the moral point of view and moral 
perfection, and that neither point of view is one "we are ever obliged to take up and 
express in our actions. "7 In this conclusion Wolf appears to discount moral 
goodness entirely, excluding it from any consideration as an important part of living 
a good life.
J.O. Urmson’s essay "Saints and Heroes" classifies in some detail actions of 
moral worth, especially those of the saint and hero.8 Urmson is much more 
approving than Wolf of such persons; however, like Wolf, he seems to place the 
hero and saint-thus, the status of the morally perfect-well outside of the reach of 
the ordinary human being and everyday moral behavior. Urmson defines the saint 
and hero as one who does his duty in situations where most people fail. Through 
an exceptional self-control the saint resists desire and self-interest, while the hero 
resists natural fear and self-preservation in the performance of his moral actions. 
Urmson, however, creates a separate and exclusive category for those actions of the 
saint and hero which go above and beyond the call of duty. This category of acts 
has come to be called the "supererogatory" from a Latin compound meaning 
"beyond due payment." An example of the saint in Urmson’s sense would be the 
unmarried daughter who stays home to attend to an invalid parent; the hero would
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be the terrified doctor who stays in a plague ridden city to nurse its inhabitants. 
Examples of the supererogatory are the doctor who "volunteers" to go the plague- 
ridden city and the soldier who throws himself on a live grenade to save his 
comrades.
Urmson argues that the supererogatory saint or hero may feel morally obliged 
to do what he does and deserves high moral praise and admiration, however, clearly 
a person would not be a moral failure if he did not sacrifice his life by throwing 
himself on a live grenade. It would be ridiculous to demand such acts, Urmson 
states, for not everyone should be expected to go off and nurse lepers, however high 
in moral worth such an action is. Furthermore, acts of heroism and saintliness such 
as these are more gracious actions than the minimally morally required and need to 
be inspired by a positive ideal rather than the simple avoidance of evil which 
underlies most dutiful actions. Urmson is hinting, perhaps, at an ideal of moral 
perfection here, yet, in the end he concludes that we need a moral code that is 
workable for men, not angels; as he says, "a line must be drawn between what we 
can expect and demand from others and what we can merely hope for and receive 
with gratitude when we get it."9
Owen Flanagan’s essay "Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection" 
questions the sovereignty of the moral-good—the belief that moral considerations 
override all other considerations as the supreme value.10 Flanagan, like Wolf, 
appears to discard the ideal of moral perfection as unattainable and undesirable. 
People may indeed appear to be admirably immoral, Flanagan asserts, and he gives 
examples of several cases where admirable traits of artistic passion, parental 
devotion, and patriotism are mixed with immoral actions in ways that make it 
difficult to make absolute moral judgments:11
1) Gauguin in anguish deserts his family to pursue his artistic ambitions in
12
the South Pacific.
2) A father who believes one should turn in criminals misleads the police to 
protect his son.
3) Churchill approves the fire bombing of Dresden in order to defeat the 
Nazis, contrary to humanitarian war conventions which protect civilian 
targets.
4) A reformist political leader who believes torture is wrong, nevertheless 
tortures the leader of a terrorist group in order to get information about 
the location of time-bombs set to go off throughout the capital city.
Flanagan admits that there can be disagreements in all these cases about the 
admirability of traits and the immorality of actions and he warns that our judgment 
must be highly conditional. Although the acts may be determined to be acceptable, 
they must be examined in the larger contextual picture of things—the causes and 
consequences of each particular case. To emphasize further the nature of such 
moral complexity, Flanagan gives the example of the expert spy whose skills of 
cunning and deception become much less admirable when taken out of his 
professonal role and manifested in his personal family life.12 Yet Flanagan also 
concedes that, although the moral good could conceivably be preserved in such 
cases, it also risks being severely undermined as well.
In his discussion of admirable imperfection, which he defines with Susan 
W olfs own words, "the person who may be perfectly wonderful without being 
perfectly moral," Flanagan likewise agrees with Wolf that when ideals of morality 
conflict with non-moral ideals, it is proper, even preferable, to disregard the morally 
ideal. Ideals of morality, Flanagan states, cannot provide a comprehensive guide to 
the conduct of life. He makes a distinction between the morally ideal and the 
morally required and associates this division with Urmson’s idea of supererogation 
to preserve the notion of a supreme moral good. By this Flanagan means that we 
must place the morally ideal in a separate and optional category of moral goodness
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since achievement of the morally ideal does indeed have great moral worth and does 
need to be acknowledged as a potential path of action. But adherence to standards 
of the morally ideal—which Flanagan describes as the maximization of the moral 
good in every act a person performs—will, Flanagan proclaims, inevitably conflict 
with what is morally required. Flanagan therefore feels that it is unfair to view as 
morally deficient the person who cannot fulfill both standards unconditionally.
7 Flanagan argues that these distinctions are difficult to draw, but necessary; otherwise 
our conception of morality is unrealistically demanding and may prevent the 
development of other goods, other admirable non-moral traits and talents. After 
all, he warns, moral theory could then demand that we all must do what Mother 
Theresa does. Our constant efforts at "doing good" will then interfere with other 
interests and responsibilities in our lives, as, for example, the conflict that could 
arise over investing money in one’s children’s education rather than in some worthy 
charity which helps the poor and disadvantaged. Flanagan, like Wolf, obviously 
equates the morally ideal, or moral perfection, with moral sainthood, a moral status 
which he places in a superior category of moral goodness, but which he argues 
should be optional and not required of every human being.
By the end of his essay, Flanagan not only retreats from the morally ideal, but 
eventually he also rejects the morally required. He justifies this rejection by 
maintaining that there are so many conflicting points of view about what morality is, 
that it is impossible to determine what is morally required. Realism about 
individual perfection and multiple points of view demands an emphasis on personal 
particularity. The best that can be done, Flanagan suggests, is that we keep talking 
about morality from a wide variety of perspectives and that we acknowledge that no 
one view can capture the essence of morality. It is therefore a mistake, Flanagan 
concludes, to believe that "morality has a nature that can be revealed by moral
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philosophy."13 This is a very odd statement for a moral philosopher to make. If 
morality is discarded, how do we know what is truly good and right. Would 
murder and theft therefore become in some sense acceptable and justifiable? Yet 
Flanagan does indeed deny that morality has a place in deciding how it is best for 
the human being to live a good life. He makes such a denial because morality as a 
concept and a philosophical thesis, he says, has failed to address adequately the 
issues of moral goodness and the good life: "it lacks content and does little action- 
guiding or dispute-resolving work. ”14 Flanagan looks upon the widespread 
disagreement and the incoherent disarray of our moral discourse and he simply gives 
up on morality. He concludes, paradoxically, that we have no other recourse but to 
find other ways of talking about the good for the human being than through an 
understanding of the moral domain.
In a dramatic contrast to the previous philosophers, Antony D uffs essay "Must 
a Good Man be Invulnerable" portrays the morally perfect person as detached from 
the world and all human relationships.15 He describes the ideal of moral perfection 
as simply "the Good," an ideal which Duff does not fully explain except to say that 
the supreme value for the good man is in acting rightly regardless of his misfortunes 
in life. Furthermore, any judgment of what constitutes a man’s well-being must be 
based on a conception of what is most important in life which is independent of any 
individual’s own subjective values. Duff, therefore, asserts that the good man 
"must be committed to a transcendent and "inhuman" good which belongs within a 
religious or moral viewpoint radically at odds with many human conceptions of 
morality."16 He must furthermore relate to the Good in ways that do not involve 
him in an egoism which would negate the very values he professes. This good man 
is virtuous because he wills the Good, but his happiness is not secured by his own 
virtue, as this would be a commitment to an egotistical goodness, rather than the
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Good itself. As the Good is detached from the world so is the good man who 
serves this Good. The morally perfect person, therefore, is detached from a 
dependence on others, as attachment and identification with family, friends, and job 
jeopardize the good man’s moral life, because he can be harmed and destroyed by 
what happens to those he loves and cares about. If the good man is to be 
invulnerable, Duff argues, he must "die to the world" and give up all self-seeking 
goals and material aspirations and relationships central to human lives and morality. 
Ultimately, although, Duff concedes, the good man can be harmed and morally 
destroyed, his well-being lies in achieving what is important to him and what is 
important to the Good, not in his own moral perfection, for whatever happens in the 
world, the Good itself cannot be harmed and that is all that really matters.
At first glance the word ‘perfect’ conjures up images of the absolutely pure, 
unblemished, that without defect or flaw. It also implies a uniqueness or oneness, 
particularity, and precise correctness. This image of perfection seems to gather the 
world up into a single shining point, smooth, sharp-edged, and brilliantly clear. It 
contains, as well, Christian implications of the divine perfection of God and the 
presence or absence of sin. Considering such connotations, it is little wonder that 
these four modem moral thinkers all seem to conceive of perfection as narrow, 
restrictive, or oppressive. As everyone knows, they seem to assume, no one can be 
absolutely perfect except God. Perfection, therefore, in light of this assumption, is 
unattainable for the human being, and all efforts to become perfect are thus in some 
sense useless and self-defeating.
It does not seem necessary, however, that the morally perfect person need be a 
saint or hero, admirably imperfect, or completely and inhumanly detached from the 
world and people whom one cares about. Moreover, these moral philosophers do 
not distinguish striving for perfection from actually attaining it. They do not realize
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that it is also not necessary for an ideal to be worth striving for that it be attainable, 
or that all aspects of the ideal be desirable. Even without knowing the 
philosophical background in each of these essays, one can sense the author’s 
confusions and prejudices about the concept of perfection, or simply feel that his 
argument does not make sense. These are serious moral thinkers whose intent is to 
argue rationally about moral perfection; yet, in many instances, their arguments 
descend into the absurd and they do not even seem to be aware of it.
For Susan Wolf sainthood is clearly a pejorative term. In her essay she is 
prejudiced from the outset against the personality she envisions as appropriate for a 
saint—a dull, "goody-two-shoes" and a social freak. Wolf also defines moral 
perfection solely in terms of a manner of altruistic behavior that is entirely self- 
sacrificing, narrowing its scope and application considerably. She fails to see or 
even consider the saint as a whole, complete person. Hence Wolf fails to see moral 
perfection in any real depth so that her description and analysis can not be anything 
else but superficial. Moreover, she trivializes moral goodness in the same way by 
comparing its moral worth to interests such as cooking, fashion design, movies, 
stereos, and hot fudge sundaes. In the end, morality to Susan Wolf appears to be 
nothing more than a personality trait, a popular (or unpopular) lifestyle, rather than 
a serious way of life, while moral perfection is rejected entirely as a fanatical, 
unhealthy ideal. While Urmson considers moral perfection much more seriously, 
nevertheless his analysis is also fundamentally negative. Moral perfection is not to 
be expected or striven for by ordinary human beings; it belongs to an angelic code 
of behavior to be placed well outside ordinary everyday morality. Urmson, 
therefore, retreats from the morally ideal by relegating its application to saintliness 
and heroism, the exception rather than the rule. The saint and the hero are 
exceptional individuals, their saintly and heroic actions achieved only rarely as
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remarkable, almost blessed events. The saint and the hero become not only 
extraordinary, but are included in a category of human being and human action that 
also becomes strangely unnatural in Urmson’s account because the saint and hero are 
so unusual and their actions so unexpected. The moral ideal that these individuals 
and their actions represent is also attained through the exceptional resistance to self- 
interest and fear, a resistance which is avoided by most people because of the 
discomfort and pain accompanying such conduct. The moral perfection of the saint 
or hero would then not naturally be sought after as a model of behavior by most 
people, although they are highly admired. Urmson, too, therefore shows a lack of 
any real understanding of moral perfection as a valuable standard that enhances the 
worth of every human being, not just a few.
Owen Flanagan’s essay is particularly ridiculous as he finds it so difficult to 
commit to any consistent, stable view of what moral perfection is that he 
systematically argues the moral and moral philosophy out of existence altogether, 
concluding that morality simply cannot be defined in such an individualistic and 
pluralistic society such as ours. Human beings vary so greatly and their many 
points of view diverge so broadly that the competing claims of what is good and best 
cannot possibly be resolved under any single conception of morality. Moreover, 
Flanagan’s essay clearly illustrates how highly modem Western society values this 
multiplicity of views in a way that resists finding any kind of moral consensus. 
Flanagan, therefore, erroneously and unwittingly permits a dangerous corruption of 
moral goodness, calling such corruption acceptable and even admirable. Finally, 
Antony Duff’s essay is a bizarre mixture of various philosophies, a kind of Kantian 
neo-Platonism which is a clear example of the chaotic and fragmented overlay of 
moral traditions that Alasdair MacIntyre refers to in After Virtue. Although Duff 
enthusiastically embraces moral perfection as a positive ideal, his portrait of the
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morally perfect person as coldly detached and dead to the world depicts a very 
abnormal human being and human life, as well as a thoroughly uninspiring and 
uninviting ideal.
The thought of these four moral philosophers and their rejection of moral 
perfection reflects the influence of another tradition-modern liberalism, the 
prominent philosophy underlying much of the moral, legal, and political thought of 
modem times in the Western world. Liberalism has evolved from ideas which 
developed in the Enlightenment and from philosophers such as John Locke, Thomas 
Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, Kant, Hume, and most recently John Rawls. It is 
primarily a deontological ethic whereby principles of morality are founded upon 
moral rights that arise from moral rules and laws of obligation and duty. In the 
case of liberalism, the focal moral principles are the primacy of justice in all moral 
and political ideals and the supreme,sanctity of individual rights.17 Modem 
liberalism demands that justice, as the standard by which all values are assessed and 
regulated, be considered prior to all other values; it derives and is justified by no 
other value or conception of the good. Within this context of justice, one must 
therefore seek out the right rather than the good, for conceptions of what constitutes 
the good differ so widely among people that only in this way can individual rights 
and freedom be secured equally for all. No one point of view of the good can be 
imposed upon others. Hence, justice is an end in itself, separate and independent 
from all conceptions of the good, and it is justice which actually defines and limits 
the good, in opposition to teleology where a particular good is prior to all.
Parallel with the independence of justice, the separation of the right from the 
good, and the priority of the right over the good is liberalism’s insistence upon the 
autonomy of the individual self, which is also separate and independent from its 
values and ends. The self is considered to be prior to the objects of the world and,
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therefore, detached from objective experience and surrounding circumstance in a 
way which allows the human being complete and absolute freedom to choose and 
pursue his various individual needs and ends, however he wishes in accordance with 
his own private conception of the good; that is, as long as he is not unjust. So 
completely free is this autonomous self that one’s identity cannot be described by 
one’s own values or ends, or even in any way by one’s personal attributes and 
possessions. In liberal theory the absolute freedom to choose is considered to be far 
more important in securing justice and in doing what is right than the particular ends 
to which one would choose to aspire, and therefore attributes of the self and its ends 
have no relevance. The liberal perspective attempts to maintain a neutral stance 
indifferent to theories of human nature and the meaning of a good life and simply is 
concerned with promoting a justice which will fairly harmonize the rights of all.
The individual thus can choose to construct his own meaning from a world that has 
no prior moral order or value which can be forced upon him against his will. In 
this way an individual is presumably completely free to express his own true nature 
and is also assumed to be free from contingency and happenstance which would 
compromise this ultimate freedom to choose his own fate. Individualistic values 
and the differences among people therefore become paramount and are not to be 
violated or coerced.
When these fundamentals of liberal philosophy are known it becomes much 
easier to understand how philosophers such as Susan Wolf think as they do and just 
how they are confused about moral perfection. Wolf and Flanagan, in particular, 
seem strangely influenced by liberal theories. In their essays one senses a strong 
resistance to having to adhere to any standard of the good outside of the individual 
self, for both of these thinkers defend their thesis in terms of the overriding 
importance of individual choice and values. They retreat quickly, almost
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instinctively, from the morally ideal and protest mightily what appears to them in 
moral perfection to be a coerced value system. It is as if they were saying, "no one 
can tell me how to live my life, except my own self," a self which is automatically 
assumed to be the autonomous liberal self.18 Michael J. Sander s critique of 
liberalism, however, has pointed out the major flaws in liberal theory, illustrating 
the deficiencies in these modem moral philosopher’s arguments. These criticisms 
also invite a consideration of Aristotle and a standard of moral perfection.
Justice is primary in liberal philosophy because of the desire to accomodate or 
eliminate the tension which arises from the plurality inherent in the human race.19 
Because of the many natural differences among people, the potential for conflict is 
always present. Justice as fairness and co-operation is therefore essential if one 
wants to live in a peaceful society. Sandel, however, argues that the justice 
liberalism envisions is flawed because the distance it requires we stand from our 
human circumstance in order to gain the proper neutrality and independence from 
our ends and attachments and thus become freely choosing agents goes too far, that 
is, it is too extreme, creating severe disadvantages which outweigh the advantages 
liberal theory claims this distancing provides. He asserts that we are not truly 
liberated and empowered to choose, as liberal theory promises, but instead 
dispossessed, disempowered, and prevented from any meaningful self-reflection and 
consequent self-knowledge which would broaden and deepen our character and 
moral worth. Liberalism fails both in its theoretical foundations and, practically, in 
its application to our actual moral experience.
Modem liberalism’s conception of the totally autonomous self—"the author of 
the only moral meaning there is"20-means, according to Sandel, that the self must 
stand at a certain distance from itself, unencumbered by what he calls "constitutive 
attachments," those attributes of the self which partly define, or "make up" one’s
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identity, such as enduring loyalties, convictions, interests, personal history and 
connections to family, friends, community, and nation. This disencumberance and 
detachment of the personal self is an especially recent addition to the liberal 
tradition, yet it reflects the deontological world view which sees the universe, that 
which is outside the self, as a place with no purposeful order, no intrinsic meaning, 
and therefore, detached from any significant connection with the self. The 
subjective self must then construct the only reality and order there can be. Sandel 
claims, however, that being so detached and "stripped of constitutive attachments," 
in reality, disempowers the individual. With one’s choices constrained by 
antecedently derived principles of justice which appear to come from nowhere, and 
which are so detached from the context of one’s actual human circumstances in the 
world, one does not truly construct the right or make meaning of the world, or 
choose one’s own ends; instead, one is involved merely in deliberating and choosing 
among personal preferences and attempting to satisfy one’s various desires as best 
one can according to the circumstances at hand, with little differentiation as to their 
moral worth. Although such preferential choice is intended to give a sense of 
control over one’s life, unfortunately, it serves instead to bring a superficiality and, 
ultimately, an unstable arbitrariness to one’s life’s choices. Since this independent 
self is also dispossessed of ownership of its personal attributes and talents as, 
according to Rawls’ theory of liberalism, these belong to society to use for its 
benefit, one’s independence is actually denied to one. Independence is, therefore, 
only an illusion. Moreover, any value for merit, considerations of desert, is 
nullified. Quality of persons appears to have very little meaning in liberal theory, 
or, at least, a much lower priority, since all attention is directed toward whatever 
furthers the principles of justice agreed upon by the society, and judgments based 
upon merit are seen as unfair and unjust, a violation of the principles of liberal
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democratic equality, or egalitarianism.
The focus in liberal theory and in the liberal conception of the self is, 
therefore, always outward in its attempt to construct meaning and order in the 
universe outside of the self. Yet, as Sandel points out, no consideration is given to 
the total context of our human circumstance, or the moral worth of the ends we 
choose, or the intrinsic quality of the persons we are. There is, in short, no 
accompanying balance of looking inward to who one is in any serious, deep, and 
abiding sense, but only a view toward and a choosing among what one has and 
wants. Hence, from a liberal perspective, our life in the world consists primarily of 
our products of choice, which remain apart from a very private and unknowable 
self, rather than interactions and engagements connected intimately and coherently 
with who we are as unique individuals. Sandel thus argues that liberalism fails to 
describe properly our moral experience. We lose too much of moral significance 
when we stand so far apart from those aims and attachments which continually 
engage and transform us throughout our lives and are so crucial to understanding 
ourselves in any deep sense. "To imagine a person incapable of constitutive 
attachments such as these," Sandel remarks, "is not to conceive an ideally free and 
rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral 
depth. "21 To be a person of character and to have moral depth, he goes on to 
explain, requires the capacity for self-reflection; but in liberal theory, "where the 
self is unencumbered and essentially dispossessed, no person is left for ^//-reflection 
to reflect upon. "22
When acting out of qualities of character, our choices of ends and the good 
tend not to be arbitrary, but are shaped according to constant reference to and re­
examination of our individual identities, which are inescapably made up to a large 
extent of our diverse "constitutive attachments," those particular conditions and
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surrounding circumstances of our experience and existence which partly define who 
we are as distinct individuals. Sandel therefore concludes that we cannot and 
should not stand apart from these vital parts of ourselves because throughout a life­
time of continually inquiring within upon the nature of one’s self and the self’s 
relationship to its .attachments amid surrounding circumstances allows for a deeper, 
more complete self-understanding and a firm, more stable knowing of one’s place in 
the world, the moral implications and responsibilities one incurs within it. This 
moral "self-searching" and self-knowledge develops the capacity for moral depth, 
which can only enhance the quality and, therefore, the meaning of our moral 
decisions and choices. Finally, it enhances the quality of ourselves as persons, and 
our lives. It is this attention and concern for moral quality which liberalism tends 
to neglect and which weakens considerably its value as a moral theory.
Liberalism is also severely weakened in its use as a moral theory by its aim to 
eliminate or contain conflict.23 Susan Mendus notes that although liberal theory 
was "bom of conflict" and fully acknowledges that there are conflicting values 
which are incompatible and irreconcilable, it nevertheless attempts to "tame" conflict 
in ways which ironically tend to deny its significance. It does this, she says, in two 
ways: first, by separating the public from the private and privileging the public 
domain in any conflict between the two, and second, by substituting principles of 
justice for the operation of fate. By fate, Mendus means the operation of 
contingency and those factors in life and the world which we cannot control.
According to liberal theory, in private life the individual is free to pursue his 
own conception of the good, but in public life all conceptions of the good must serve 
principles of the right, or justice. Justice must therefore always "win" whenever 
these values conflict. Thus, in actuality, the priority of justice tends to deny that 
the world is made up of a plurality of diverse and conflicting values, for by valuing
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justice so exclusively above all other values, as it does in prefering the public sphere 
over the private, liberalism refuses to acknowledge the authority of the opposing 
claim, and it is as if the opposition ceases to exist. The resolution of the conflict is 
then, in a certain sense, incomplete, since there is a failure to recognize the value of 
what is lost on the opposing side; it denies a consideration of a whole moral truth 
and a vision of the total moral order. It is also true that the distinction between 
public justice and private moral values is not always so easily drawn. Mendus 
gives as a case in point the example of the current abortion controversy, a clear mix 
of public and private values and evidence of a pluralism about what is right and just.
Liberalism is also similarly mistaken in its attempts to make a clear distinction 
between injustice and misfortune. Famine, poverty, unemployment, and the 
vicissitudes of the stock market are defined by some as accidents of nature or the 
contingency of circumstance. Mendus, however, argues that these circumstances 
may also be a result of a particular political ideology, or the role one chooses to 
occupy in that political context. Liberalism, she says, tends "to desire to rid the 
world of such random forces and to deny that we are, any longer, under the thrall of 
circumstances which are outside our control. " 24 Such an attitude is valuable when 
an acknowledgement of the responsibility of political policy can correct disaster and 
misfortune, but it is dangerous to believe that we can escape all disaster and the 
contingency of circumstance, or fate. With such a belief, Mendus’ argument 
implies that, again, we will discard something of value and corrupt our attitude 
toward the moral world and our place in it, for this belief allows liberalism to 
declare conflicts for which we cannot find solutions as therefore necessary and just, 
or not unjust. Poverty in the Third World, Mendus explains, can therefore be 
deemed just, which is a tragic and cruel misinterpretation of justice. She suggests 
that justice cannot always be the ultimate solution, that, at times, our sense of justice
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and injustice must be suspended, and that we must deal with the ambiguities of 
conflict and value more truthfully and with a much more wholesome awareness of 
their moral significance. By placing justice over all other values, we blind 
ourselves to a broader system of values, to a larger, more demanding moral order 
within which we exist and to which we are responsible, even when we are unable to 
completely understand or reconcile the conflicts inherent within it.
The influences of liberalism thus create serious deficiencies in modem moral 
theory. As we have seen, its tendency to separate and prioritize values in service of 
a supreme value--justice--is problematic; As the right is separated from the good, 
so the autonomous self is separated from its ends and values and any meaningful 
connection to the external world and objective circumstances, and thus, ultimately, 
from a larger moral truth and world order. Having been so disconnected from an 
external context and dispossessed of the knowledge of a stable and richly 
"constituted" self, an individual cannot make moral choices of a similarly rich and 
stable nature. By denying, in the name of justice, the natural tension between 
conflicting values inherent in the plurality of the world, liberalism has also removed 
the motivation to reflect deeply about moral issues and to acknowledge completely 
their significance; more importantly, it removes the struggle to search for the wisest 
and best of all possible moral choices. A moral vision described in such terms as 
this is therefore incomplete, showing as it does a lack of depth and quality, a lack 
which is surely reflected in the arguments of philosophers, such as Susan Wolf, who 
are influenced by liberal values. The moral vision contained in Aristotle’s ethics, 
however, to which I shall now turn, strives for completion and the depth of moral 
perfection, where the human being must reach toward the best that is within him to 
live the truly moral life.
Chapter 2 
Aristotle’s Concept of Moral Perfection
The objections to perfection that we have seen in the previous discussion about 
the essays of four modem moral philosophers appear to be two-fold. The first 
objection rejects moral perfection on the grounds that such a standard would mean 
that we all must be the same. If this is true, the philosophers appear to say, we 
would all lose our individuality having to adhere to a single standard of being. But 
everyone, they protest, is not the same, nor can they ever be; we are not equal in 
our attributes, natural talents, or life circumstances. Moreover, diversity enriches 
our world. Our differences and the tensions resulting from them give a vital 
creativity to life in the world. The second objection against moral perfection 
concerns the belief that perfection is an unattainable standard. The objectors reason 
that if the human being aspires to an unattainable ideal, he will be constantly 
frustrated with his inability to reach his goal. The ideal is therefore useless and 
unproductive, an unworkable solution to the problem of living well as a human 
being. Aristotle’s concept of moral perfection, however, arises from a much more 
sound understanding of perfection. His moral theory responds to modem objections 
to perfection by admitting degrees of morality to standards of conduct; yet, it does 
this without accepting mediocrity or corrupting the moral good. As we shall see, 
Aristotle acknowledges and honors human diversity. There is value for each and 
every member of the human species in striving for the best that he can be.
We must therefore take the ideal of moral perfection seriously. What does 
moral perfection mean? Going back to the origin of the word ‘perfect,’ one comes
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not to the ancient Greeks, but to the Romans and the Latin language. The word 
‘perfect’ derives from the Latin compound peifectus, a participial form meaning 
"having been done through" or "made through," and by extension "having been 
completed," "finished," or "ended." Perfection thus denotes ‘completion’ in its 
most radical sense. How different moral perfection becomes when perfection is 
imaged in terms of completion! For completion also derives from a Latin 
compound, compleo, which means "to fill up," "to make full," or "to fulfill." With 
this idea of completion in mind, the image of perfection no longer draws the world 
together into a narrow, restrictive point, but instead it is as if the world suddenly 
opens up into the fullness of possibility, satisfaction, and abundance. Although our 
word ‘perfection’ comes to us via the Latin language and not the Greek, it is, 
nevertheless, this view of perfection understood as completed fulfillment which is 
the basis of moral perfection in Aristotle’s ethics and ancient Greek morality, and it 
is this meaning which makes all the difference in achieving the ideal.
In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle outlines his teleological view of 
human nature. In accordance with the universal natural law, all things aim at some 
good which is their own perfection, or completion—the end or tsKoq for which the 
thing exists. The human being aims at svSaipoda, which can be translated as 
"happiness," but is better understood in the Greek mentality as human flourishing, 
or human completion. Thus Aristotle defines this ultimate good for man in Book I, 
Chapter 7:
to oivOp&icivov ayocOov ipvxvs evepyeia yivsrcti tear oipsrqv, si Ss rXsiovg ai 
apsToti Kara rr\v apiorrjv noii ts\ siotcltt\v. en  5’ sv @ia) tsXefw.
The human good turns out to be an activity of the soul on the level of virtuosity 
and if there are several kinds of virtuosity, then on the level of the best and 
most perfect kind. Moreover, (this level and kind of activity must be carried 
on) in a complete life. (1098al6-18) 25
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The Greek equivalent of the Latin perfectus, from which our word ‘perfect’ 
comes, is Tshstog and is used here in Aristotle’s definition twice, translated both by 
"perfect" and "complete. " 26 The term translated as "best"—apiorrju—is also related 
etymologically to apsr^v, which is rendered in this translation as "virtuosity. " 27 
The human good is thus closely associated with conceptions of perfection, 
completion, virtuosity, and the best. By activity of the soul, Aristotle means 
activity of those parts of the soul that participate in a rational principle, that capacity 
of the human being which sets the human being apart from all other living things.
In short, the human being fully realizes his happiness, that is, his intended potential 
and completeness as a human being, through a virtuosity of his skill in being a 
human being—a virtuosity which is performed at the highest level and in its most 
complete form.
What then, for Aristotle, constitutes completeness as a human being? How 
does the human being achieve virtuosity in being human? In this first book of his 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle declares that the function of the human being is more 
than just living. Ultimately, it is to live the active life of the rational part of the 
human being, or literally, in the Greek, "that part which possesses Xoyoq," or 
"articulate reason" (1098a3-4).28 This rational part, however, is divided between 
two natural aspects in the human soul It should be noted that in the Greek,
‘soul’ has a much broader application than simply ‘soul’ or ‘mind,’ for it represents 
"the whole vitality of any living creature. " 29 The soul therefore encompasses the 
total life spirit of the human being. It is then a much fuller and richer 
understanding of the soul than that associated with the Christian conception.
Aristotle describes this life spirit, or soul, as consisting of two parts—a non-rational 
and a rational element, both of which are further divided into parts.
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The non-rational part of the soul is also divided into two parts: one part that 
causes nutrition and growth which is common to all living things, but which does 
not partake in Xoyog, Or a rational principle at all, and another part which is the 
appetitive or desiring part of the human soul. This desiring part does in fact 
participate in Xoyog in the sense that it can listen to and obey the rational principle; 
it can be persuaded and guided by the higher authority of reason and understanding 
residing in the purely rational part of the soul, that part which actually possesses and 
exercises Xoyog itself (1102a28-1103a3). As was made clear in his definition of 
happiness above, Aristotle emphasizes that one’s perfection or completion as a 
human being can only be achieved when the activity of the soul is performed at the 
level of virtuosity; for, as Aristotle believes, it is only by performing one’s function 
(as a human being) as best as one can that it is possible to reach one’s TsXoq and 
fulfill one’s true human potential (1106al5-25). Because of the double division of 
the human soul, however, there is a corresponding division of human virtuosities 
which are derived from the two different parts. The intellectual virtuosities—such 
as theoretical wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom—virtuosities of thought 
and understanding, develop from the purely rational element of the soul, that part 
which actually possesses Xoyog and has the capacity to reason and think things 
through (rag 8t,avor}Tikaq ocpsrdg). The moral virtuosities—such as gentleness, 
self-control, and courage—virtuosities of character (rag riOiKOtq aperdq), arise from 
the non-rational, appetitive element of the human soul, the part which merely gives 
heed to and can obey the leadership of the rational element (1103a4-l 1). Moral 
virtuosity, or perfection, therefore, is a perfection of the desiring mode of the 
human being and is a subtle combination of rational and non-rational elements.
There are serious problems with Aristotle’s account of the parts of the human
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soul in the Nicomachean Ethics. There are inconsistencies in his various 
descriptions and we must assume much of which we cannot be sure. It is 
important, however, to understand in a general way Aristotle’s concept of human 
psychology because he bases his account of human virtuosity on the development of 
a virtuosity of these various aspects of the human soul. Moreover, because the 
human soul is viewed as a total life spirit and because Aristotle describes the aspects 
of the soul that in particular define our "humanness" as aspects that operate together, 
he succeeds in giving a wholeness and depth to moral perfection and the human 
being in a way in which other moral theories cannot. The quality of the 
"humanness" of the human being is a nebulous one and difficult to translate 
adequately into words. This difficulty is reflected in Aristotle’s account of the soul, 
its various aspects and their corresponding virtuosities. Because Aristotle must talk 
about the rational element in the human being as a fundamental part of moral life, it 
is easy to over-intellectualize Aristotle’s ethics, turning the human being into a 
machine that constantly calculates what is good to do and what is not. By 
interpreting Aristotle in this way, one loses what is most valuable in Aristotle’s 
ethical theory and also what is most valuable and human in the human being.
Moral perfection, with an emphasis upon the moral, is foremost a virtuosity in being 
human, a virtuosity that includes a view of the human being that is whole and 
complete, rounded out and deepened by the complexity of moral character and 
worth.
Moral virtuosity is brought to perfection through the development and 
acquisition of appropriate habits and is not the result of teaching, as are the 
intellectual virtuosities. Aristotle points out the close connection these habits have 
to one’s personal character by remarking that the word for "habit" (sOoq) and the
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word for "ethical" (1)01/07), which is derived from the word for "character" (i}0og), 
are related (1103al5-19). The quality of one’s character, how one performs as a 
human being, is thus determined by constant practice and eventual habituation of 
virtuous activities. We do not naturally possess these good habits however, but 
only the capacity and potential to form them; and therefore, Aristotle states that this 
innate potential can only be realized through practice in acting in accordance with 
right reason (/card t o v  opQov Xoyop irpotTTsiv 1103b33), until finally these habits 
become fixed as a disposition of mind and character (etjig). As fixed habits, 
virtuous activities are then so ingrained that they can be performed as if they had 
been done without thinking (1103al9ff). Moreover, because some degree of 
pleasure or pain accompanies every human emotion and activity, pleasure and pain 
are intimately connected with our habituating ourselves to perform virtuous actions. 
It is, Aristotle says, because of the pursuit of and avoidance of the wrong kind of 
pleasures and pains, or by going about this in the wrong way, that human beings 
become corrupt (<f>ai)Xoi) (1104b21-22). Before we have become properly 
habituated in virtuous activity, pleasure will cause us to perform base actions and the 
avoidance of pain will keep us from performing noble and good actions (1104b 10-
12). We must be trained from childhood, Aristotle argues, to feel pleasure and 
pain at the proper things (1104bl2-14). We must receive a correct education, one 
which will help guide us to make choices conducive to fulfilling our proper function 
and completion as human beings.
In Book VI of his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle clarifies what he means by 
"acting in accordance with right reason," explaining how this relates to our human 
virtuosity. He describes the parts and divisions of the strictly rational part of the 
human soul and the corresponding intellectual virtues. 30 As with the non-rational
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element of the soul, the rational element also consists of two divisions; one part 
which apprehends fundamental, eternal, and invariable facts and principles of 
reality, and a second part which apprehends the contingent and variable principles. 
These faculties are also called, respectively, the scientific, or the faculty having to 
do with knowledge (smaTijfj-opiKov) and the calculative, or deliberative (Xoyicmicop), 
while the virtuosities which develop from each are correspondingly called theoretical 
wisdom (oo<j>ia) and practical wisdom (fipoprjcnq). Both kinds of wisdom function 
through reasoning processes, since, as was mentioned above, they both possess 
Xoyog in the strict sense. In the human soul these two intellectual elements 
together, as well as sensation and desire, control human actions, yet the ultimate 
purpose of the intellectual faculties is the attainment of truth (1139al-20)~the truth 
of both unchanging and changing perspectives of reality. The rational aspect of the 
human being, therefore, seeks out truth, that is, conformity with the facts of 
experience and reality. Moreover, the fact that the attainment of truth is the 
purpose of these particular aspects of the human soul which define our "human" 
nature implies that Aristotle intends for the human being to acquire a moral depth of 
integrity, honesty, and sincerity in his actions by means of these faculties of the 
human soul.
As is implied in the word "practical" which comes from the ancient Greek 
word for action (-wpa^iq), practical wisdom (<j>p6ur}oiq) is directed toward human 
action. It is the rational faculty specifically concerned with truth in moral conduct— 
how and when we should act or not act in order to do what is just, noble, and good. 
Choice, Aristotle asserts, is the cause of all action, while the cause of choice is 
desire and reasoning aligned together toward some end. Aristotle further explains 
that for our moral conduct to be truly good, our choice must also be good
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(CTTouSato!)—good, that is, in the sense of reflecting an earnest and serious attitude 
toward attaining what is truly good and important in life. 31 It therefore follows that 
if our choices are to be good, our reasoning (X0 7 0 ?) must be true and our desire 
correct. Our reasoning must affirm what our desire directs us toward. Practical 
wisdom is this ability to discern truth in harmony with correct desire, that desire for 
the particular pleasures which may be obtained in pursuing the highest human good, 
namely, fulfillment and completion as a human being (1139a21-1139bl3).
Practical wisdom, then, is concerned with the right means to fulfill our proper 
human function and end. Aristotle insists that we cannot fulfill our essential 
function as human beings without practical wisdom and that we cannot acquire 
practical wisdom without moral virtuosity, for moral virtuosity enables us to choose 
the right ends, while practical wisdom makes us choose the right and appropriate 
actions conducive to those ends (1144a6ff). Aristotle often alludes to the image of 
the archer and his target when he speaks of this relationship. The target is the 
ultimate human good and it must be clearly visible to the archer for him properly to 
aim his bow and arrow and hit the target. The experience and skill with which the 
archer uses his bow and hits the bullseye with his arrow functions similarly to 
practical wisdom as it finds the target of the human good moral virtuosity provides. 
This inseparable combination of moral virtuosity, the capacity to know and choose 
the good, and practical wisdom, the discernment of the right means to attain the 
good, is, in part, what Aristotle means by the phrase "acting in accordance with 
right reason." It is also what vice, or wickedness (fioxOrjpia), destroys, for only 
the truly good can know what the highest human good is, since wickedness distorts 
what is good and causes the human being to be mistaken about the fundamental 
principles of moral action (1144a33-37). The greater the degree of vice the less
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clearly will the target of the good be seen and the human being will be much less 
able to aim at the appropriate end for his actions, being unable even to know how to 
act to hit and achieve the aim of living well as a human being.
Since there may be many different means to an end, practical wisdom is the 
ability to deliberate well about the particulars of a circumstance and choose the best 
possible means to an end which is both good and advantageous for oneself in the 
immediate circumstances and for oneself as a human being. Yet, practical wisdom 
is much more than simply the ability to discern the right means to the right ends. 
Practical wisdom, Aristotle states cryptically, is also not merely intellectual and 
rational (1140b28-30), although he demonstrates that it qualifies as the virtuosity 
which belongs to the intellectual and calculative part of the human soul. In Chapter 
12 of Book VI Aristotle asks of what use is practical wisdom in the moral life of the 
human being, as if he himself is puzzled about the relationship between the moral 
and intellectual parts of the human being. Simply by knowing what is good and 
just does not make one more capable of acting good and just, he says. Moral 
virtuosity is a habit of character; the good person will therefore be good naturally, 
he will not need to ask the advice of. his practical wisdom in order to perform noble 
and just actions. Moreover, in the following chapter, Chapter 13, Aristotle 
describes how it is possible to perform actions as a morally good person should, and 
yet not actually be just and good, as, for example, when someone does what is good 
and right unwillingly or in ignorance. This is a kind of false,"accidental" morality. 
In such cases a person clearly does not perform his actions from choice or for the 
sake of the acts themselves, two motivations which for Aristotle are crucial criteria 
for true goodness. The relationship between practical wisdom and moral character 
is obviously a complicated one; however, it is upon this intricate relationship that
35
the human significance of moral goodness and perfection lies.
At the end of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle has decided that 
practical wisdom does indeed produce a moral effect. As he has stated previously 
both practical wisdom and moral virtuosity fulfill the nature of the human being by 
completing his true function as a human being. Literally, in the Greek, we can see 
Aristotle’s image of the archer aiming surely and confidently at his target, as he says 
moral virtuosity "makes the mark (target) right (t o p  o k o t t o p  icoisi opBop), while 
practical wisdom makes the means to the mark (rd irpoq t o v t o p )  right (1144a8),
But Aristotle says there is also something more beyond this particular sense of moral 
virtuosity and practical wisdom. He now speaks of virtuosity and goodness in what 
he calls the true, full sense (Kvpia 1144b4).32 Everyone, Aristotle explains, is bom 
with the capacity for a natural kind of moral virtuosity, moral qualities which we 
already possess at birth. In order to possess a higher quality of moral goodness, 
one which expresses itself in the true, full sense of a completely developed moral 
virtuosity, there must, however, be the addition of some intellectual awareness, or 
intelligence, in moral conduct in order for us to choose our actions for the sake of 
the acts themselves (1144alff). Aristotle insists, therefore, that a perfected moral 
virtuosity is not only performed in accordance with right reason ( k o c to c  t o p  opBop 
Koyop), or practical wisdom, but that it is actually united with, or co-operates with 
this rational principle (psrce opBop \oyov 1144b26-30). Socrates was mistaken, 
Aristotle declares, when he said that all the moral virtuosities are forms of practical 
wisdom, although he was right in saying that they cannot exist without practical 
wisdom (1144al8). By closely uniting virtuosities of parts of the rational and non- 
rational aspects of the human soul, Aristotle makes moral action more complete and 
whole, reflecting more fully the humanness of our human nature. In other words,
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to be completely and fully manifested in its perfected form* moral virtuosity, or 
goodness, cannot be simply a blind habit that one performs. There must be a kind 
of conscious mindfulness to doing good, in a way which exhibits our humanity at its 
best.
Much of the force of Aristotle’s meaning in these passages is contained in the
word Kvpioq which he uses to characterize this most genuine form of human
virtuosity. The word itself recalls a famous passage in Aristotle’s Politics. 33
Aristotle is discussing the members of the household and household management.
He is wondering about the moral virtuosity of slaves, women, and children. They
are human beings after all, he muses, and so they must also have moral virtuosities.
But he asks, of what sort are they? Aristotle decides that there are differences in
the virtuosities of the ruler and those who are ruled, just as, he says, the parts of the
soul that by nature rule and are ruled are different and have different virtuosities.
There are naturally various classes of rulers and the ruled, hence Aristotle states:
aXXov yap Tpoirov t o  eXevOepov t o v  bovXov apxsi noil t o  appev t o v  dr/Xeoq n a i  
avr\p iratboq. nai iraoiv evvirapxsi pev ra  popta rijq ifrvxys, aXX’ evvwapxsi 
Stot<j>ep6vTG)q* o pev, yap bovXoq oX&q o v k  s x s i  t o  ( S o v X s v t i k o v ,  t o  be OrjXv 
exsi pev, aXX’ anvpov, o be iralq exei pep, aXX' aTsXeq.
For the free rules die slave, the male the female, and the man the child in a 
different way. And all possess the various parts of the soul, but possess them 
in different ways; for the slave has not got the deliberative part at all, and the 
female has it, but without full authority, while the child has it, but in an 
undeveloped form. (1260al 0-14)
This is, of course, a very controversial passage in this day and age. Many are 
offended by Arisotle’s attitude on slavery and women. However, he was a man of 
his times and influenced by his own cultural context. More will be said about this 
below. Nevertheless, the offensiveness should not detract from the importance of 
the passage to an understanding of moral virtuosity in the full, true sense noted by
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Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, nor to the value of Aristotle’s ethics as a 
whole. The slave is the least free, therefore he is totally deficient in the ruling part 
of the soul (and we assume the corresponding virtuosity)—the deliberative. The 
female has this part, but it is anvpov, an alpha-privative form of the adjective nvpioq 
which negates its meaning. The ruling part of the woman’s soul exists, but it is not 
authoritative, not full or complete in the highest sense, a completeness which is 
manifested only in the ruler—the male and master of the household in this passage. 
The woman in her nature as a woman does not exercise the deliberative part of the 
soul as completely or as commandingly as the male, her husband in the household, 
although she has the capacity to do so. Aristotle believes this deliberative part of 
the soul in a woman is not, however, as fully activated or as dominant as what is 
found in the soul of a ruler. The child, of course, is as yet undeveloped and 
incomplete by nature of his being a child, an immature human being. The parts of 
his soul and their corresponding virtuosities will also be similarly immature.
This hierarchical scheme of degrees of completeness in the activity of the parts 
of the human soul also correspond to the completeness of moral virtuosity as it 
manifests in moral activity. The highest, most complete virtuosity—practical 
wisdom united and operating together with genuine goodness of character—is most 
praiseworthy, demonstrating a quality of moral conduct and character which is the 
human best. Other degrees of moral virtuosity-qualities of character and action 
that are truly praiseworthy within their own specific nature and circumstance-may 
yet be characterized as less supreme and complete because the particular virtuosity 
has the capacity to be exercised at what Aristotle considers to be an even higher 
level of activity and completeness. This is not to suggest that we should think that 
women, children, and slaves are inferior as human beings, but we need to
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understand that the moral virtuosities do vary, becoming less or more praiseworthy 
as they exhibit, or do not exhibit, higher degrees of development and fulfilment of 
our human nature. This must be emphasized because it would be a mistake to 
understand Aristotle’s moral theory as a theory which advocates accepting the 
mediocre as a standard for moral conduct, simply because Aristotle does admit a 
certain range of conduct that can be defined as virtuous.
Aristotle tries to illustrate this point by comparing cleverness with practical 
wisdom, a comparison that he states is similar to the relationship of our natural 
moral virtuosity to that which is most true and most fully expressive of our human 
virtuosity (NE VI. 12 1144a25ff). Cleverness {heivorqq) is a praiseworthy human 
trait. It also devises means to ends as does practical wisdom, iand as such 
cleverness is therefore very similar to practical wisdom in the same way our natural 
virtuosity is similar to a more supreme, fully developed moral virtuosity. If a 
person’s cleverness is used for base purposes, it is clearly inferior to practical 
wisdom and no longer praiseworthy. Practical wisdom cannot be defined as 
practical wisdom without its interaction with true moral virtuosity. The genuinely 
good person will not aim at base goals, his moral wisdom will not allow him to 
exercise base means to attain his ends. Whereas our natural moral virtuosity can 
resemble true virtuosity, it clearly is not so highly developed when compared with 
the actions of the person who chooses his acts with a full understanding of what he 
does, consciousnessly deliberating his choices, choosing the acts because they are 
good and right, and acting in accord with his character.
Alasdair MacIntyre comments that Aristotle’s account of the relationship 
between practical wisdom and moral virtuosity is "notably elliptical and in need of 
paraphrase and interpretation."34 MacIntyre himself interprets Aristotle’s account
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to mean that the deliberations of practical wisdom about what is best to do in a 
particular circumstance include deliberations that concern the moral agent’s 
character, namely, judgments as to what is good for someone of his particular sort 
of character to do and to be; and that "an agent’s capacity to make and act upon 
such judgments will depend upon what intellectual and moral virtues and vices 
compose his or her character. " ? 5 MacIntyre holds that, from the Aristotelian point 
of view, ethics is all about an "education of the passions" whereby theoretical 
reasoning provides the human being with the ability to identify his rsKoq and 
therefore pursue it, while practical wisdom identifies the right action to perform in 
each particular time and place. 36 He also recognizes that Aristotle describes an 
intimate relationship between the moral virtuosities and practical wisdom which 
creates a kind of moral life that is much more than a means to an end relationship, 
as he says:
But the exercise of the virtues is not in this sense a means to the end of the 
good for man. For what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life 
lived at its best, and the exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part 
of such a life, not a mere preparatory exercise to secure such a life. We thus 
cannot characterize the good for man adequately without already having made 
reference to the virtues. 57
MacIntyre also makes some enlightening remarks on the interrelationship of the
moral and intellectual virtuosities in his interpretation of the way Aristotle describes
our moral education, statements which bear directly on Aristotle’s own conclusion
about this interrelationship as discussed above. MacIntyre states:
As we transform our initial naturally given dispositions into virtues of 
character, we do so by gradually coming to exercise those dispositions kata ton 
orthon logon. The exercise of intelligence is what makes the crucial difference 
between a natural disposition of a certain kind and the corresponding virtue. 
Conversely the exercise of practical intelligence requires the presence of the 
virtues of character; otherwise it degenerates into or remains from the outset 
merely a certain cunning capacity for linking means to any end rather than to 
those ends which are genuine goods for man. 38
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MacIntyre thus concludes that, according to Aristotle, the moral virtuosities of 
character cannot then be separated from intelligence (intellectual virtuosity). He 
adds that this is a view "at odds" with that prevailing now in the modem world, a 
view in which intelligence does not require knowledge of the good, nor goodness in 
the possessor. Modem social practices and theory disconnect and separate human 
character and the intellect.
While much of the moral significance, depth, and completeness .which marks 
Aristotle’s ethical theory comes from his emphasis on quality in moral conduct and 
quality of moral character, it is not immediately apparent that this insistence on 
quality is founded upon sound metaphysical assumptions. In his ideal of human 
flourishing, or completion, we see Aristotle’s own biological metaphysics, where he 
envisions the human being much in the same way one views a growing plant. As a 
plant grows and develops, it pushes into the earth for nutrients and out toward the 
sun for energy, utilizing all of its capacities as a plant to mature fully and beautifully 
into the form it was meant to be. When it has reached its full potential after a 
lifespan of striving to be, the plant achieves completion or fulfillment. 39 In 
Aristotle’s ethics, the individual human being in his nature as a communal animal 
completes himself and flourishes by growing and maturing in a well-ordered 
community which nurtures him and enables him to form good habits and dispositions 
through the skilled use of his capacity for reason. This distinctively human power 
to think things through enables him to judge and choose appropriately what is the 
good and the best thing to do at any given moment. If a particular individual 
should choose not to pursue the highest human good in the use of his natural 
capacities and remain instead on what Aristotle describes as the level of a cow, in a 
life aimed only at sensual pleasure and immediate goals (1095M9-21), he fails to
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achieve the moral, ethical life made available to him by nature as a human being.
He can then be defined as morally imperfect in his denial of his own human 
birthright.40
Underlying Aristotle’s use of the term aperr/ as virtuosity in his definition of 
human happiness are also vestiges of the Homeric warrior’s moral code, a code 
which further reveals a deep connection for Aristotle with the cosmos. The 
Homeric warrior’s purpose in life was to exhibit a supreme virtuosity on the 
battlefield, thus demonstrating an almost god-like perfection in himself and his craft 
as he constantly risked his own mortality in a dance with death. The warrior 
attached great importance to riprj, honors given to him by his peers in 
acknowledgment of his superior prowess and expertise. Such an attachment to 
honor is considered a defect by Aristotle in his ethical system, as rifirj is not the 
highest human good. Hence, the failure of Agamemnon to treat Achilleus 
appropriately and Achilleus’ resultant anger and its disastrous consequences can be 
seen as a moral failure of these two warriors to consider their highest human good 
and their own completion as human beings. In terms of being a human being, 
therefore, their warrior virtuosity, a virtuosity which aimed at achieving ripr/, was a 
misguided aperr/ and their failure to prevent a tragic catastrophe reveals this 
fundamental error.
The ultimate goal of the warrior, however, was also to experience the divine 
joy of svSatfLOPta—happiness—through his virtuosity on the battlefield. Aristotle, 
therefore, takes this same heroic spirit of the Homeric warrior of constantly striving 
to realize one’s fullest potential through a manifestation of atperr), or virtuosity, in 
one’s actions on the battlefield and places it into the life of the human soul, and thus 
into the moral activity and life of the human being. 'Aperr/ then for Aristotle
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becomes an essential part of what it means to be a human being. It is only be 
achieving apery that perfection is attained because only through apery can a human 
being become complete, since if anything does its function as best as it can be done, 
according to Aristotle, it reaches its proper reXog; it fulfills its true nature and 
purpose in accordance with cosmic Nature’s own final purpose. Finally, this most 
complete, and therfore perfect, virtuosity which fulfills the human being as a human 
being also gives the highest pleasure and joy for the human being, since it resonates 
so certainly with the ultimate nature of all things.41
While the ultimate purpose of the warrior was to experience the joy of 
evbaipovia, his heroic striving toward supreme virtuosity was actually motivated by 
his acute awareness of death—the brief and limited mortality of the human being.
The warrior’s aspiration toward perfection was, therefore, also an attempt to 
transcend this mortality, to overcome death while risking his life constantly in battle 
and, hence, to find meaning in the face of the eternal emptiness and meaninglessness 
of death. Through the immortal fame won for the glory of his virtuosity and 
achievement, and the honor and respect which came from the members of his human 
community, the warrior could achieve acknowledgment of his worth in the eyes of 
his society and a meaningfulness in his own personal life; while in the fulfillment of 
his apery, the beauty and nobility of his "bestness" which was in perfect accord 
with nature’s most fundamental law, the warrior could, at the same time, also 
achieve a kind of acknowledgment from nature itself as he attained the closest thing 
to divinity to which a human being could aspire, and for a brief moment in the joy 
of evbaipovia actually defeat death with his god-like perfection.42
Aristotle does not explain in his ethics why perfection is the natural order of 
things. Because the concept is so much a part of his cultural tradition, Aristotle
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assumes that the reason this is so is obvious, and we, who are now far from the 
ancient Greek tradition, can only find the answer by way of vague allusions in his 
text. Aristotle writes that happiness-euSatpco^ta—is the best of man’s possessions 
and one of the most divine things that exists, for the prize and end (rekoq) of 
virtuosity must be the highest good and something god-like and blessed (1099bll-
13). Here, he is assuming that doing one’s best must deserve the best, as is 
observed in the Homeric warriors’ code of conduct. As his reason for these 
assumptions, Aristotle states that the things in nature have a natural tendency to be 
ordered to be the most beautiful, or in the best possible way ( s t r e p  ra Kara <I>volv, 
oiov re kolW iotoi sxslv, ovtw rs<j>vKev 1099b20-23). In this statement is the
principle underlying the whole of Aristotle’s teleology and ethical theory; that is,
 ̂ -
that nature is ordered and is purposeful, this natural order being designed for the 
purpose of being "the most beautiful" (tcdXXiara), which is also the best.43 In his 
observations of nature Aristotle had observed this recurrent pattern that if something 
achieves its reXog, its perfection and completion—happiness, or successful 
flourishing, in the case of the human being—it is expressing the "most beautiful” in 
its own nature of being, and thereby complying with and fulfilling what has been 
mandated by the order of nature, coming into harmony with the fundamental aim of 
the entire cosmos. 44
For Aristotle and the ancient Greeks, perfection is therefore the highest and 
fullest expression of to KctXov—the beautiful. And as Aristotle had, again, observed 
in the operation of nature, perfection in the human being can only be achieved by a 
conscious and deliberate striving toward the goal of completion, a striving which is ' 
performed at the highest level, at its best with the highest degree of virtuosity 
possible. In the Greek, the adjective KaXbg denotes what is simultaneously
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beautiful, noble, good, and therefore right. Expressing t o  mXov in one’s actions 
is, therefore, automatically what is right, and it is then of necessity what one is 
obligated to do for right moral conduct. Because what is beautiful—t o  mXov—is s o  
deeply rooted in the operation of nature, it is also what is, most deeply, the good 
and truth in the nature of things as well, and if our conduct is in true accord with 
this nature, it naturally follows that our actions are also correspondingly and most 
fundamentally good and true. Expression of t o  mXov in human life is thus the very 
essence of morality in the ancient Greek tradition and in Aristotle’s ethics.45
Another fundamental assumption of the ancient Greek tradition explains further 
why beauty and perfection, or completeness, in virtuosity is the ultimate purpose 
and good of nature. This assumption has been expressed most clearly by Plato in 
his Philebus where he states that "the power of the good is to be found in the nature 
of the beautiful; for measure and measuredness constitute beauty and aperri 
everywhere" (mTars^evyeu ijp.lv ij to v  ayaOov bvvapiq eiq rqv to u  mXov <j>vatv. 
perpioTtjq yap m l avppsrpia m W oq brjirov m l aperrj ravraxov %vp(laivsi 
yiyveaOai Philebus 64e5-7). The good and the beautiful is thus a symmetry of a 
just right measuredness, or proportion in things-a kind of poise where the human 
being finds perfection in himself and in his harmony with the universe. It only 
remains for the human being to determine this proportion in order to guide his 
conduct in accord with it and express what is beautiful, good, right, and true in his 
deepest nature, achieving ultimate completion as a human being thereby.46 It is 
this process of determining the just right measure which underlies Aristotle’s 
theories of practical wisdom and moral virtuosity discussed above and which will be 
further explained below in a discussion of his doctrine of the mean.
How then, one may ask, does one obtain such a high degree of virtuosity, such
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as will lead to human completion? Must we become like the Homeric warrior, 
Olympic champions of human virtuosity obsessed with the good in order to be truly 
moral and reach the human good and be happy? The warrior image underlying 
Aristotle’s account of moral perfection as the manifestation of dipsrri can make 
moral perfection seem a particularly unattainable ideal. This warrior standard 
seems set much too high for ordinary mortals even to hope to attain. At this point 
Aristotle’s version of moral perfection might seem to be little different from being 
required to become a saint or hero for our moral goodness’ sake, as Susan Wolf, dr 
J.O. Urmson suggested. Ethics, however, is a practical science, as Aristotle 
repeatedly states, and in Book II of his Nicomachean Ethics he gives us his formula 
for moral success in what scholars call his doctrine of the mean, a formula which is 
decidedly human, not god-like; it is practical, wise, and certainly attainable if one 
chooses to practice it. It reveals as well that Aristotle’s ethics promote a 
particularly well-rounded and well-balanced conception of moral perfection to which 
every human being may aspire, and not just the Homeric warrior.
Moral virtuosity develops and matures through practice of the various moral 
virtuosities, for as with anything else, one learns best by doing. "It is," Aristotle 
says, "by playing the harp that men become both good and bad harpists" (1103bl3). 
Likewise, through correct practice, the correct habits are acquired which establish 
the proper attitudes of mind, or dispositions of character, toward our human 
emotions and actions. In time these habits become spontaneous and natural, in a 
sense enabling the human being to "play" himself as he would a musical instrument, 
becoming expert—a virtuoso—at always choosing and achieving the just right 
measure, the correct proportion of feeling or action required for living well and 
being good as a human being. Our standard of performance is, according to
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Aristotle, the moderate amount—the best amount-of feeling and action. It is the 
mean between extremes of excess and deficiency, extremes which would destroy the 
quality of our feelings or actions and cause them to become vice (1106b 1 Off). For 
example, a person who is too confident and bold in his habits becomes reckless, 
while the one who is so lacking in confidence that he is always fearful becomes 
cowardly (1107b 1-4). By repeatedly achieving the mean amount of fear and 
confidence, neither too much nor too little for his circumstances, a person exhibits 
courage, a characteristic which is praiseworthy and brings goodness and success to 
one’s life and person.
In this way Aristotle extols the value of the mean in human moral behavior. 
The mean is always the proper amount and is to be praised, while extremes are 
neither praiseworthy or right; on the contrary, they are worthy of blame (1107al5). 
The proper median in human behavior, however, is not an absolute mean relative to 
the particular moral virtue, but a mean relative to the one who peforms it and to the 
situation in which the act is performed. In an analogy to explain exactly what he 
means by this kind of moral median, Aristotle discusses the proper amount of food 
for a man training in athletics. A certain amount may be too little for Milo, a 
wrestler of great renown and strength, but too much for someone new to the sport 
and just beginning his training (1106a26ff). The mean is therefore not the same for 
everyone. It is instead an individualized standard of perfection, but with absolute 
limits of too little and too much. The wrestler just beginning his training must find 
the amount of food appropriate for him as an individual and at his own particular 
level of physical fitness: Milo’s portion is obviously outside of the proper limits for 
a beginning wrestler and would provide no benefit or advantage to a beginner. 
Similarly, the degree of fear or confidence displayed by one person in a particular
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situation may not be the same as that exhibited by another, yet both could be 
described as courageous when each person attains the mean amount of fear or 
confidence for himself as an individual and within absolute limits of what can be 
defined as too much or too little fear and confidence for any human being. 
Moreover, although one person may be able to hit his mean more often and with 
greater ease than another-as one assumes would be the case with the expert wrestler 
Milo—as long as both persons achieve an appropriate and praiseworthy mean, they 
both will be attaining some degree of moral virtuosity.
Aristotle makes it very clear, however, that at some point every action and 
feeling reaches a limit of excess and deficiency; it becomes out of proportion and 
therefore vice. He also asserts that there are some actions and feelings which have 
no mean and are never praiseworthy. Such emotions as spite, shamelessness, and 
envy, and similarly such actions as murder, adultery, and theft are bad in and of 
themselves, having no excess and deficiency. It would be absurd to think 
otherwise, Aristotle proclaims (1107a9ff). Aristotle’s version of moral perfection
in the doctrine of the mean, therefore, tolerates a certain degree of variability, but is
>
firm about absolute limits of unacceptable standards of conduct. We are not moral 
failures if we cannot perform as Mother Theresa does, or as a Homeric warrior.
We need only aim at a mean which is within the range of our own individual 
capacity for achieving completion as the best possible human being we can be.
Yet, although we do not have to aspire to a single, narrow vision of perfection, nor 
to any self-defeating, god-like standard of perfection, Aristotle’s moral theory does 
expect the human being to continually reach for the best and not to settle for 
mediocrity in his moral conduct.
In the words in which Aristotle lays out his doctrine of the mean there are
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nevertheless no signs of a rigid, inhuman, and unattractive perfectionism of the sort 
Susan Wolf and Owen Flanagan imply in their essays. On the contrary, Aristotle’s 
concepts exhibit a wise tolerance combined with a sturdy, reliable morality. He 
gives no exact rules to follow, but his picture of the perfectly moral is clearly 
defined. It is an artful, perfect poise in which one is balanced flexibly between 
what is judged to be too much and too little for each and every particular 
circumstance. Such a stance prepares one to meet confidently any unexpected 
contingency in life, unlike modem liberal moral theory which seeks to eliminate 
contingency and happenstance. Aristotle’s ideal is one of harmony and proper 
proportion, a mean which expresses the measuredness of the beautiful and the good 
inherent in nature and the truth of things. Human completeness is realized in the 
practice of human virtuosity as the appropriate choices are made to maintain this 
perfect balance between too much and too little, a balance which signifies the 
perfectly moral and what is most true in the nature of the particular circumstances as 
well as nature at large. Since Aristotle’s ideal of moral goodness is individualized 
within an individual’s own capacity for human completeness, as his doctrine of the 
mean clearly implies, then it would seem that Aristotle’s views are well defended 
against modem criticisms that only a saint or hero can be deemed perfectly moral.
Nancy Sherman’s essay "Common Sense and Uncommon Virtue" also defends 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics against charges of an unattainable perfectionism and moral 
sainthood.47 Aristotle’s emphasis on conscious intent, stable character, flexibility 
of action within the context of circumstance, and the spirit rather than the letter of 
the law in doing what is right shows that Aristotle’s conception of human goodness 
in everyday moral activity centers upon a standard of human decency. In his ethics 
the good person is often called eirieucfiq--decent, considerate, equitable. The decent
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moral agent, the standard for decent behavior, is fair-minded, forgiving, 
sympathetic, and willing to take less than his fair share, if the interests of justice and 
decency are to be better served. Sherman also reminds us that the Aristotelian 
"moral virtues" include virtuosities of character and intellect, not just those traits 
required of altruistic behavior. Characteristics such as proper pride, humor, wit, 
and friendliness are very important in Aristotle’s vision of the morally ideal. The 
ideally good person, furthermore, does not have to be overly tolerant—the saint 
Susan Wolf describes who neglects his own needs and welfare for the sake of 
others-for Aristotle requires him to express his displeasure appropriately at 
excessive or offensive behavior. Sherman’s point is that Aristotle’s conception of 
perfection is very broad and rich; the human best includes not only being just and 
decent toward others, but also how one dispenses one’s moral goodness, the 
appropriateness to truth and proportion described by Aristotle’s doctrine of the 
mean. If Aristotle’s ethics thus call simply for what can be called a standard of 
human decency in human behavior, moral perfection is to be highly valued, and 
expected of every human being, not repudiated as an unattainable, or unattractive 
standard for moral sainthood.
Because Aristotle had observed the principle of perfection, or completion at 
work everywhere in nature, he had no doubt that a substantial degree of perfection 
was an attainable goal for the human being who was also an integral part of this 
same nature. Although he did believe without question that moral perfection could 
be attained by every human being whose capacity for virtuosity had not been 
maimed (1109bl 8), Aristotle also knew that it is not easy to attain the human best, 
the middle way of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. As Aristotle explains at the end 
of Book II of his Nicomachean Ethics: "There are many ways of going wrong, but
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only one way which is right" and therefore, "it is easy to miss the target and 
difficult to hit" (1106b29-35). In other words, it is very easy to become a bad 
haxpist, but more difficult and, by implication in this greater effort, of much higher 
value to become a good harpist; and similarly, it is easy to be bad and much more 
difficult and of higher value to become a good human being. In describing how to 
attain these precious means, the marks of human virtuosity, Aristotle states that to 
be good "to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, for the right 
purpose and in the right way is not easy, nor is it within everyone’s power, which is 
why to hit the mean properly is something rare, praiseworthy and beautiful" 
(1109a25-29).
Because a human being is viewed as being of higher value, something rare, and 
worthy of praise by the fact of his being good, moral perfection for Aristotle, 
therefore, necessitates a consideration and distinguishing of persons as to their 
quality as human beings, a judgment about what makes one better and another 
worse. There might seem to be a danger here of what people call being too 
"judgmental" and arrogantly "elitist" in categorizing people as good or bad; 
however, I do not believe that is the proper understanding of Aristotle’s ethical 
theory. It must be kept in mind that Aristotle was a biologist, his passion was for 
the articulation and order of nature and its whole zoology, especially its beauty and 
"rightness." Nothing was so humble in nature for Aristotle that it could not be held 
in great awe because the manner of its being was seen to be so clearly an expression 
of the beautiful and the divine in nature.48 Aristotle’s thinking is often described as 
"hierarchical" since he arranges and prioritizes goods and concepts into higher and 
lower ranks and classes. This likely is a natural consequence of a study of the 
natural order where one looks for standards of comparison among and within species
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in order to evaluate their place in the order of things. The point at which a 
particular member of a species reaches the fullest expression of what it is and how it 
functions would naturally be a part of such a study of nature. The fact that 
Aristotle uses as his standard of perfection a doctrine of the mean which admits a 
great deal of variability and individuality indicates his attempt to find a wise and 
realistic appraisal of the way things naturally and truly are. Each species and each 
member of that species has its own nature with an individual potential each strives to 
complete. A bear and an owl would therefore not be expected to function the same 
way; nor would certain individual bears and owls as members of their respective 
species. Yet, the individual bear and owl still strive to fulfill the nature of their 
particular species, and are more or less successful as distinct individuals in achieving 
this aim in their different ways. That Aristotle’s ethical principles would then be 
used by anyone to justify being too judgmental, inappropriately judging any human 
being, is clearly going a step beyond the limits of what is good and best, an extreme 
which is certainly contrary to the essence of Aristotle’s ethics.
Aristotle’s ethical thought is clearly an agent-emphasis theory as in his ethics 
moral behavior stems from character. In Book II, Chapter 4, of his Nicomachean 
Ethics Aristotle describes how his ethics derive so essentially from character. In 
this chapter he discusses how it is that moral virtuosity is something more than 
simply performing acts that are just and good. One’s acts should be more than 
mere products; the agent must also possess a certain state of mind when he acts.
First, the agent must know what he is doing, that is, the act must be a conscious one 
where the agent knows he is doing the right thing; second, the agent must choose the 
act deliberately and for its own sake; and third, the agent must act from a firm and 
unchanging character. Of these three criteria, knowledge of the act is least
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important, for in order to perform moral acts of true goodness, the goodness lies in 
the doing of them, not just in an intellectual knowing of what they are. Most 
importantly, Aristotle emphasizes that one’s actions must be performed in a 
particular way—the way a truly good person would do them (1105a26-1105bl 8)—that 
is, from the constancy and depth of the goodness in one’s character, a virtuosity in 
goodness which has become a fixed disposition (e^ig) of the mind or soul, 
established by repeated and habitual just and good acts.
It should be noted how Aristotle’s emphasis on character causes him to use the 
model of a particular type of person—a paradigm of human conduct—to indicate how 
a moral action is to be performed. The judge of what determines moral virtuosity 
is the man of practical wisdom—the <j>p6vipoq. In Aristotle’s formal definition of 
moral virtuosity, he specifically refers the determination of what constitutes the 
proper mean in moral conduct to the 4>p6vipog. The mean, he says, is determined 
as the <f>povip.oq would determine it (cog av o 4>p6vipoq opiasiev 1106b36), that is, as 
the man of practical wisdom would judge and perform the mean. Moral virtuosity, 
hence perfection, is a habit which is a constituent of one’s character and arises from 
the "shape" of the individual human character. One’s actions are therefore 
inseparable from who one most truly and deeply is, just as inseparable as the overall 
quality of one’s actions is from the quality of one’s character.
Aristotle’s emphasis upon quality of action and character give his ethical theory 
a profound moral depth and stability. His ethics meld together the good and the 
right in human action and character so that his moral theory is grounded firmly in 
the intrinsic value of moral action and moral character, both in what kind or quality 
of action they produce, and even more in their value as ends in themselves. Good 
action, or faring well as a human being—fiUTpa^ia-which for Aristotle is
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synomyous with ebbaiiioviot or happiness, is, Aristotle declares, an end in itself.
The virtuosities the human being develops in the parts of his soul are valuable as 
ends in themselves, he says, even if they are not used in action, simply because they 
are virtuosities. They are therefore desirable because a virtuosity of anything 
fulfills and completes that thing’s function as nature intended (1145a2-5). In this 
way Aristotle avoids the tendency toward superficiality that we saw in modem 
liberal theory; however, because Aristotle’s theory is character-based it also contains 
a certain ambiguity because such things as human character are difficult to define 
precisely or to codify in a set of rules. Aristotle appears to recognize the difficulty 
this presents, yet deliberately ignores the desire people have for exactness in his 
insistence upon following the rule of nature and incorporating the world of man 
within that nature as one of its natural elements. Aristotle implies that the fact that 
there is a certain ambiguity and impreciseness to what is required by nature is just 
the way things are in reality and that this fact of reality, furthermore, is an important 
means by which the human being develops his skill and virtuosity at being a human 
being; without the struggle to come to know how to become a good human being, 
attainment of the goal would have little value.
Aristotle assumes, however, that there is a normative standard for living well 
as a human being, and that this standard is what he thinks it is. Modem critics are 
more skeptical than Aristotle and often debate about what exactly constitutes living 
well as a human being, how human beings can flourish, arid what criteria we should 
use to judge and criticize our human behavior. They ask if Aristotle’s theories 
about ultimate human welfare can apply to all human beings in all cultures through 
time. Since there is so much variation in human behavior, how do we choose 
which is better or worse? Aristotle’s own perception of what is good and valuable
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was influenced by his cultural tradition, as we have already seen. Therefore, his 
theories are not likely to be universally applicable. Yet, Aristotle was very much 
aware of competing accounts of what constitutes human happiness (NE 1.4 
1095al4ff). It is also clear that he constructed his ethical principles broadly in 
order to account for the plurality of human experience. At the same time 
Aristotle’s theory is not a species of relativism; not all choices for the human good 
are equally valid and true among cultures. His moral theory is sensitive to local 
social and cultural contexts, which gives it a degree of relativity, but Aristotle firmly 
holds that what is right and good in a local tradition must also be right absolutely 
and objectively anywhere in the human world. This may sound like a 
contradiction, but it reflects a tension that exists throughout the arguments in 
Aristotle’s ethics as he describes a human good which is local and particular, in the 
context of his life in a polis, and at the same time cosmic and universal, as it relates 
to the world at large. Human nature is therefore in a sense both political and 
metaphysical and one’s life reflects both spheres.49
Martha Nussbaum argues cogently and eloquently that Aristotle’s virtue ethics 
is an objective human morality, a moral theory suitable for general human 
flourishing in all cultures in all times. She believes that since Aristotle’s theory 
often strives to accomodate both an objective account of the human good and human 
flourishing-our general humanity—and a reference to local traditions and practices, 
Aristotle’s account of human morality combines the objective good and the relative 
good in a way which is "mutually supportive" and which is not incompatible. 
Nussbaum converts Aristotle’s list of human virtuosities to generalized "spheres of 
human experience" in which any human being in all cultures and times must struggle 
to determine how to choose how to act or not act, well or badly. Differences in
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human cultures are thus explained as simply different responses to the same common 
human problems. The virtuosities that must be developed in order to cope with 
these common experiences are also shared, even though they may superficially be 
called by different names and described by a different cultural context. For 
example, since ideas of what actions constitute courage are so variable in different 
cultures, Nussbaum modifies Aristotle’s virtue of courage into a sphere of human 
experience she calls the fear of death, a fear which underlies the concept of courage 
and which is a common problem all humans must face.
Nussbaum demonstrates that Aristotle’s theories do adequately recognize the 
underlying similarities between cultures and in our common humanity, and can, 
therefore, be quite valuable in our search for the common human good in 
contemporary life. She further gives evidence that Aristotle believed in ethical 
progress, that local traditions should not be fixed and inflexible, and that unjust laws 
anywhere should be open to revision. This is what Aristotle meant, Nussbaum 
argues, when he stressed that the human being must always search for what is best 
and good. Although difficult to accomplish, the goal is the same for us as it was in 
Aristotle’s time and culture, that is, to balance successfully generalities of universal 
humanness with particular circumstances as we seek the truth and the good. The 
general is therefore used as a guide, but priority is given to an understanding of the 
particular in human moral behavior, for, as Aristotle realistically asserts, it is the 
accurate judgment of the particulars of one’s own context which enables one to 
modify one’s behavior in light of new and different circumstances, a skill at 
assessment the value of which Aristotle’s discussion of practical wisdom and moral 
deliberation makes clear.50
Because Aristotle’s theories value the diversity and complexity of human nature
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and human culture, they can seem to be classifiable as a kind of pluralism or 
relativism; however, Aristotle also relies upon a generalized, universal, and 
objective human good and has such a high regard for the order of nature and what is 
natural, that such classifications are therefore inaccurate for Aristotle’s philosophical 
thought. J.D.G. Evans has instead described Aristotle as a cultural realist, a 
category he calls a form of pluralism. Evans describes Aristotle’s moral theory as a 
reconciliation of a debate begun by Aristotle’s predecessors, between the Sophists 
and Socrates and his pupil Plato. At that time in ancient Greece the fact that there 
are a diversity of views and values among different groups of people was explained 
in terms of either nature or human convention. The Sophists supported human 
convention and valued relativism, the complexity and diversity of humankind, while 
Socrates and Plato were realists and emphasized human value, in particular 
promoting the importance of knowledge of true values. According to Evans, Plato 
ignored the social and cultural dimension of human life. Aristotle, however, 
integrates this social dimension by placing both nature and human convention into 
his theory of human nature and morality. He therefore keeps to the middle ground 
between extreme relativism and extreme universalism by advocating that we 
consider both absolute principles and contingent goods when we make our choices. 
Thus, for Aristotle some human practices are good from the perspective of the 
general nature of things while others require human convention or law to give them 
their appropriate value (NE V.7 1134b24-33).
According to Evans, it is especially significant that Aristotle recognized that 
nature itself is dynamic, that it is a mistake to assume nature is rigid and 
unchanging. This meant that Aristotle could include variability as a natural 
property and the variability of human convention and law as also a natural element
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in the natural world order. Aristotle, Evans argues, tried to eliminate conflict 
between nature and convention by supplementing general law with principles of 
equity, judgments and insights about a general law which adapts it to a specific 
particular case, insuring that the law remains fair and just. Aristotle appraises 
human convention or law by how successful it is in maintaining true justice; 
therefore, he concludes that there are always better and worse possibilities and 
choices, and in each culture there is one that is in each case best. Evans points out, 
however, that this does not mean that Aristotle subscribed to the Sophists’ view that 
convention is superior and determines what is best to do. In agreement with 
Nussbaum, Evans concludes that in Aristotle’s theory the human agent must pursue 
the good relative to local cultural context; both cultural variation and objective value 
must be considered and are compatible. At times one or the other value-the 
universal or the particular-might be deemed more appropriate and preferred as more 
conducive to the final good in a particular circumstance, but neither necessarily will 
take precedence over the other, as both are essential elements in the natural scheme 
of things.51
The natural scheme of things also includes moral error. Aristotle gives a 
detailed discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics about what constitutes moral error, an 
effort which would appear to indicate that moral error is also a prominant factor in 
the life of the human being. It is obvious that Aristotle is trying to clarify the range 
of variability and the limits both of virtue and vice in order to complete his 
definition of moral perfection and human flourishing. He also illustrates very 
plainly why moral perfection is not easy and why it is so praiseworthy. The true 
virtuoso at being a good human being is indeed a very rare phenomenon, as his 
virtuosity requires great skill and knowledge and years of experience and practice.
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Aristotle clearly does not expect that everyone hit the mean exactly all of the time,
but that everyone at least aim toward it in order to become good. Always, Aristotle
advises, we must aim toward what deserves to be praised in order to come close to
hitting the mean (1109b24-27). Because of the complex particularity of the world,
we must sometimes, however, deviate in the direction of excess and sometimes in
the direction of deficiency in our intent to hit the mean (1109b25), but this is not to
be blamed, as Aristotle explains:
a AX’ o jihv fwtpov tov ev irapeKpaivtov ov \peyeTai, ovt eiri to paXK ov 6m 
stl to rjTTov, o Be irkeov omoq yap ov AarvOavet. o Be psypi Tivoq icai eiri 
ttogov \j/8KToq ov paBiov t£) Aoya> a<f>opioai’ ovBs yap aXko ovBev to)v 
aioOrjTcbv ra Be roiam a ev Tolq KaO' enaoTa, nai ev t\j a iodrjoei 17 Kpioiq.
We do not blame one who diverges a little from the right course whether on the 
side of too much or too little, but the one who diverges more widely, for his 
error is noticed. Yet to what degree and how seriously a man must err to be 
blamed is not easy to define on principle. For in fact no object of perception is 
easy to define; and such questions of degree depend on particular circumstances 
and the decision lies with perception. (1109bl 8-24)
Moral error, therefore, is, as is moral virtuosity, very dependent upon degree and
circumstance.
In Aristotle’s discussion of the mean and human virtuosity the test for virtue 
and vice is, in the broadest sense, simply praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. 
Moral virtuosity is that which deserves to be praised, as it comes closest to hitting 
the mean, our standard reference of the best, while vice, any excessive deviation 
from the mean, is to be blamed. As with moral virtuosity, Aristotle also 
differentiates moral error based upon the quality of the feeling and action which 
arises out of a certain character or disposition of mind. Beginning in Book III 
Aristotle distinguishes between actions which are voluntary and involuntary . 
Voluntary actions are those which arise from within the moral agent and are thus in 
the agent’s power to do or not do, and as such they are capable of praise or blame.
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Aristotle includes within this category actions due to passion and appetite since the 
initiative of the act lies within the moral agent, however irrational the emotions are. 
Conversely, involuntary, or unintentional, actions are distinguished in two ways: 
those acts done under compulsion where the action is thus initiated from a source 
external to the agent, or those actions done due to ignorance where the moral agent 
does not choose the act he performs with full knowledge of all particulars of the 
circumstance (III. 1).
In his analysis of just and unjust acts in Book V Aristotle further differentiates 
varying degrees of moral blame in a description of three categories of kinds of 
harm, or error, that a person can commit in his dealings with his fellow human 
beings. These are: an unforeseen mishap or accident (aTvxijfia); an act done in 
ignorance, but which could have been foreseen and avoided (afiapTrjpa);52 and a 
harmful act done knowingly, but not out of a calculated and deliberate malice 
(aMnrjiioi). Since Aristotle claims all such acts are done out of some degree of 
ignorance, responsibility or blame varies according as to how conscious the moral 
agent is of the harm he does. If, for example, the agent commits an act for which 
he has regret afterwards, the act itself is unjust and blameworthy, but the agent 
would not be considered essentially unjust. Aristotle, however, insists that harmful 
acts done from choice and with deliberate malice are unjust and wicked and the 
agent is fully culpable. Moral depravity {p.oxQ'npioi) also clearly produces unjust, 
vicious, and immoral actions which are in no way excusable, although it too results 
from a certain state of ignorance (V.8).
Although Aristotle admits a range of-moral error and corresponding blame 
which fluctuates variously between limits of true knowledge and absolute ignorance, 
he is unflinching in his assertion that the human being is responsible for his own
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actions and character. It is the human being who chooses good and evil (III.5).
The human being is clearly the origin of actions which ultimately arise from within 
the self; thus, for Aristotle there is no doubt that the human being possesses the 
power to act or not act, so that even in ignorance or passion he can be responsible 
for what he does. Aristotle defines choice as a voluntary act preceded by 
deliberation (III. 2-5). It is a reasoning process of thought which seeks to determine 
a particular outcome in circumstances that are unpredictable and indeterminate.
Such deliberation therefore seeks to determine means to ends, the "how" of things in 
ethical behavior, or, in other words, in what manner and by what means we get 
from here to there. Aristotle notes, as he does with his doctrine of the mean, that 
this crucial "how" is much more difficult to accomplish than knowing what to do 
(V.9 1137a6ff). Choice itself is characterized by moral goodness or badness and it 
determines a person’s character even more than his actions (III.2 111 lb30ff).
Choice, in fact, differentiates the morally weak (o'xparqq), a person without moral 
power who acts through appetite, not choice, from the morally strong (syKparriq), a 
person who possesses moral power and acts with self-control and from choice (III.2 
llllb l4 -1 6 ). Aristotle spends the bulk of Book VII in his Nicomachean Ethics 
defining the morally weak in all the varying degrees of blame and he seems to use 
this concept of the morally weak as an example of the person who is not a 
wrongdoer, but who nevertheless does wrong.
If the ideal is attainable for Aristotle, we must clarify how he characterizes the 
ideal individual. It is not the <j>p6nnoq as one might expect. For the ideal moral 
agent Aristotle uses the term oirovSaioq which is translated literally as "the man who 
is good in an earnest and serious sense." Thus the airovhaloq is the person who is 
earnest about life, one who takes life seriously and the fact that he is a human being.
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He is responsible about moral choice, with high moral standards to which he turns to 
help him judge correctly about what is truly good. Therefore, he knows where the 
mean lies, having developed virtuosity in making the most deeply right moral 
choice. This ideal moral agent has acquired the ability to discern the truth in almost 
every situation and is not misled by pleasure or by whatever merely seems good at 
the moment, differentiating him from the worthless (4>av\oq) person, as well as the 
morally weak, who are both corrupted in different degrees by the pursuit of the 
wrong kind of pleasure and mistaken ideas of:what constitutes the moral good 
(III-4).
The OTtovhaioq, moreover, is also the model for the evSaifxcov—the flourishing 
human being Aristotle describes in Book I, Chapter 10, of his Nicomachean Ethics. 
This supremely happy man possesses a permanent and stable happiness which is 
unaffected by changes of life’s fortune because his life’s activities are performed at 
the level of apsrrj, or virtuosity, the most enduring and valuable activity on the 
scale of all human activity. Because he is truly good he will bear any adverse 
changes of fortune most beautifully and nobly, which is why his happiness is so 
continuous and stable. Aristotle admits that some measure of good luck and success 
can make a life more completely and perfectly happy, and that the pains and 
hindrances of many misfortunes can also seriously mar our happiness; yet, he insists 
that only very great and numerous disasters could disrupt this highest and most 
complete and perfected form of human happiness, for in the pain of any misfortune 
this supremely happy man’s nobility will always shine through as he endures with 
patience, generosity, and greatness of soul. Aristotle implies that misfortune may, 
in fact, hone and temper such a man’s goodness, allowing him the challenge--and 
opportunity-to practice his virtuosity in being a human being. The evSaino)v can
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never become miserable because he cannot do what is hateful and base, the mark of 
vice and unhappiness, for in his expertise at being human, he can make the most 
effective use of whatever circumstances life presents to him, whether good or bad 
, (1100a31-1101al4).
In Book X, Chapter 7, Aristotle outlines the most perfect, the most complete 
life for a human being, one which appears to go beyond the expectation of the 
doctrine of the mean. In accord with his usual "hierarchical" way of thinking, 
Aristotle proclaims that Oaoipia, translated variously as "contemplation," "theoretical 
knowledge," "study," or "speculation," is the highest form of activity possible for 
the human species; therefore, a life of such activity constitutes the supreme, most 
complete happiness possible for the human being. Since the human mind (vovg) is 
the highest thing in the human being, Aristotle has determined that this is what 
differentiates the human being from other animals. Because the activity of the mind 
contemplates the eternal, unchanging principles of reality, those objects of the 
cosmos which are divine and the most beautiful of all things, this part of the human 
being is also in some sense divine. It follows that contemplation, the highest 
activity of the human mind, is the most divine, or god-like, activity the human being 
can perform; hence, it results in a life and happiness separate and even higher than 
that of the purely human life of moral virtuosity (1177al2ff).
Aristotle creates some confusion with this assertion because he has been 
implying up to this point that moral virtuosity is the highest life of the human being; 
now he states that it is secondary and inferior. This conclusion appears to result, in 
some way, from his initial division of the human soul in Book I into two parts, and 
a corresponding division of the human virtuosities into the moral and the 
intellectual. It seems reasonable to assume that the activities of these two parts of
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the soul must work together in the truly flourishing human being, yet, unfortunately, 
Aristotle does not fully explain his thoughts about O s u p i a .53 The life of O s c a p ia ,  
however, does fundamentally agree with Aristotle’s principle of the attainment of 
a p s r q ,  or virtuosity. It makes sense that the human being must reach the absolute 
apex of human functioning in order to realize fully his innate potential and find 
absolute completion, and for Aristotle this is the divine in the human being. If one 
views a life of contemplation as the fulfillment of another aspect of the human being 
that is separate from the external, physically active life that directs itself toward the 
moral sphere of human life, some of the confusion can be avoided. Q s u p  to t then 
becomes the flourishing and completion of the internal, more privately active life of 
the human soul. For Aristotle, this contemplative life represents the highest, most 
complete functioning of the human soul because it touches upon the divine, which is 
highest thing of all in the universe. However, there yet remains some confusion 
about O s u p i a .  Nevertheless, for our purposes it is significant that Aristotle 
connects ultimate human perfection with the divine. This connection to the divine 
in the cosmos gives Aristotle’s ethical theory further depth and completeness—a kind 
of numinosity in the art of being a human being that also brings even higher value in 
striving to become the best human being we can be.
As if in anticipation of the protest that the divine is unattainable for the human
(
being, that one ought not expect such self-defeating perfection, Aristotle defends his 
position:
o v  XPV 5 s  K a r a  r o i i q  T r a p a i v o v v T a q  a v O p i b m v a  4> p o v e lv  a v O p u r o v  o v t o l  o v b s
OvrfTOi TOP dPrjTOP, OfXX’ £</>’ OOOV S P b s X G T a i O tO etPG lTLfap K a i  TTSXPTa TOISLP  
i r p o q  t o  £rjp k c i to .  t o  K p a n o T O V  to>p s v  o lv to ? ' s i  y a p  K a i  t w  o j k q  p iK p o u  s o n ,  
b v u a p s i  K a i  T i f u o r r j n  i ro X u  p a W o v  7ro c p tu p  U 7 r s p s x s t .
Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man’s thoughts 
and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to live
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in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in
power and value it far surpasses all the rest. (1177b32-l 178al)
Here, as with his doctrine of the mean, Aristotle’s emphasis is on the activity of 
striving and aiming toward an ideal standard. It is, therefore, the quality of the 
activity in human life which comes from the proper directing of one’s intentions 
toward appropriate goals which has the highest value and meaning for the individual 
human being and is most important to Aristotle’s understanding of human 
flourishing and completion. Again, the heroic spirit in striving toward the human 
good is what gives worth and quality to human life and the human being, more so, it 
seems, than actually reaching the goal. Only in the process of believing in and 
aspiring toward something which is of superlative value, which is greater and 
beyond oneself, can the human being acquire his essential life spirit, that which 
gives meaning, purpose and a deep intangible value to his very existence. When 
this reverence for something greater than himself, such as the divine, or the good, or 
a higher ideal of some kind, dies, something vital in the human being also dies; he 
and his life is impoverished, as a human being he is diminished, becoming less as 
there is nothing for which he can dream and hope for in order to be truly and most 
fully human.
Chapter 3 
Aristotle and Tragedy
Although Aristotle views life as a struggle, a striving toward the goal of human 
completion-the good and the best in being a human being--he is confident that 
almost everyone, through his efforts, can attain a reasonable level of perfection and 
happiness. If Aristotle’s optimistic view of human flourishing in a world directed 
toward the good and the best is therefore correct, and, as he believes, the happy, 
virtuous man can never be truly miserable, how can this Aristotelian optimism be 
reconciled with the pessimism of tragedy and the tragic world view. It is obvious 
from Aristotle’s description of the evdotLfioiv, the happy man, which includes one of 
the few oblique allusions to a tragic sense of life in the Nicomachean Ethics, that 
Aristotle does not believe a tragic reality can exist. Although Aristotle does admit 
misfortune and suffering in his view of human existence, he sees it as a deviation 
from the ideal of human nature and the order of the cosmos.
Tragedy, however, is commonly held to depict the downfall of the basically 
good person, who, in spite of an admirable moral goodness, or even because of it, 
suffers or dies in a particularly disturbing and thought-provoking way. Tragedy is 
disturbing because it may imply, contrary to Aristotle, that human virtuosity and 
goodness is not sufficient for human happiness and that, in fact, the structure of the 
universe is fundamentally opposed to human happiness and the highest moral 
aspirations of humankind.54 Consider, for example, Oedipus, an essentially good 
man and king, who unintentionally killed his own father and married his own 
mother, and who despite his goodness became a blind and wandering beggar, a
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horrible pollution in his land. Another example from tragedy is Hecuba, the wife 
of Priam, the ruler of Troy, a good and noble woman, who, after losing all except 
two of her children in the Trojan War, saw her last daughter sacrificed by the 
Achaeans upon Achilleus’ grave and then discovered her youngest son had been 
killed by one of her best friends. She responds to this misfortune by losing her 
humanity in a bestial revenge. These tragic stories of extreme suffering naturally 
cause one to ask for an explanation for such incomprehensible circumstances; such 
extreme misery and misfortune does not seem fair or right, and the moral confusion 
and discomfort persists when there are no answers, no clear reason for such disaster.
Tragedy therefore appears to teeter on the edge of absolute hopelessness and 
despair in its suggestion that there is no purpose, meaning, or order in the world.
Its characters portray people who are inept at controlling their lives and happiness; 
they live in a world governed by a seemingly pernicious and unpredictable fate, who 
are swept away by irrational passions and so overwhelmed by such a blind ignorance 
about themselves and this "fate-full" world that they are doomed to make tragic 
mistakes, causing great misfortune and unhappiness for themselves and others. In 
such a world one questions, in direct contrast to Aristotle, the value of being moral 
or aspiring toward human virtuosity, since it all seems for nought, human life 
having no real purpose and happiness being so elusive and unstable.
In her essay "The Death of Tragedy," Susan Sontag states that tragedy is a
vision of heroic nihilism.55 She quotes Simon Weil’s description of the Iliad as a
perfect example of the tragic vision: "The Iliad is about the emptiness and
arbitrariness of the world, the ultimate meaninglessness of all moral values and the
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terrifying rule of death and inhuman force." Tragedy, Sontag asserts, thus 
demonstrates, the "implacability of the world," "its brute opaqueness" in the 
"collision of subjective intention with objective fate."56 She suggests that the
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assertions of Judaism and Christianity that all events in the world are part of a divine 
plan, that every disaster must be seen somehow as just and good, denies tragic 
values which say there is indeed ultimate injustice and undeserved suffering in the 
world. These religious traditions’s attempt to find order and meaning in the world, 
in fact, prevented a rebirth of tragedy in the Christian era; for modem tragedy, 
Sontag claims, is often not true tragedy at all. This is apparently because, 
according to Sontag, modem man lives with the "increasing burden of subjectivity at 
the expense of his sense of the reality of the world."57 Modem theater depicts life 
as a dream and the world as a stage in which characters self-consciously dramatize 
themselves in their public roles, roles which have become separated from their 
private and more true selves. In contrast, the ancient Greeks did not have this same 
self-consciousness and degree of subjectivity; consequently, they did not act out a 
role, but instead saw themselves as being the actual role they portrayed.58 The 
ancient Greeks, therefore, incorporated in their drama a larger concern and a greater 
interaction with an objective reality outside the independent self; their dramas reflect 
just how much they felt themselves to be directly connected with and influenced by 
the world at large. This broader perspective would significantly change the nature 
of the tragic vision, as we shall see below.
This view of tragedy as totally nihilistic, pessimistic, and irrational is a very 
grim world view, indeed. It is, however, a very modem interpretation of the 
essence of tragedy, and Sontag’s essay does, indeed, imply that the true tragic sense 
of life belongs to the classical drama of the ancient Greeks, the creators of tragedy. 
She grants that this ancient view may be quite different from the modem 
perspective. In fact, the phrase "the tragic view of life" did not exist in ancient 
times. Aristotle does speak of different opinions about what constitutes a life of 
happiness in his discussion of ethics, and such opinions, which express different
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views of life, in his writings as well as those of other Greek philosophers and writers 
do, therefore, clearly suggest personal and cultural views of life. Nevertheless,
"the tragic view of life" is our own modem terminology for a modem philosophic 
concept, which often does not belong to the ancient Greeks at all.
The concept of the tragic view of life arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries among certain German philosophers, scholars, and Romantics, such as 
Lessing, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Winckelmann, Holderlin and Nietzsche, who 
were enamored with ancient Greek art and culture, and, especially, classical Greek 
ideals. These German theorists sought to link German thought with the world of 
the ancient Greeks, believing that the classical ideals were far superior to those of 
German culture at that time. They therefore desired to model the German nation on 
the ideals of excellence and beauty which they felt epitomized ancient Greece. As a 
consequence of this intense focus on and enthusiasm for all aspects of ancient Greek 
culture, theories about the nature of Greek tragedy and the tragic proliferated.59 
The German interpretations of tragedy were largely philosophical speculations of a 
metaphysical nature and this philosophical tradition then combined with a tradition 
of literary theory and criticism emphasizing dramatic style and effect, which had 
also been accumulating since the Renaissance and the rediscovery of Aristotle’s 
Poetics.60 Needless to say, this philosophical and literary theorizing upon tragedy 
and the tragic dimension has continued to the present day; thus, as with moral 
philosophy, conceptions of the tragic and what tragedy means are overlaid and 
confounded by centuries of various literary and philosophical traditions and views.
It is, therefore, also necessary to go back to Aristotle, the first critic of tragedy, 
and, ultimately, to the poetics of the ancient Greeks’ own tragedies, in order to 
clarify the tragic sense of life and its relationship to moral perfection and virtue 
ethics.
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According to the classical scholar Albin Lesky, Greek tragedy of the fifth 
century gave both the original and the perfect expression of the tragic sense of 
life.61 Many have tried through the centuries since the ancient Greeks to define 
tragedy, but the complex nature of tragedy makes any precise definition a perplexing 
problem. The tragic motif begins in the heroic songs of the Homeric hero, whose 
anguish in the face of his human limitations and inevitable death is highlighted in the 
dramatic contrast with the blessedness of the immortal gods. The human being as 
human being was depicted as extremely vulnerable to failure in a world of unseen, 
unknowable, and overpowering forces where appearances hide actual reality. Later 
Athenian tragedy adapted these heroic tales to a dramatic performance given as part 
of a public festival in honor of the god Dionysius. Most of these dramas chose 
from the heroic cycles serious subjects which involved suffering, and, therefore, the 
tragic experience became deeply associated with the experience of human sorrow 
and often depicted "a fall from an illusory world of security and happiness into a 
depth of inescapable anguish."62 Yet, tragedy is not simply the depiction of a sad 
event; it is, according to Lesky, a particular dynamic sequence of events which 
appear to have a special depth of meaning in which suffering becomes important to 
the ultimate meaning of human existence.63 Because the suffering is so bitter and 
hard, it is also an important path to self-knowledge for the human being.64
Lesky differentiates the essence of tragedy into three forms, a differentiation 
that he believes helps to clarify the problems arising from the variety of tragic 
experiences he has discovered in his study of ancient Greek tragedy and theories 
about tragedy through the centuries.65 The "totally tragic world view" conceives of 
the world as a place where forces and values are inexplicably and inevitably 
predestined to conflict and be destroyed. There is, moreover, no transcendent 
purpose in this conflict and destruction. The "totally tragic conflict" is also
70
inescapable, but the destruction is a part of a transcendent totality with laws which 
have meaning and purpose, implying that if the human being can come to know this 
higher level of being, the conflict can be resolved and have meaning. It also does 
not, however, include the whole world in conflict and destruction, but remains as 
one situation of conflict within the world. Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus is given as 
an example of this category. Finally, the "tragic situation" views a conflict of 
opposing forces and anguished awareness of inescapable destruction, yet there is still 
hope of relief from the suffering and anguish. The possibility exists that a 
harmonious resolution can be achieved. The Oresteia by Aeschylus is considered to 
be by Lesky just this sort of tragic situation. Tragedy is, therefore, as Lesky 
describes it, not simply a dramatic art form, for it clearly expresses a particular view 
of the world. Lesky consequently reviews the philosophical debate of recent times 
that has arisen surrounding questions of whether tragedy presupposes a meaningless 
world, a void of nihilism in the totally tragic world view, or a world governed by a 
higher transcendent order of purpose and meaning. The one view resigns humanity 
to defeat and annihilation while the other raises the human being up into the 
possibility of hope and the belief in the existence of absolute, unchanging norms and 
values beyond events in everyday human life.66
Lesky is compelled to answer this debate through a study of ancient Greek 
tragedy. He demonstrates that none of the three ancient Greek tragedians whose 
works remain for us today subscribe to the totally tragic world view, where the 
universal order makes human suffering inevitable and utterly senseless, such as 
Susan Sontag describes in her essay. In Aeschylus we see the gods representing the 
meaning of the world. Suffering is the path to self-knowledge and knowledge of 
the gods and their universal wisdom. In Sophocles’ plays this deep faith in the gods 
and a transcendent purpose continues. Although his characters are shown in
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irreconcilable conflicts with unseen forces which rule world events and the. divine 
remains an unknowable mystery, the human being asserts himself heroically with 
dignity and worth, directly confronting the forces of the universe and taking 
responsibility for his actions in the world. Euripides appears to come closest to 
accepting the totally tragic world view. Under the influence of the Sophists, 
Euripides used his dramas for a deep and searching philosophical questioning of the 
human being and his actions. His tragic world is full of irreconcilable 
contradictions which are centered around the individual and the human world rather 
than the conflict between the human and the divine. Although Euripides questioned 
the pious acceptance of the popular religious tradition and often harshly criticized 
the immorality of the traditional gods, along with the folly and cruelty of 
humankind, there is, however, enough evidence among his criticisms to show that 
he believed humanity and the world to be more good than bad, and that a 
transcendent order ultimately prevailed.
Euripides’ plays represent the transition between tragedy and modem drama; 
hence, his plays can perhaps most clearly illustrate what is true tragedy and what is 
not. Euripidean tragedies often exhibit ambiguity and inconsistency; it is therefore 
extremely difficult to define a coherent, unified world view from his plays.
Because of his focus on the contradictory nature of things, a focus on contradiction 
that was so typical of the Sophistic movement of his times, the thought within 
Euripides’ plays and their structure are often similarly contradictory. Euripidean 
drama, for example, will contain the new thinking of Sophistic rational debate 
within a structure still formulated upon the traditional literary form. As Euripides 
therefore begins to give new meanings and contexts to the old myths, we also see an 
increasing secularization in his plays. Gods and goddesses still walk upon his stage, 
but their behavior is often less dignified and "god-like," often functioning without
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meaningful relevance or much religious connotation; for Euripides’ emphasis is 
increasingly centered upon the human being and the dynamics of human complex 
psychological subtleties, passions, and motivations. The questioning of 
philosophical theory is gradually replacing religious reverence in his plays; internal 
human experience and transformation thus also tend to displace external events and 
- human activity, while Euripides’ characters are more often portrayed against the 
background of chance and changeable fate rather than transcendent divinity and 
cosmic order.
The questioning of Euripides’ thought and his structural innovations often 
stretch the boundaries of his tradition, yet his plays and art still remain within the 
spirit and definition of tragedy. Lesky insists that Euripides was never an atheist, 
or nihilistic. Several passages in his tragedies indicate a belief in the existence of 
higher powers which fashion human destiny, a divinity which is however beyond
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religious superstition, such as in his tragedy The Suppliants, where the chorus sings 
in praise of the gods these words:
I believe
That there are more good things than bad for mortals;
If there were not, the light would not be ours.
I praise the god who set our life in order,
Lifting it out of savagery and confusion.67
and in The Trojan Women, when Hecuba prays the following:
O power, who mount the world, wheel where the world rides,
0  mystery of man’s knowledge, whosoever you be,
Zeus named, nature’s necessity or mortal mind,
1 call upon you; for you walk the path none hears
yet bring all human action back to right at last.68
Euripides, therefore, never appears to deny the existence of divine power, his 
concept of the gods is simply not that of the popular tradition. His questioning 
doubts the value of this tradition, but it functions primarily as Euripides’ own
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passionate search for the truth behind human nature, a search which never ends for 
him and which he never successfully concludes. It is this profound questioning of 
the human being and his complex contradictory nature that could often give great 
depth to his poetry, as well as a tremendous power and pathos. A character such as 
Medea can display the most abominable and inhuman cruelties, while others, such as 
Alcestis, Hercules, or Iphigeneia will exhibit courageous self-sacrifice and great 
human merit. Euripides’ last play, The Bacchae, returns to the more archaic tragic 
form and subject matter and is a much more typical tragedy than any of his previous 
plays. Its dramatic action depicts a tension between "the highest rapture and the 
deepest anguish" of the forces of life, and thus, demonstrates a tragic conflict of the 
highest order.69
Even in Euripides, the most cynical of the tragedians, there is, therefore, no
vision of utter meaninglessness in the world. Human suffering is still framed within
a definite world order,70 albeit one in which the "human" order is severely
questioned. Euripidean tragedy does not yet, however, promote a completely
hopeless world view. The world for classical tragedy and tragedian was therefore,
Lesky concludes, one of meaningful absolutes where order and purpose existed in a
universe which is fundamentally divine. He states that the totally tragic world view
rejects the idea of the Absolute—of a meaningful universe that is divine in 
origin. Classical tragedy, on the contrary, presupposes such an order, and its 
tragic events confirm it. But as the relationship with the transcendent begins to 
weaken, the conviction and the dignity of tragedy decline.71
It is significant to Lesky that the disappearance of true tragedy after Euripides
coincides with a loss of faith in the old gods and a loss of religious depth generally
in the Greek society.72 Tragedy after Euripides therefore becomes "modem," and
never again quite like ancient Greek tragedy.
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Lesky’s study shows that the essence of the ancient form of tragedy is not 
nihilistic and is instead grounded in the belief that there is order and purpose and 
meaning in the world, a much more positive and hopeful vision of life than human 
suffering implies. This suggests as well an affinity to Aristotle’s view of human 
nature and life. Aristotle’s optimistic view of the world and the human being is 
similarly compatible with the tragic world view in Greek tragedy; it is not necessary 
to split fundamental reality into two, the Aristotelian and the tragic. In view of 
Aristotle’s ethical theory, however, tragedy exemplifies human moral imperfection. 
The characters of tragedy are models of how the human being can deviate from the 
mean of moral conduct, failing to flourish as a human being because they do not 
attend to a proper aim at the ultimate human good. The moral imperfection 
depicted in tragedy is why Plato strongly disapproved of poetry. Because of its 
immorality, Plato believed that tragic poetry had a corrupting influence on the 
human being; therefore, in the Republic he banned it from his ideal city. In Plato’s 
thinking tragic poetry nurtured the emotional excesses in the human being, causing 
him to lose control of himself and his reason. He thought that tragedy would 
encourage the citizens of his city to think that they were not responsible for their 
own fates. As fictional accounts of events that had never happened, tragedy thus 
told untrue stories; hence, from a strictly philosophical perspective as well, they 
were inferior imitations of the true nature of reality.
If Aristotle had rejected the tragic, as did Plato, we should see this evidenced 
in his writings, particularly the Poetics, his treatise on tragedy. We shall, therefore, 
turn to a discussion of this particular treatise in order to see just how Aristotle 
viewed moral perfection in tragedy.
Aristotle’s Poetics has been criticized because it does not interpret or evaluate
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the meaning of tragedy. Aristotle, rather, discusses how to construct a plot that
will produce the maximum and best combination of pity and fear, the essential tragic
emotions. These emotions for Aristotle define the best kind of tragedy and evoke
the pleasure that is unique to tragedy. At one point in his treatise, Aristotle defines
tragedy as an imitation not of men, but of an action and of life (1450al6).
Character is, furthermore, not primary, but secondary to the action because it is by
one’s actions that a person is happy or unhappy, succeeds or fails, in life (1150al8).
Aristotle also states, however, that character is what reveals moral purpose or will,
showing what kind of things a man chooses or avoids (1450b8-9). Aristotle notes
further that tragedy’s characters must be either good (airovSaioq), or unworthy
(<pocvXog), since character is distinguished by virtuosity (aperri) and vice (/ca/da),
that is, they are better or worse, or much as we, the majority of humanity, are, lying
somewhere in between (1148al-5). Choice, therefore, determines the goodness and
badness of the character. In these passages are definite echoes of Aristotle’s ethical
theory in his Nicomachean Ethics. He makes it quite clear that tragedy is also
about making right choices which will lead to happiness or unhappiness in life.*
Tragedy is then an important showcase for moral activity since it demonstrates so 
profoundly how difficult moral choice is, how disastrous its consequences can be, 
and its overall value for human life and human worth. In short, it dramatically 
portrays just how hard it is to become the best human being one can be and 
especially how difficult it is to hit the middle way. At times, tragedy can even 
show how good choices can respond most beautifully when purely external 
misfortune falls upon a human being.
Aristotle’s Poetics has become the standard for the definition of tragic 
literature; yet it is also an extremely controversial document. Through the centuries
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since Aristotle wrote Kis treatise scholars have made many attempts to interpret and 
reinterpret Aristotle’s ideas on tragedy. His work has had a tremendous influence 
on tragic theory and literary criticism, although a great deal of this influence is 
based upon serious misinterpretations of his text. It is not my purpose to enter into 
the debate about what constitutes true tragedy in this thesis; however, what tragedy 
appears to be in moral terms and how this relates to moral perfection is quite 
relevant to my argument. Therefore, I shall attempt to examine roughly, relying 
upon the best scholarly opinions I can find, a few of the concepts in Aristotle’s 
theory about tragedy that have a particular bearing on his idea of moral perfection.
I do, therefore, very much agree with the assessment of those modem scholars who 
argue that Aristotle’s Poetics is "morally laden" and not purely aesthetic, that it must 
be understood in light of the moral assumptions that underlie the ethical theory in his 
other philosophical works.73
Aristotle formally defines tragedy in Chapter 6 of his treatise in the following
way:
s o t i v  ovv rpaycobia pLifirjcnq irpd^eoiq oTcovhouaq m i rekeiaq psysOoq 
exovcrijq, rjSvofievq Xoycy X^piq s m o T G )  t & v  eib&v sv roiq popioiq, bp&vruv 
m i ov Si' awayysXiaq, St' eXeov m i <j>o(3ov irepodvovoa. rtju t & v  t o i o v t o i v  
TaOrjfidiTOiv mOapoiv.
Tragedy, then, is the imitation of a good action, which is complete, and of a 
certain length, by means of language made pleasing for each part separately; it 
relies in its various elements, not on narrative but on acting; through pity and 
fear it achieves the purgation (catharsis) of these emotions. (1449b24-28)74
The terms that have been highlighted are among those which have moral implication
and significance. These are OTovbouoq, skeoq, 4>o/3oq, and mQapoiq. Other
"morally laden" terms from elsewhere in Aristotle’s text which will also be
discussed below are apapnoi and t o  4>i.\6ii>6pwirou.
It is generally agreed that oirovbcaoq is, as with many other ancient Greek
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words, difficult to translate adequately into English. No one word satisfactorily 
captures its wide range of meanings. Several translators prefer "serious" to "good" 
as a translation because Aristotle at the point of his definition has been discussing 
the differences between comedy and tragedy and serious action would contrast more 
properly with non-serious comic action. Rorty believes that serious is an 
appropriate term because the kinds of actions depicted in tragedy are those that are 
vitally important to a human life. These sorts of actions are crucial in defining 
one’s life since tragedy shows the way such actions affect one’s ends, and how error 
in performing them brings disaster.75 Kaufmann and Golden both prefer "noble" as 
the most accurate translation;76 therefore, their sense of tragic action tends to lean 
toward the heroic. This is because arovSaiog is at other points in the treatise 
opposed to <j>av\oq, which means "common," "mean," "worthless," and "ignoble." 
hirovbmoq, therefore, would have the opposite meanings of "of high worth," 
"worthwhile," "good," and "noble." Golden points out that Aristotle has defined 
airoubaioq in his Categories to be an adjectival form of aperr}, which would then 
connect oirovbmoq with good in the sense of moral excellence or virtuosity.77 
Golden also notes that Aristotle uses oirovbaioq consistently throughout the Poetics 
in reference to character; therefore, he argues that Aristotle differentiates tragic 
action from that of comedy on the basis of the kind of character imitated. Tragedy 
depicts the actions of the airovbalot, while comedy the actions of the <f>av\otJ&
Since the quality of a person’s character intrinsically determines the quality of his 
actions, Golden amends the interpretation of Aristotle’s definition to read "tragedy is 
the imitation of an action that reveals nobility of character. "79 This interpretation, 
admittedly, has a certain valid connection with the thought in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics.
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John Jones, however, is also correct when he writes that the separation of the 
meaning of a%ov8aloq into various English translations is a result of "modem" 
misinterpretations of Aristotle’s usage and a misunderstanding of the term "good," 
for as Jones says:
Aristotle has in mind a generalised, aristocratic, ancient and practical ideal of 
human excellence, so broad that the latter-day doubleness of spoudaios 
disappears within it....and the inner identity of seriousness in the action with 
heroic worth in the stage-figure who proves true to the noble type is still so 
obvious that he can leave his reader to recognise it for himself.80
Tragic action is therefore all of the above, that is, a presentation in some way of the
serious, the good, and the noble in human action. It seems clear that Aristotle
intended this word to convey an ethical requirement for tragic action in his
definition.
At this point it must be stressed that action dominates in Aristotle’s theory of 
tragedy. This is quite important to keep in mind, for as John Jones in his study of 
Aristotle and tragedy cautions, the modem reader must not make Greek tragedy into 
an imitation of human beings, overly psychologizing Greek tragedy and Aristotle’s 
Poetics, otherwise he turns them into versions of modem art, distorting their 
meaning and value. Our modem conception of dramatic character and the human 
self, Jones says, is centripetal, one of intense inwardness and subjectivity, of a 
solitary, individualized consciousness. Aristotle, on the other hand, with his 
emphasis upon action makes the figure on the stage, as well as the human being, at 
one with his action, which means the self becomes centrifugal, moving outward into 
the activity of the dramatic action and of life, "a continuous dying into the full life 
of self through the self’s dissipation in action. "81 The people of tragedy are 
universalized, Jones remarks, they are the people of life. The stage-figure is, 
furthermore, a realized type, that is, it conforms to what is required of the type
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portrayed—king, slave, woman—in appropriateness and goodness. Jones notes that 
this sense of goodness is the achievement of the fullest articulation of the particular 
type, the Aristotelian achievement of the good of the type, or its rsKog. The good 
of the type is also the fulfillment of the Greek mean, a concept which is prevalent in 
Aristotle’s thought. Jones further explains that the stage-figure is both good in its 
achievement of excellence as to its type and yet typical, a unity of the normal and 
the ideal within an individual who represents a class of individuals.82 Oedipus as 
king is therefore merged with Oedipus the human being. Jones’ warning recalls 
Susan Sontag’s essay and her comment that modem man is over-burdened by his 
subjectivity; he is out of balance with the reality of the world, while the ancient 
Greeks, who were less subjectively "bound," tended to identify fully with their roles 
in life and, in the theater. Here, in Aristotle’s Poetics, the reality of the world is 
one of dynamic activity and perfection of form and function, the human being is 
fully interactive with his world, the structure of his life dependent upon this activity.
The structure of the tragic action, the plot, is "the soul of tragedy" (1450al5), 
and it is the plot which Aristotle repeatedly states is foremost, the "first and most 
important thing in Tragedy" (1450b22). He describes the plot as the structural 
union of the parts (1451a30), with its own principles of development and 
completion. Plot therefore becomes for Aristotle a kind of living organism 
(1459a21), demonstrating once again Aristotle’s penchant for the biological. The 
principles of tragedy Aristotle outlines in his treatise are intended to describe how 
tragedy can reach its perfection and the completion of the form it inherently is. If 
perfection is recognized as Aristotle’s fundamental moral principle, plot is also a 
moral element in Aristotle’s theory, since it, too, is teleologically directed toward an 
end: "The incidents and the plot are the end of tragedy: and the end is the chief
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thing of all" (14.50al6ff). This defines the plot’s moral nature as it associates tragic 
action with a teleological directive to aim at some good and the thought which 
begins Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.' Achievement of an end is the attainment of 
the good—completion or perfection in the good at which all things aim. Aristotle, 
therefore, must emphasize actions in tragedy because it is primarily by human action 
in the completed form of the structure of a human life, instead of simply by 
character, that happiness, the ultimate human good, is realized. Plot as the telos of 
tragedy is a continuation of this line of thought. It gives tragedy a definite moral 
nature. Plot is responsible for imitating actions that lead to and constitute happiness 
or unhappiness; it functions as a means to reveal human virtuosity by showing how 
human action produces that happiness, or unhappiness, as is more often the case in 
tragedy. By revealing just how human folly may undermine human flourishing, 
tragedy becomes a measure of the degree to which action or life is conducted on the 
level of virtuosity.?3
Plot is therefore a complex moral phenomenon, reflecting the complexity of 
human action, emotion, character, and life in general. Through his poetic skill the 
tragic poet constructs the proper tragic plot that will evoke the emotions that define 
the proper response to tragic action, emotions that also have a complicated nature. 
Scholars point to passages in Aristotle’s Rhetoric to define what he means exactly by 
the pity and fear evoked by tragedy. In Book II of the Rhetoric Aristotle defines 
skeoq ("pity," "compassion") as "a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly 
or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil that one might expect 
to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near (8:85b)." He 
defines <t>o(3oq ("fear") in the same work thus: "for men do not fear all evils...but 
only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far
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off but near at hand and threatening (5:82a);" later he adds, "fear is accompanied by 
the expectation that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune (5:82b)." To 
support the claim that these two emotions are closely connected, we can quote 
another passage of the Rhetoric: "We have to remember the general principle that 
what we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others (8:86a)."84 
Pity therefore implies that we feel sympathy and compassion for someone who is 
suffering. We identify with the person’s sorrow, share it in some degree; although 
it is not our own, we recognize and fear that it could be. Fear indicates the threat 
of danger is near, that something might happen soon to cause great pain in suffering 
and misfortune, something that should be avoided at all costs.
Kaufmann suggests that these two English terms are weak translations of the 
ancient Greek when one considers what happens when experiencing a Greek 
tragedy, an experience of intense suffering and overwhelming terror. Instead of 
pity and fear, he thus prefers "ruth," an archaic English word with a meaning which 
is the opposite of ruthless, and "terror," a stronger form of fear that is implied by 
the origins of the word 4>oPoq, which meant panic flight in the Homeric epics. 
Kaufmann admits that Aristotle’s meaning probably lies somewhere in between his 
own alternatives and the more usual translations of "pity" and "fear." Once again 
we see the difficulty and the distortion in meaning when one language and one 
culture is translated into another and across centuries of time. It is crucial to the 
understanding of tragedy, however, to get an appropriate sense of these emotions 
because Aristotle considers them definitive for the quality of true tragic action.85 
Since these emotions are effects of the plot, they are also emotions deeply involved 
in the moral nature of tragedy, as we shall see below.
Aristotle does not explain why tragedy should evoke these particular two
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emotions. He only observes that it does and that the best tragedy does it very well; 
furthermore, he believes that not only should a properly written tragedy evoke pity 
and fear, but that through this emotional response, if the tragedy is well-structured, 
a naOoipoiq occurs of these same emotions. The modem scholar is, unfortunately, 
left to wonder what Aristotle means by naOapoiq. If KaOocpmq is the final 
achievement of a piece of tragic literature, as Aristotle’s definition implies—some in 
fact call KaOapaiq the actual function of tragedy-it must be tied up with the chief 
end of tragedy, which Aristotle has already stated is the plot. With this connection 
to the ultimate end of tragedy, icaOapoiq also attains a definite moral status since the 
structure of the events in a work of tragedy are an imitation of human life, which for 
Aristotle means a life that ought to strive toward evbotipovioL, thus toward moral 
perfection.
KaOapmq is another very controversial term in Aristotle’s Poetics and has been 
variously interpreted by many scholars. Amelie Rorty summarizes the different 
ideas combined in this term in three different interpretations: a medical therapeutic 
cleansing or purgation; a formal ritualized purification of powerful and dangerous 
emotions; an intellectual clarification which directs emotions to their properly 
intended objects. All three forms, Rorty says, are meant by Aristotle and are 
necessary for the "proper functioning of a well-balanced soul," that is, a soul 
brought to its proper order, functioning healthily, with neither an excess nor 
deficiency of emotions, with thought and emotion fulfilled in right measure, defined 
and directed toward the right things.86 She believes that the debate over whether 
KaBapatq is an intellectual clarification or an emotional rectification is unnecessary, 
since for Aristotle, thought, character, and action are coordinate in human practical 
life. She justifies her view with the fact that, as we saw in his Nicomachean Ethics,
83
Aristotle had insisted that moral virtuosity of character cannot be attained without
practical wisdom. Rorty herself describes KaOapotq as a working through the
emotions, which allows a person to realize "the proper objects of otherwise diffuse
and sometimes misdirected passions;" hence, she concludes:
In recognizing and re-cognizing the real directions of their attitudes, the 
members of an audience are able to feel them appropriately; and by 
experiencing them in their clarified and purified forms, in a ritually defined and 
bounded setting, they are able to experience, however briefly, the kind of 
psychological functioning, the balance and harmony that self-knowledge can 
bring to action.87
Closely associated with the concept of catharsis is the idea of tragic pleasure, 
another mysterious and unexplained concept in the Poetics. It seems morbid to 
claim that tragic poetry is pleasurable; it is paradoxical that the poet should strive to 
produce pleasure in his tragedies. How can observing the pain of human misery 
and failure be pleasing in any way? Aristotle, however, does make just that claim 
and recommendation for the rules of a perfect tragedy. He says in Poetics, Chapter 
14:
ov yap  iraoap Bel farslr rjBopr/p ccko rpayipBiaq aXka tt/p oinsiav. sirei Be 
Tr\v airo sXeov Kai <j>o(3ov Bia p.ip'qoeoiq Bel riBovr\v irapaoicevafeip top 
TroLTfTTjp, <f>apepop d>g tovto sp roiq T p a y p a o iP  Sp.'ffOCqTBOP.
...for we must not demand from tragedy every kind of pleasure, but the one 
which is proper (belongs) to it as its own. And since the poet must provide 
that pleasure which comes from pity and fear through the imitation, it is 
evident that this (particular pleasure) must be created within the circumstances 
(of the plot). (1453bll-14)88
There is then a very specific and unique pleasure that tragedy produces, and it comes
from pity and fear. From this passage many assume that Aristotle is speaking of
naOapoiq as a pleasurable release; however, from his discussion of pleasure in the
Nicomachean Ethics, it is likely that Aristotle means tragic pleasure to be much
more than that.
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Aristotle defines pleasure in Book VII of his Nicomachean Ethics as the 
unimpeded activity of our natural state (1153al4-15). Every activity naturally 
exercised is accompanied by a pleasure proper to it. This pleasure is independent 
of any kind of achievement that might result from the activity and it is separate from 
the state that produces it. It is, therefore, a quality entirely intrinisic to the activity, 
as it fulfills, completes and perfects the action appropriate to what the activity is. 
Pleasure perfects the activity differently than the perfection that the goodness of the 
activity brings however. Aristotle states that the perfection of pleasure does not 
perfect as a fixed disposition (e.g. a virtue) does, but by being a supervening 
{sTiyiyvonevov) perfection, like the bloom of health in the young and vigorous 
(1174b23ff). Hence pleasure accompanies and augments human activity when it is 
done as it should be, unimpeded by its imperfection, any incompletion of form or 
function.89
Pleasures are very distinct from one another, differing according to the activity 
that produces them. Some pleasures are therefore better than others. Recall 
Aristotle’s cautions that the wrong kind of pleasures corrupt the human being and 
that it is easy for the human being to get lost in the pursuit of the kind of pleasures 
which belong to cows rather than human beings. We can therefore choose 
pleasures which are more worthy of us and are more conducive to our human 
virtuosity. Pleasure, however, is not the ultimate end of human life. We choose 
our acts for their own sakes, for our ultimate human good, and not the pleasures that 
they bring. Aristotle emphasizes this point by remarking how the courageous 
person will choose to act well even if he must sacrifice his own life, forfeiting all 
goods and pleasures of life for the sake of acting good and nobly, rather than basely 
(1117blOff).90 The ultimate value in being a human being for Aristotle therefore
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remains firmly in our human virtuosity; nevertheless, pleasure is a value of high • 
worth in its own right, as he says: "there is no pleasure without activity and no 
perfect activity without its pleasure (1175a21)."
As with human activity and life, tragic action in the plot also must attain to its 
own peculiar pleasure in its ultimate perfection. In his Poetics Aristotle alludes to 
two aspects of the pleasure in tragedy: there is the pleasure derived from a tragedy 
when all its parts are well-formed and well-performed, a pleasure in the unity and 
order of each incident, and there is the pleasure the human being derives from 
imitation, a kind of delight in the recognition of the imitation’s likeness to reality 
and in the learning through the imitation. But Aristotle does not answer the 
question what is learned through the tragic imitation of human activity and life. If 
the learning is simply a recognition of what is essentially human in human life, 
Aristotle implies that our essential humanity, as it is reflected in tragic action, does 
involve definite moral implications and responsibilities, and that the pleasure tragedy 
gives also involves the moral life in some way as well.91 This question will be 
discussed more fully below.
In order to explore the moral implications of the controversial terms in 
Aristotle’s definition of tragedy, it is necessary to turn to Aristotle’s thoughts on the 
character of the ideal tragic protagonist, since character is a pivotal moral element in 
both Aristotle’s virtue ethics and his Poetics, and it is by the reversal of the 
protagonist’s fortunes through his actions and character that the correct proportion of 
pity and fear is aroused in tragedy. In Poetics, Chapter 13, Aristotle outlines his 
criteria for the tragic protagonist. It turns out that the ideal tragic protagonist must 
be a person who occupies the mean position between perfect goodness and absolute 
vice or moral depravity. He is not especially distinguished in human virtuosity
( a p s r i i )  and justice, and he falls into misfortune through no vice or depravity, but 
rather through a "certain hamartia ( a p a p T t a ) " —some fatal error in conduct, or 
judgment, or a human frailty for which he is not fully responsible. Aristotle also 
required that the protagonist have great renown and good fortune so that his high 
personal status would make him more admirable and his fall into misfortune far 
more dramatic. Thus, the tragic protagonist is a person who is more good than 
bad, highly admirable in many respects, but not perfect, not faultless. Although he 
may be someone of high social status, he is in his humanity a person like ourselves 
(bfjLolov), one with whom we can identify and whom we can understand, therefore, 
feeling fear for his fault and misfortune, knowing that his suffering could easily be 
our own. Because his a p a p r i a  is largely unintentional, not done with forethought 
or malice, and his error is one in which he is not completely blameworthy, we can 
also feel pity for an undeserved or unjustified suffering. Intellectual judgment is 
therefore combined with emotions of pity and fear in the proper response to a tragic 
performance. The spectator must evaluate emotionally and ethically the 
protagonist’s moral choices and his moral character to obtain the proper tragic 
pleasure and to experience the true tragic sense of life as intended by the tragic 
poet.92
Exactly what Aristotle means by a "certain hamartia" is another hotly debated 
concept, similar to the KaOapoiq controversy. Is it a moral flaw of character, or a 
simple intellectual mistake of fact due to ignorance? In view of his account of 
moral error in his Nicomachean Ethics, it is most likely and more typically 
Aristotelian that apapria  denotes a range of meanings and applications that include 
varying degrees of moral blame as well as simple intellectual error. What is 
important is that the agent’s culpability is mitigated by circumstances in such a way
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that the tragic emotions of pity and fear can be produced.93 'A/xapTiai is 
fundamentally the deviation in some degree from the mean in aretaic human 
conduct. It thus mars the moral perfection of Aristotle’s universe. Because 
Aristotle sees the natural order as always functioning in the best possible way, to be 
in attunement with that order will also represent the best. For moral perfection to 
be attained in harmony with nature, moral goodness must be acquired through one’s 
own effort-study, practice, and the experience of years. This is nature’ own best 
way of attaining perfection and, therefore, to participate in what is most sublime and 
blessed in the universe, this way must also be the human being’s. Aristotle thus 
asserts that nature does not depend upon chance ( t v x v )  to attain perfection.
However, he does understand full well that factors exist in human life that will make 
human happiness much more difficult, or even impossible, to obtain. For example, 
the addition of some degree of external prosperity in the form of such things as 
friends, wealth, political power, good birth, good children, and personal beauty will 
augment the ability to perform virtuous acts and be happy. Aristotle admits such 
external attributes do require a kind of good luck. In such situations as these, 
where the individual cannot control external factors that contribute to his happiness, 
the universe is imperfect. Aristotle nevertheless firmly maintains that it is better to 
be happy through the greater and more divine prize of goodness--one’s own efforts— 
as this is in more perfect accord with nature’s own best way (NE 1.8-9 1099a30- 
1099b24).
Because of Aristotle’s firm belief in a natural order that is arranged toward 
attaining what is best, apapria ,  as a deviation from that best, becomes very 
important to Aristotle, for it demonstrates how the human being, in spite of what he 
believes are his best efforts, deviates from the proper path to his perfection, and
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ultimate happiness. The part afiapTia plays in human happiness is also somewhat 
ambiguous, since it represents a kind of human error that seems both within and 
without human control—a mistake due to ignorance of circumstances, but which 
could have been foreseen and avoided.94 This raises the question of the extent to 
which the human being can actually control his ignorance. The moral element of 
tragedy is, therefore, a dominant theme in the Poetics, as Aristotle outlines the kinds 
of plot and character which would fail to arouse the proper tragic emotions and 
pleasure (1452b30ff). Thus tragedy should not depict morally good or worthy 
(sTnsiKelg) men passing from good fortune to bad, for this is shocking (fuapop), 
morally repugnant, and outrageous; nor should the wicked or the morally depraved 
(p.ox6ypot) be seen passing from bad fortune to good as this is not only not pitiable 
or fearful, but it does not satisfy feelings of "philanthropy" ( t o  <t>Lk<xvdp<i3irov), a 
term signifying human feelings of sympathy and a kind of moral sense of propriety 
for good fortune which is clearly deserved.95 It is likewise particularly untragic to 
show a bad man passing from good fortune to bad because this reversal and 
suffering is not undeserved. In all possible plots Aristotle notes the type of moral 
response the character and his actions arouse, describing them in terms of moral 
repugnance and outrage or moral satisfaction and propriety.
In the strictest sense, the arousal of pity and fear is an aesthetic requirement for 
the construction of a good tragedy.96 The concept of t o  <f>i\avOpo)Tcov, however, 
gives this feature of Aristotle’s theory much of its moral significance. It appears 
obvious that Aristotle’s discussion of the various schemes of tragic action that will 
properly arouse the essential tragic emotions of pity and fear is intended to show 
how the satisfaction or lack of satisfaction of the audience’s moral sensibilities must 
be considered by the tragic poet if he is to arouse successfully these emotions. If
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the tragic action is morally outrageous, neither pity nor fear will be evoked in the 
audience, the tragedy will not have its tragic effect--it will not be a real tragedy.
This does not mean, however, that tragedy must evoke feelings of moral satisfaction 
to be truly tragic; on the contrary, Aristotle only states that a tragedy must not 
depict a situation which is not satisfactory to moral propriety (ot/ <f>Lhav9pu)Tov).
The requirements of tragedy are much more subtle and complex than to be fulfilled 
by one simple rule.
By exact definition, (frCkavdpwicov basically means "love," or "regard for"
(4>i\elp) the human being (avOpuTroq). Its meaning changes as it is applied in 
different contexts. Generally, it has two different meanings: (1) a feeling of 
general sympathy with our fellow human beings, whether the misfortune of another 
human being is deserved or undeserved, making it a different sort of sympathy from 
that which is a part of pity; (2) a moral sense of natural justice which is satisfied by 
deserved suffering or deserved prosperity, in other words, by the just punishment of 
the bad and the good fortune of the good. This second meaning can include "poetic 
justice," whereby punishment or reward seems especially suited to the character, 
such as when a clever, unjust man is deceived in an equally clever scam; however, 
this is not the kind of moral propriety Aristotle intends for the proper tragic effect.
It makes more sense to the context in which the term (frihoivBpu'Kov is used in the 
Poetics that Aristotle intends the second meaning of our moral sense of justice, that 
is, moral propriety or*moral proportion. Aristotle also intends that the avoidance of 
t o  fjuapou must be kept in mind at the same time. Thus, pity is felt when the 
audience judges that two criteria are met, that there is human suffering and that it is 
undeserved, while fear is felt for the protagonist when he is judged to be a person 
like ourselves (6( i o l o p ). The moral sense is secondary to these emotions, but it
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functions critically in allowing the audience to feel these emotions, because this 
sense determines which changes of fortune the protagonist experiences warrant the 
appropriate moral response and emotion. This will make more sense when one 
examines Aristotle’s criteria for the particular tragic situation that will elicit the 
proper response to tragedy, a situation which lies in between the extremes of t o  
piapov and t o  (frChavOpuTov.
The intermediate case of the neither very good (sTrisi/ofe)97 man nor the very 
bad (o<f>o8pa Tovqpov), a man who is better rather than worse, and who falls from 
good fortune to bad fortune through a apapria, is the tragic plot the poet should 
aim for. This best kind of plot is balanced between extremes of moral outrage and 
exact retribution, for both the morally outrageous and exact retribution eliminates 
the arousal of pity which depends upon undeserved suffering, which would not exist 
in these extreme cases. The protagonist who is more good than bad is more like us; 
therefore, his misfortune arouses the proper degree of fear. The change of fortune 
from good to bad for such a man will arouse the correct proportion of pity and fear 
only when he commits a apapria  for which he is somewhat responsible, but which 
is not of the sort that is morally repugnant, that is, vicious or depraved, since only 
in this way can the poet create a crucial tragic imbalance between the tragic 
protagonist’s action and the merit of the disasterous consequences. This means that 
tragedy can not satisfy t o  <j>Ckavdpanov too much, which would happen if the good 
were always rewarded and the bad punished; pity would not be aroused, the tragic 
effect would not be achieved. Tragedy would descend into melodrama in this case.
It is interesting to note that what is best for a tragic plot lies in a range which is the
mean between extremes, that one aims for a critical balance, recalling Aristotle’s\
doctrine of the mean in human virtuosity.
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The term t o  / u apov is another word Aristotle leaves unexplained in his Poetics. 
It is a very strong word, denoting disgust and revulsion. Its force compels one to 
ask why Aristotle finds the fall of the very good man so shocking and repulsive.
The moral import of much of the passage where Aristotle makes this statement 
suggests that his reasons for his reaction are also concerned with his attitudes toward 
the moral implications of tragedy. The ideal tragic protagonist is clearly not the 
same as the ideal moral agent—the OTovbaioq in Aristotle’s ethics. For the 
atrovbaioq knows the mean; he knowingly practices human virtuosity and is skilled 
at hitting the mark of conduct appropriate for human flourishing.98 In tragedy the 
protagonist has not yet attained moral perfection. Although his intentions may be 
good, he is unskilled at being a virtuoso human being, he fails to hit the mean; in 
fact, he may not even know where it lies so that he can aim at the proper goal, 
guiding his conduct accordingly. Through his tragic suffering, however, the tragic 
protagonist and the audience learn the consequences of his error and its human 
significance. They come to know just how the protagonist deviates from the mean. 
It should be noted that the word which Aristotle uses to designate the morally good 
man—the emsiKriq—whose fall to misfortune is shocking for Aristotle is nearly 
synonymous with airovbouoq and svbaifiojp in the Nicomachean Ethics, which is why 
Aristotle reacts so violently to such a calamity.99 For Aristotle to react with such 
moral revulsion indicates that the STneinrjq, in contrast to the tragic protagonist, is in 
the same category of high moral worth and skill as the cnrovbouoq and the evbmnov, 
so that he can never do anything morally flawed to become unhappy, however 
adverse his circumstances become. If he were to be the protagonist, not only would 
the proper tragic effect be destroyed, but so would the foundations of Aristotle’s 
whole ethical theory.
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Besides being a treatise on tragic poetry, Aristotle’s Poetics is also Aristotle’s 
defense against Plato’s criticisms of poetry. As was mentioned above, Plato 
condemns poetry in his writings, particularly in the Republic, X. Plato maintains 
that poetry is a detriment to emotional self-control and reason; it is a lie which is far
i
from reality and ultimate truth. When poetry tells stories that represent the gods as 
immoral, or where goodness does not bring any benefit, Plato believes it becomes a 
harm to human morality and a threat to civic harmony. He does believe, however, 
that poetry has value in educating the young toward virtue when the stories it tells 
are fashioned wholesomely, those which give good images of the gods, showing 
them as the cause of all good things.100 In contrast, Aristotle’s concept of 
KaOapoiq implies that there may be a benefit to the human being in arousing 
particular emotions, in educating these emotions, rather than repressing them. 
Aristotle also-believes that poetry was not meant to mirror ultimate reality; however, 
it does depict universals. Its truth is more philosophical and higher than the truth 
contained in the particulars of history (1451b36ff). Furthermore, the human being 
learns through imitation and he finds pleasure in this activity (1448b4ff). Since 
Aristotle defines tragedy as an imitation, the implication is that there may be some 
kind of learning process associated with tragic imitation, although it is not clear that 
this is what Aristotle has in mind.
Aristotle does not explicitly state that tragic poetry should improve a person’s 
moral judgment. Aristotle only asserts that tragedy has a moral effeci--that if pity 
and fear are aroused in a certain way from the appropriate kind of plot, a KctOapoiq 
is achieved, and a benefit presumably is obtained. The many echoings in the 
Poetics of principles in the Nicomachean Ethics also hint that Aristotle considers 
tragedy to be directed in a certain degree and in some kind of unexplained way
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toward the ethical dimension of human life. Aristotle’s descriptions of the proper 
tragic plot, the chief end of the art of tragedy, are imbued with moral values. With 
this kind of evidence, it seems appropriate to wonder if Aristotle did indeed see 
some moral instructional value in tragedy. It is certain that many others since 
Aristotle did and still do. Greek tragedy itself is full of moral lessons: thus, the 
tragedians themselves were no doubt aware of tragedy’s moral power and influence. 
It may be of benefit to examine some of the speculations about what it is that 
tragedy teaches.
Scholars ask why and what and whom we should pity and fear in tragedy; it is 
not clear-the tragic protagonist, ourselves, general humanity, or all three.101 
These simple questions quickly transform themselves into ethical questions involving 
the nature of human life and its value. Most speculations about the educative value 
of tragedy center around Aristotle’s concept of naQapoiq. Martha Nussbaum writes 
that pity and fear reveal the importance of the human good, as these are sources of 
illumination or clarification and therefore provide a richer* deeper self-understanding 
of the human being and of life.102 She bases her conclusion on the central meaning 
of n a Q a p a i q  as a clearing up, a clarification. In Plato there is even evidence that 
K a O a p a t g  is used to describe the clearing up of the vision of the soul by the removal 
of bodily obstacles, which associates the word with the true or truly knowable. The 
K a O a p o i q  provided by tragedy, therefore, allows one to explore the pitiable and the 
fearful, intellectually and emotionally clarifying these emotions and their objects, 
thereby bringing us to a clearer understanding of ourselves in our essential 
humanity. Tragedy dramatizes such moments of awareness, illuminating how our 
judgments can become distorted and giving us "access to a truer and deeper level of 
ourselves, to values and commitments that have been concealed beneath defensive
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ambition or rationalization."103 Moreover, Nussbaum also interprets Aristotle to 
intend that the appropriate response of pity and fear to a tragic situation is valuable 
in itself, a part of good character and who we are as human beings. These 
emotional responses would then play some part in our completion as human beings.
Amelie Rorty concurs with Nussbaum. She also admits that witnessing a 
tragedy will not make us virtuous—only the repetition of virtuous acts can do that.
As spectators of a tragedy, we gain a recognition of who and what we are, the 
attunement of our emotions, the revelation that character determines one’s fate, a 
sense of a common humanity, a shared civic life, and a connection to the activity of 
a larger world order. As we learn to know who we are, she says, we will know 
how to act, what our obligations are and what is important in the way we interact 
with others. Tragedy shows us that we may be ignorant and forgetful of who and 
what we are; therefore, for a moment, tragedy rectifies our ignorance. Rorty 
recalls that Aristotle said that human virtuosity includes the capacity to have the 
right emotional reactions at the right time, in the right way, directed at the right 
objects, and she implies that tragedy somehow educates us in this capacity.104
David Forte also believes that tragedy provides recognition and enlightenment 
of our human condition through its portrayal of human suffering. Tragic suffering, 
Forte says, did not force Aristotle into believing that the human condition is absurd, 
implying in this observation that Aristotle had reason for thinking the opposite. 
Moreover, to feel the appropriate pity for undeserved misfortune means the spectator 
must be a person of a certain moral sensitivity. Forte therefore expresses the moral 
sense of tragedy’s audience in a different way from that of our discussion of t o  
4>i)\div9po)irop above.105 Aristotle also indicates a similar appraisal of the moral 
quality of the audience when he says in the Rhetoric: "In order to feel pity we must
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also believe in the goodness of at least some people; if you think nobody good, you
will believe that everybody deserves evil fortune" (1385b35). Aristotle also argues
that feeling pity reveals some moral worth in the one who feels the pity:
If you are pained by the unmerited distress of others, you will be pleaised, or at 
least not pained, by their merited distress. Thus no good man can be pained by 
the punishment of parricides or murderers. These are things we are bound to 
rejoice at, as we must at the prosperity of the deserving; both these things are 
just, and both give pleasure to any honest man...All these feelings are 
associated with the same type of moral character. (1386b 26ff)1̂ 6
Aristotle obviously locates high value and moral worth in the person who can feel
pity in the appropriate circumstances; such a person is good and honest, he is aiming
at the mean in moral conduct and at moral virtuosity. Furthermore, such a person
is capable of reflecting upon tragedy and understanding its significance; therefore,
the pain of human suffering in tragedy is necessary for moral development; if, that
is, art can indeed educate moral judgment. It is evident, however, that in this
appraisal is Aristotle’s firm belief that there is worth and validity in viewing
humanity and the human condition as essentially good, that goodness brings pleasure
to those who are themselves good.
These are very grand speculations by a few contemporary scholars,
extrapolated from a handful of unexplained words and concepts in Aristotle’s
Poetics. We cannot know precisely whether any of them are what Aristotle had in
mind. They are evidence, however, of the effect tragedy may have on human
thought and emotion. Aristotle said that tragedy is an imitation of action and of
life, and the complexity of that action and life is reflected in the controversy that
surrounds his simple outline of tragic theory, as well as in these speculations about
what Aristotle means. It is certain that Aristotle does see tragedy as a valid form of
an imitation of reality; he sees it as having some mysterious moral function in moral
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education by way of what he calls a notOotpoiq of pity and fear. The Poetics is, 
therefore, also compatible with the Nicomachean Ethics', it amplifies and 
complements Aristotle’s ethics, giving further validity and worth to striving to be 
good. It also shows that modem theory of tragedy is mistaken; tragedy is not 
nihilistic, nor is it hopeless.
Having established that Aristotle’s ethics and Greek tragedy are fundamentally 
compatible, we can now see that tragedy gives us representations of moral 
imperfection. This is especially apparent in Aristotle’s concept of a p a p T t a ,  which 
echoes concepts in his Nicomachean Ethics that concern character and moral error. 
In tragic drama’s characters we see examples of human beings who fall short of the 
Aristotelian moral ideals, the aTouSaiog and the <j>p6vi(iog. Therefore, we can 
explain the moral imperfection depicted in tragedy in terms drawn from the 
Nicomachean Ethics. We can thus elucidate as well how moral failure cannot be 
easily explained in terms of modem moral theory, how modem moral theory is 
flawed because it does not take into account the kind of person one is and lacks a 
consideration of the virtues in moral conduct. Therefore, we will now turn to an 
examination of two ancient Greek tragedies, since Greek tragedy best illustrates the 
tragic sense of life and moral imperfection, an examination of which can bring an 
even deeper understanding of what moral perfection means and what being morally 
good is all about. Moreover, we will discover that Aristotle’s ethical theory offers 
a solution to the complexity of human action and life in the development of moral 
depth.
Chapter 4 
Two Greek Tragedies
Sophocles’ Antigone is a Greek tragedy which powerfully confronts what it is. 
to be a human being in the world. It questions and explores how the human being 
comes to choose and do what is most deeply right in life; as such, it is particularly 
applicable to Aristotle’s ideal of moral perfection and human virtuosity. Antigone 
is foremost a story about a conflict of principles between two different people. It is 
on one level a story about a simple family conflict, yet on another level represents a 
conflict of much greater dimension and serious consequence, for in this story the 
conflict ends tragically in death and destruction. Sophocles’ tragedy of conflict 
forces us to examine the dynamics of human conflict, i.e., differences in points of 
view and how these can be resolved and, especially, the place of the deeply right in 
human life, whether it should be pursued and how that can be done.
The conflict begins before the opening scene of the play. Polyneices and 
Eteocles, the brothers of Antigone and the sons of Oedipus, have fought and killed 
one another in a civil war for the kingship of Thebes. Creon, their uncle and now 
ruler of the city, has decreed rightfully by law that because he is a traitor,
Polyneices is to be denied burial, while Eteocles, the city’s defender, will be buried 
with full honors. As the play opens Antigone is approaching her sister Ismene for 
help in burying their brother. She plans to defy her uncle’s decree, even though it 
means her own death by public stoning, because a proper reverence for the 
unwritten laws of the gods demands the burial of one’s own kin; therefore, she has 
the stronger claim to what is the most deeply right thing to do. Ismene, however,
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refuses to help her sister. Afraid to defy the State and convinced of her weakness 
as a woman, she pleads with Antigone to consider and reflect upon what she does, 
reminding her of the ill-fortune which has marred their family history (49-68). 
Calling her "overbold" (47) and "mindless" (99), Ismene finally cautions Antigone 
against attempting to do the impossible (92). Antigone proudly proclaims that she 
will do the deed alone if she must, as it is noble and right, the loving thing to do, 
and holy, for it is more important to her to please the dead than the living and to 
honor what is honorable to the gods (69-77). In this first scene the conflict is 
suddenly amplified to something beyond just a civil war led by brothers.
Sophocles establishes in his prologue that the conflict in his play is a 
fundamental opposition between the human and the divine, the world of man’s 
politics and state decrees versus that of religious duty and reverence to the laws of 
the gods. Within this broad framework, obligations to family clash fiercely with 
obligations to the State, while the needs and personalities of individual family 
members also tumultuously collide. In the interaction and contrast between the two 
sisters, Sophocles reveals Antigone’s proud and willful nature. She is much like 
her father, Oedipus. Her harsh and scornful treatment of Ismene’s gentle caution 
and understandable fear is startling. Creon’s edict appears to offend Antigone’s 
own strong personal pride. She is short-tempered and sharply sarcastic when 
opposed, and as she speaks of love for her dead brother she appears to have no 
comparable share of love for her only sister. Antigone’s courage to do the right 
thing in the face of death is also certainly heroic, and her steadfast, uncompromising 
adherence to religious principle and justice is highly admirable, but her convictions 
are noticeably narrow and extremely onesided. Although Ismene tells Antigone it is 
senseless to do what is excessive (68), Sophocles’ first scene appears to question the 
rightness of Antigone’s doings and her motive much less than the excessiveness of
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her manner, the violent stubbornness with which she seems to direct her deed.
The Parodos which follows the prologue sings of the triumph of Thebes’ 
victory over its enemies and of Zeus’ abhorrence of the boasts of a proud tongue, 
the pride that goes before a fall (100-161). Its song, therefore, seems to point back 
to Antigone’s pride in the previous scene and forward to Creon in the next scene 
where he puts forth his own proud principles of kingship and proper rule. Needless 
to say, this background music hints ominously of impending disaster for both uncle 
and neice. Creon’s speech reveals that he cares only for the safety of the city and 
he will show no mercy to his foes, which means no mercy for Polyneices. Justice 
is defined strictly as good will to Thebes and only those who show the proper good 
will in obedience to Creon and the city will be honored by Creon (209-210). His is 
a power, the chorus declares, which extends over both the living and the dead (211- 
214). Like Antigone’s, Creon’s wrath is quickly aroused when he meets with 
opposition. In his position as a new and untried ruler, Creon is obviously insecure, 
and when he learns of Polyneices’ mysterious burial, he quickly denies any 
workings of the gods in the event and insists in his fear and paranoia that it is the 
work of insurrection and conspiracy against him (280-314). Creon will listen to no 
voice but his own.
When Creon confronts Antigone, the same excessive stubbornness in their 
characters and their unyielding positions are even more clearly demonstrated. As 
they stand side by side, inflexibly polarized, neither one listens or learns from the 
other. Creon angrily accuses and threatens Antigone, fearful that he will look weak 
in the eyes of his subjects if he allows anyone, especially a woman, to go 
unpunished (484-485); he is convinced that the State will suffer and he will be 
shamed. Antigone appears determined to die, as she proudly defies and taunts 
Creon, calling him a fool (470). She coldly rejects her sister Ismene’s wish to
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share her death; but when Ismene asks why Antigone causes her this grief, since it 
in no way benefits Antigone (50), Antigone appears to soften a little and tells her 
sister that if she laughs at her, she does so from her own pain (52). In this brief 
statement is a very important point about human conflict, for it is the pain of grief, 
fear, anger, hurt pride, anguish over injustice, and other various pains of heart 
which are often the underlying cause of conflict between two people. While 
vengence, a retaliation of pain for pain, is an attempt to relieve one’s pain, such 
reprisal more often heightens and extends the conflict, rather than resolving it; 
vengence does not heal the heart’s seering pain. People in conflict thus persist in 
their irrational behavior, even when it gives no real benefit to either party, so that 
the conflict inevitably continues, as it does here in the Antigone.
In the second choral ode, the famous "Ode to Man" (332-383), Sophocles 
poses the essential conflict between the human and the divine in terms of the 
awesome power of man to conquer and control his world.107 Man’s ingenuity and 
resourceful skill allow him to sail the seas, plough the earth, tame and domesticate 
the animals of both land and sea. With his intelligence, man has taught himself 
speech and thought and civic law, and how to protect himself from the harshness of 
his environment, as well as from diseases that afflict his body. Only death limits 
man, reminding him that he is still mortal.
Although this ode praises the world of man and his abilities, it is also deeply 
ironic, containing a subtle warning. This image of man as controller of the earth 
and life shows him to be out of balance and out of control. The human being 
confidently and completely subjugates what is naturally wild and uncontrollable 
without acknowledging the power and place of nature—of the divine—in the scheme 
of the universe. In the last strophe, the ode notes that man’s ingenuity of art is not 
stable; it is entirely unpredictable, since it brings him sometimes to evil and
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sometimes to good. Unless, the ode seems to warn, man honors both worlds 
together, both the laws of the land and the justice of the gods, he will be uncitied 
(arroXig 370), that is, homeless, rootless, or like a ship without a harbor or anchor. 
This rootlessness is, furthermore, associated with a reckless overboldness (rbXpag 
371) and what is not right and good and noble ( t o  prj KaXop 370). Clearly, Creon 
and Antigone are implicated in these words, since, ironically, they both believe they 
can control their fates absolutely, and that they alone know what is completely right 
with no acknowledgment of what may be right in the claims of another. Antigone’s 
motive may be more right and good, but the manner in which she asserts her views 
is, like Creon’s, deficient in goodness. (More will be said about this point below.)
When Haemon confronts his father in the center of the play he brings a voice 
of calm reason to the stage (635-765). With great diplomacy and care, Haemon 
considers his father’s position and sensibilities as he pleads for the life of Antigone, 
his bride to be. He first appeals to reason, seeming to balance the extreme view 
expressed in the Ode to Man, as he says: "the gods caused reason to grow in the 
minds of men, and it is the highest of all our possessions (683-684)." He speaks 
out on behalf of the people of the city who keep silent out of fear of Creon’s anger 
and he tells his father that they sympathize with Antigone and believe the burial of 
Polyneices is right and a glorious deed (690-700). Finally Haemon attempts to 
resolve the conflict by appealing to what is even more deeply right, saying: 
spot be oov rrpaoooprog svrvx&g, rrdrsp,
OVK SOTLP O v b s P  K T r j f id  T ip iW T S p O P .
tl  yap irarpog OaXXoprog smXsiag rsKvoig 
ayaXpa p e l f r p ,  rj n  rcpog iraiboip r r a rpi, 
p r i  vvv sv r)9og povvov sv o a v 7 &  <j>opsi, 
big <t>rjg av, Kovbsv aXXo, t o v t '  opQ&g sxsiu. 
bang yap avrog rj fypovslv povog boKsl, 
rj yX&aaap, rjp  o v k  aXXog, rj i j / v x w  s x s i p , 
o v t o i  b ia i r T V x O s p T s g  uxfrO rjoaP  k s p o l .
)
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aX X ’ avbpa, net nq  ft ao<ftoq, to papOapeiP 
xoX X ’ ouaxpbv ovSsp koiI to pft tslpslp ocyotu. 
opaq irapa peidpoioi x ^ ^ p p o tq  boot
bsvhpwv VTTSIKEL, K.\C)POiq biq SKoCp̂ ETCll'
Ta 5 ’ avTiTsivovT' avrdirpepp' a x o X X u ra t .  
avTwq be vaoq ooriq eyicpaTrj iroba 
Tsivaq vteikei prjbep, vTrioiq Kara)
OTpsipaq to  Xolttop oekpaoip pavnXkerai. 
aX X ’ sine Ovpov not! perdoTaoLP bibov. 
yp&prf ya p  ei Tiq none' epov psoirepov 
Tpooson, <t>ftp' syw ys irpsofievsip xoX u 
4>vpai top apbpa tocpt’ einoTijprjq irX sw  
el S’ ovp, 4>i\ei ybtp rovTO pft ravrrf psirsip,
Kai twp \eyoPTo)P ei) nakop to papQapeip. (701-723)
To me, father, there is no possession more honorable than your faring in good 
fortune and prosperity; for what is a greater ornament of glory to chldren than 
their father flourishing? or what to a father than his children (flourishing)? Do 
not now bear one disposition only in yourself, that as you say, and nothing 
else, that (this) is right, for whoever thinks that he himself alone is wise, or 
has a tongue, or a mind, which no other (has), these men, when opened and 
spread' out, are seen to be empty. But it is not shameful that a man, even 
though he be wise, learn many things and not be too rigid. You see beside 
winter streams how as many trees as yield preserve their branches from danger, 
but the ones that resist perish altogether, root and branch. And in this same 
manner whoever, having stretched taut the ship’s sail-rope, yields in no way, 
he overturns the ship and sails for the rest of the voyage with the benches 
turned upside down. But yield your anger and grant a change.. .it is much the 
best for a man to be by nature full of understanding, but if that is not possible, 
for this is wont not to turn out in this way, learning from those speaking well is 
a good and noble thing. 108
In these words Haemon gently advises his father that the most glorious and 
honorable thing in life is flourishing and good fortune, which implies his father does 
not, or will not, have such a life if he proceeds in his present course of action and 
extreme state of mind. Haemon continues by giving his description of what real 
flourishing is. In contrast to Creon’s autocracy and rigidity of mind, the 
successfully flourishing human being is not so narrow and single-minded that he 
cannot admit learning from the wisdom of cithers. To be inflexibly proud implies a 
superficial and false wisdom, an emptiness in the soul which has no real meaning or 
purpose. To illustrate the truth and value of such flexibility, Haemon uses
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examples from both nature—unbending trees uprooted in a winter’s flood-and the 
world of man-the sailor who loses control of his ship when he holds the ropes too 
tightly, so that the sails cannot accomodate the force of the changing winds. Both 
of these colorful examples warn of destruction for an unyielding and 
unaccomodating stance in the changing circumstances of life. Anxious to resolve 
the conflict, the chorus takes up Haemon’s message, encouraging father and son to 
learn from one another, as they conclude; "it has been well spoken on both sides 
(720-725)." Creon, however, refuses to yield to his son’s wise words, insisting that 
disobedience to the State and to himself, the king, is the worst of evils; 
consequently, in the pain of their disappointment in one another, the argument once * 
again rapidly deteriorates into unproductive taunts and bitter name-calling.
Teiresias, the blind and ancient seer, finally persuades Creon to be reasonable, 
although their meeting is not without conflict (888-1090). Teiresias enters the stage 
humbly led by a young boy. The young and sighted are thus symbolically 
contrasted with the old and blind, the folly of youth and the wisdom of age, two 
views of life and two levels of strength and experience are aiding one another. "We 
come on this common way, two seeing by one, for the way is possible for the blind 
by a guide" (888-990), Teiresias says, as he offers his own true guidance and that of 
the divine world he represents to Creon. As he warns the king that he is standing 
on the razor’s edge of fate (996), it is clear he is pointing to Creon’s own stubborn 
and blind refusal to consider the wise guidance of others, a denial which will lead in 
the end to disaster. Bird signs and the failure of sacrificial rites have told the seer 
that the city is polluted by the unburied corpse of Polyneices (998-1022). The 
world of man is unhealthy; it is unbalanced and out of control because Creon’s 
decree did not account for the existence of a divine world order and deeper
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obligations to what is truly right. As Haemon had done before him, Teiresias bids 
Creon to think and correct his wrong, and so cure the city’s sickness (1023-1027). 
"Self-will brings folly,” and "there is no strength in slaying those already dead" 
(1028-1030), Teiresias wisely reasons, but Creon again refuses to listen and, holding 
on to his narrow, short-sighted principles of kingship, he accuses the old man of 
shamefully taking bribes (1033-1047). Their meeting therefore also degenerates 
into an exchange of insults and frustrated anger as had those in earlier scenes.
Teiresias’ dire warning of impending disaster frightens Creon and the chorus of 
elders. The authority of his aged wisdom and his seercraft’s link with the mysteries 
of the divine make Teiresias much more difficult for Creon to ignore. Out of fear, 
therefore, and no clear recognition of what is truly right, Creon at this point hurries 
to bury Polyneices and to free Antigone from her prison cave; but he arrives too 
late. At the play’s end corpse lies upon corpse, Antigone, Haemon, and Creon’s 
wife Eurydice have all killed themselves, cursing Creon’s unwillingness to resolve 
the conflict. His family destroyed, his life in ruins, now joyless, Creon himself 
becomes a living corpse (1167, 1288). In utter despair, Creon now sees all that he 
should have seen before. Deeply contrite, he finally admits his stubborn blindness 
(1261-1265). He has learned a bitter lesson, having, Creon remarks, been smitten 
on the head by a god (1272-1275). The worlds of the human and the divine, 
therefore, meet and touch in this tragic moment of Creon’s recognition of the deep 
truth of his own human existence.
Scholars note that Antigone is exceptionally rich in words describing reasoning 
processes and intellectual understanding. 109 Throughout the words and actions of 
the play’s characters, calm and tolerant reason is variously contrasted with emotional 
passion and foolishness, and its painful consequences. Antigone and Creon
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consistently and passionately resist appeals to reason, rigidly fixing their minds upon
only one set of principles and one claim of right. They both leave no room for
negotiation and change. By remaining at the extremes of behavior and thought,
there is then no hope of compromise, no middle way, and no resolution of the
conflict. Minor characters, such as guards and messengers, are shown in the
process of successful deliberation 110--the to and fro and back and forth
consideration of various points of view in order to find the right thing to do for the
particular circumstance. This process is obviously lacking in the minds of Creon
and Antigone, and is aborted by other characters who leave the stage in angry
frustration after confronting the impenetrable wall of these characters’ stubborn
wills. In the end, however, Creon does come to learn the error of his ways and,
although too late, he shows himself to be capable of reform. The chorus closes
with a last verse that reminds the audience of what Creon has learned:
to X X u ) t o  4>povslv e v b a ip o v ia g
irpwTou v T a p x s f  XPV 5e r a  7 ’ s ig  Osovg
prfdev acrsTCTslv; fieyd th o i be  X0701
p s y a X a g  irXrjydtg t&v V T spavx& v
otTOTsiaaPTsq
yripgc to 4>povelv eb ib a ^ a v .
By far, being wise is the first part of happiness.
And one must not treat in an unholy way the things of the gods.
For great words of the over proud teach wisdom 
in old age by repaying great blows. (1347-1353)111
Once again, these last words recall the Ode to Man and its depiction of man’s great
ingenuity of mind existing apart, unbalanced, and independent from an equal regard
for the world of the divine. Antigone thus teaches that the wisdom and greatness of
man must be joined with a reverence for the gods in order to achieve happiness and
avoid the "great blows” of disaster and human suffering.
Some scholars suggest that the opposition between Creon and Antigone actually
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represents a permanent and irreconcilable conflict between the human and the 
divine. 112 The human being is thus eternally subject to a struggle between two 
concepts of the meaning of life and is, therefore, doomed to the kind of suffering 
portrayed by Sophocles’ tragedy. In Sophocles’ plays, however, the divine shapes 
and guides the world, and the human being must find a way to shape himself and his 
life in accordance with its eternal laws; 113 but it also is by the "ultimate greatness 
and value of man that the divine order prevails" . 114 This implies that the divine 
and human are not actually apart, but intertwined and interdependent, just as 
Sophocles indicates in his image of Teiresias and the boy standing before Creon; 
for, like them, the human and the divine exist in some kind of mutual support and 
need. As the tragedy dramatizes in the person of Creon, the human being is often so 
blindly ignorant of circumstances that he requires some guidance to find his way 
through life in the world, while the meaning and power of the divine is made 
manifest by what is also meaningful and of the greatest value in the human being, 
such as the greatness that we perceive in Antigone’s heroic deed.
In Aristotelian terms Sophocles’ Antigone presents two examples of what is not 
completely right and good and noble (to fir/ ncthov 370) in moral conduct.
Antigone and Creon do not express to Koihov in their actions. Unable to act in 
accordance with this divine imperative that is rooted in the heart of nature, they 
stand apart from a true and stable good and right to which they are as human beings 
ultimately responsible. Therefore, as the "Ode to Man" describes, Antigone and 
Creon are "rootless," they forfeit their rightful place in the natural scheme of the 
cosmos. In different ways their conduct is reckless and overbold, out of proportion 
with circumstances. In the last verse, "being wise" and "wisdom" are translations 
of the phrase “ t o  4>povslv," a verbal form of the same root from which (frpopipoq
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(the man of practical wisdom) and <j>pbvr\oiq (practical wisdom) are derived. This 
word and the lesson offered in this verse also recall Aristotle’s account of practical 
wisdom in his ethical theory. Both Creon and Antigone are deficient in this faculty, 
for they miss the mark, they fail to hit the right target offered by moral virtuosity; 
they therefore suffer the consequences of their failure to adhere to a standard of 
moral perfection. For Antigone and Creon were capable of much more as human 
beings, as it is certain that the death and destruction which ended their story could 
have been avoided. Yet, Antigone and Creon reacted as they did because they were 
people of a certain sort, with characters and habits fixed in ways that made their 
conflict inevitable. We, as spectators to their drama, can feel for them, recognizing 
in the blindness of their character’s stubborn wills and their inability to Find a 
harmonious middle way a familiar pattern of human behavior. We learn in their 
story just how such conduct can lead to disaster, and how valuable is the proper 
proportion of moral virtuosity and practical wisdom.
In the second example from classical drama, Aeschylus’ Agamemenon, we will 
find another story of conflict. It is, in fact, about several intensely passionate and 
violent conflicts—a conflict between husband and wife, between two countries at 
war, between two powerful gods, between citizen and king, and finally between two 
irreconcilable rights. The scene we shall examine, in particular, dramatizes the 
internalized conflict of the human mind and heart that seeks the good, but cannot 
find a way to achieve it. It therefore depicts the complexity of a moral dilemma 
with all its agonizing intellectual and emotional tensions. This drama further 
highlights the suffering of the human being and the self-reflection that it brings.
Thus it is an example of what is required of the human being as he faces the moral 
complexity of human life. Even more than the Antigone, this tragedy of Aeschylus
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shows us how difficult it is to make correct decisions that will lead to our human 
flourishing.
The Agamemnon is the story of the murder of Agamemnon, the leader of the 
Greek expedition to Troy, by his wife Clytaemestra, in revenge for his sacrifice of 
their daughter Iphigeneia at the beginning of the war. In the opening prologue a 
watchman is wearily sitting in the darkness of the night atop Agamemnon’s palace, 
waiting for a beacon light signaling the end of the Trojan war, the return of his lord, 
and the return also of normalcy to the household below. He speaks in prayer of the 
gods, of the ordered and eternal movements of the stars and the inevitable burdens 
the changing seasons place upon men. Immediately, we are thus informed that the 
action will take place in these two very different, although interacting, realms-the 
human and the cosmic or divine—which gives Aeschylus the means to universalize 
and overlap the personal views and action of his characters and themes with a larger 
more complex cosmic truth. Human passion and pathos therefore coexist with the 
mystery of the divine.
The watchman rapidly goes through a whole array of mood swings. He is 
bored, then fearful and apprehensive, an insomniac with bad dreams. There is a 
"man-hearted" woman in the palace-a perverse situation to be sure and fraught with 
uncertainty, for she is an adulteress as well, waiting and plotting evil vengeance with 
her lover. The watchman then weeps, remembering happier times before the war 
and prays fervently for a release from his anxieties. Sudden happiness comes when 
the beacon lights up; he shouts for joy, but checks himself as he remembers 
Clytaemestra and her lover Aegisthus, wondering what will happen when 
Agamemnon finds out. In the end, the watchman can only hope with affectionate 
loyalty and in a foreboding tone that his king’s homecoming will somehow happen.
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Helpless to influence the inevitable workings of cosmic fate, symbolized by the dark 
night sky which arches silently above him, the watchman turns to watch and wait to 
see the action unfold, still standing in the darkness, looking and hoping for the light 
as do we, the audience. All this tumble of emotion with intimations of past and 
future events intertwined in the present gives a sense of great confusion, ignorance, 
helplessness, and foreboding uncertainty on the human plane of existence, while the 
larger mysterious, more orderly universe is controlling and subjecting the mass of 
humanity to its will.
Aeschylus thereupon shifts from the watchman as private individual to the 
chorus’ public collective voice in the Parodos, the first choral ode, where the 
watchman’s emotions are duplicated, but expanded in more detail. The chorus 
begins its song similarly to the watchman with reference to the long years of waiting 
for the end of the war. Then, in brief narrative, they allude to its cause, its 
hardship, and the stubbornness of the gods’ anger and the certainty of destiny’s 
eternal course. In recollection their thought encompasses the past, the present, and 
the future with ominous hints and considerable artxiety. We learn that this chorus is 
composed of old men, elders left behind by the expedition. Their wisdom of age 
and experience is undercut by wistful expressions of their bodies’ weak frailty and 
they weep for circumstances that seem hopeless. In their collective stance they 
seem to emphasize even more vigorously the weary laboring of human life and the 
helpless bewilderment of a human world subject to the cosmic unknown.
The anxious bewilderment is continued as the chorus returns to the present 
circumstances with an appeal to Clytaemestra to release them from their anxiety and 
an emotional state which vacillates wildly between dark thoughts and shining hopes; 
it is further reflected in their excited questionings about Clytaemestra’s activities.
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These questions do not seem to expect answers, but indicate instead the intense 
confusion and worry of mind which "eats” their hearts. Ironically, Clytaemestra 
performs ritual sacrifice in dutiful gratitude for the war’s end and her husband’s 
homecoming while she surreptitiously plots his murder, an act which will not heal, 
but fulfill the chorus’ fears of eminent catastrophe. Such ironic juxtapositioning of 
the chorus’ foreboding and Clytaemestra’s presence suggest that on some level of 
consciousness the chorus knows of her secret intentions, as did obviously the 
watchman, and this is, likewise, the source of their fear.
The rest of the ode follows the same format as these first stanzas and the 
opening prologue with still further expansion and repetition in imagery, emotion, 
and theme. The chorus returns again to recollections of the past and the beginning 
of the Trojan war with the story of the eagle portent which predicted a successful 
outcome of the war, but simultaneously incurred the wrath of Artemis, resulting in a 
conflict of wills between Zeus and Artemis which eventually led to Iphigeneia’s 
sacrifice. At this point the narrative flow of the ode is interrupted by another 
appeal for a release from their extreme anxiety in a prayer to Apollo to pacify the 
goddess’ anger, and in a long reflective hymn to Zeus. Following the hymn, the 
chorus vividly describes the horror and pathos of Iphigeneia’s cruel sacrifice, bound 
and gagged like a sacrificial goat upon the altar. We see the Achaean kings 
responding with horror at the prospect of Iphigeneia’s sacrifice, while Agamemnon 
is envisioned debating his choices-divine anger, the pride of a king and leader, or 
the slaughter of his own child. Anguished emotion thereupon clashes violently with 
reasoned thought, and Agamemnon makes his fatal decision, hoping that all may be 
well. Finally, the chorus, similarly again to the watchman in the prologue, refuse 
to speak more of evil. With a wait-and-see attitude they hope for good fortune, but
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then yield their thought once more to an ominous future and sufferings imposed by 
cosmic justice.
Aeschylus’ powerful imagistic style makes his poetry complex. He rapidly 
piles his descriptive adjectives, appositional phrases, and images one upon the other 
while imposing multiple layers of meaning upon single images. He does not move 
in straight lines, but in clouds of poetic image and meaning. Each line is dense 
with poetic association and implication, creating highly visual dramatic scenes which 
are incredibly alive with complex and intense emotion. The metrical rhythms and 
sounds of the Greek language further express and reinforce the meaning and emotion 
of his poetry. Thus, it is difficult in prose to describe the powerful effect of 
Aeschylus’ art, yet through his poetic skill it is clear in the first few hundred lines of 
the Agamemenon how Aeschylus defined the tragic sense of life. It is contained 
poetically throughout the emotional and thematic content of the prologue and 
Parodos, but encapsulated most effectively in a single paradoxical refrain the chorus 
sings at the end of three of the parodos’ stanzas: aCktvou a'Ckivov stirs, to 5’ sv 
vikoitu). The refrain can be translated: "Sing sorrow, sorrow: but good win out in 
the end. " 115 Keeping in mind both past evils and an uncertain future, the chorus of 
elders sings of hope mixed with hopeless despair, of evil and good together, a blend 
seen entwined throughout the ode and which comes to a climax in three, reflective 
stanzas in the center of the Parodos—the choral hymn on the nature of Zeus (160- 
183).
The tense, almost frantic anxiety of the elders and the correspondingly 
condensed syntax of the previous stanzas before the hymn suddenly relax and release 
their thought and poetic melody into a calm, soothing contemplation of the 
unfathomable cosmic order which is Zeus. The elders seek comfort and a reason
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for all the violent doom—ah answer to why for the sake of just punishment against 
Paris, Iphigeneia and the innocents of Troy must suffer. In this they are also 
expressing the eternal tragic question-the awful why of human suffering.
Aeschylus answers the chorus’ painful questioning with an enigmatic paradox and 
another good in evil—learning through suffering. Zeus’ wisdom, or cosmic law, 
says that only learning through suffering can heal and redeem mankind; in the 
moment of this particular ode and tragedy, wisdom’s lesson is moderation, or self- 
control (a<a4>popelv 181). Aeschylus, however, dramatically and paradoxically sets 
his theme of moderation against the wasteful destruction of innocents and the excess 
of passions of avenging murder which crowd turbulently round about the thoughtful 
hymn. It is also unclear exactly what or who the unavoidable pains of life teach 
here in the poem, as Aeschylus repeatedly depicts the wills of two gods and two 
claims of right pitted agonizingly against one another. In yet still another dramatic 
paradox, he calls the gods’ grace violent (183). The elders nevertheless seem to 
gain comfort from Zeus’ wisdom that there is meaning and purpose in human 
suffering, however mysterious. At the same time the clash of thought and the 
tension created in the opposing mix of energies of good and evil question how this 
can be. Amid the certainty of the cosmic order, the elders are subtly reminded of 
the precariousness and uncertainty of human life; in the end they get no conclusive 
answer at all to their agonizing dilemma.
Thus, the chorus, which represents humanity at large, remains suspended 
between the emotions of hope and despair just as their hymn to Zeus is itself 
suspended dramatically and enigmatically in the center of the parodos. As they 
resign themselves to faith in Zeus’ majestic omnipotence and the mysterious justice 
of cosmic law, they simultaneously question and doubt its meaning and justice.
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The poetry of Aeschylus’ tragedy therefore mirrors the pattern of human life, and 
represents a certain view of ultimate reality. The human being is suspended, that 
is, balanced or poised, between opposite poles of hope and despair, as well as 
between many other alternatives such as the simple and complex, good and evil, the 
rational and irrational, knowing and not knowing, seeing and not seeing himself and 
the nature of his universe. 116 Human life is thus fraught with many complex 
emotional ambiguities, paradoxes, ironies, and tensions. Sometimes life will tip 
closer toward hope and at other times it will descend into despair, yet the emotional 
substance of human life is always present as this constant tension, a psychic material 
of life which the human being must learn to cope with and learn from in order to 
•flourish and find completion as a human being.
Tragedy appears to emphasize despair, yet as Albin Lesley’s study of tragedy 
shows, the essence of tragedy, and therefore of human life also resides in hope; for 
tragedy is, as Aristotle says, the imitation of life. Each tragedian founds his view 
of tragedy and ultimate reality in the belief that there is purpose and meaning in the 
world and likewise in the terrible human suffering he portrays. Without the crucial 
tension between hope and despair, classical Greek drama would lose its tragic stature 
and its profound and ineffable meaning, as also perhaps would human life itself. 
Against our will and in a painful perplexity of heart, just as do the chorus of elders 
in the Agamemnon, we, the spectators of tragedy, are brought by tragedy’s poetic art 
to sense meaning and purpose, however silent and unseen, beyond the veil of life’s 
confusion, uncertainty, and suffering, even when we cannot explain exactly what itf
is we see and feel.
As spectators of tragedy we can also sense the disharmony in these tragic 
conflicts, in the interrelationships between the characters themselves and in the
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relationship of the individual characters with a larger, objective moral order. In 
terms of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and his Poetics we can specify what 
constitutes this disharmony by summarizing the characters’ moral imperfections—the 
"certain hamartia" that brings each to his downfall. Almost immediately in 
Antigone and Creon we see evidence of the vice short-temperedness (opyikdrrig), a 
quickness to anger that is an indication of excess according to Aristotle’s list of 
virtues (NE II.7 1108a5-10). Aristotle calls the mean state in relation to anger 
"gentleness (irpaoTrjq)," a calm, steady, unconfused state (arccpaxog), which is 
praiseworthy because one then feels anger appropriately for the right motive and 
against the right person and in the right manner and length of time (NE IV.5 
1125b26ff). Antigone and Creon were clearly justified in their anger with one 
another; Antigone had willfully broken Creon’s state decree, while Creon was 
1 shamelessly denying a proper burial to his own kin. However, the manner of the 
expression of their anger was defective, as neither’s actions proceeded from a calm, 
steady temperament. If Antigone and Creon had possessed this particular moral 
virtuosity of gentleness, their minds would surely have been more open and flexible 
to negotiation and reason, and the destruction of their lives averted.
Antigone also gives signs of a deficiency of fear and an excess of confidence, 
missing the mark of Aristotle’s criteria for true courage. Aristotle defines the truly 
courageous person as one who endures his fears and displays confidence 
appropriately-according to the merits of each situation, as reason directs him, and, 
especially, for the sake of the true end of courage, for what is beautiful, or noble 
(tou KaXou svsKa. NE III.7 1115b6ff). The most fearful thing of all for the human 
being is death; thus, the most courageous act a human being can perform is to 
endure death nobly. Antigone does indeed endure the fear of death; yet, in her zeal
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and determination to oppose Creon, she also appears to rush recklessly toward death 
as an escape from her sorrow and grief. According to Aristotle, this is not true 
courage, for to seek death as a means of escaping from our troubles is a weakness; 
we then submit to death for the wrong reason-to escape evil rather than because it is 
the noble thing to do (MsIII.7 1116al4-15). Another false motive of true courage 
that Antigone exhibits is when one rushes toward danger when driven by anger.
This can resemble true courage, but it is actually an excessive confidence that 
derives from feeling (raOoq), rather than because one intends to act nobly and as 
reason demands (NE III.7 1116b24ff).
In addition to his defective expression of anger, Creon’s moral imperfection 
also includes an excessive fear of disgrace. Aristole asserts that fear of disgrace is 
the mark of a decent man (NE III.6  1115al0ff); a proper shame is one of Aristotle’s 
virtues (NE IV.9 1128bl0ff). Creon, however, is so fearful that he will look weak 
in the eyes of others if Antigone is not punished for defying his decree that he does 
not consider the broader implications of what he does. As Creon comes to realize 
at the end of the drama, his actions are not balanced by a fear of disgrace for not 
giving his kin a decent burial, not giving due reverence to the laws of the gods.
This character defect of Creon’s could therefore be described as a deficiency in his 
sense of shame, a defect which contributed to his downfall.
Agamemnon’s imperfection is similar to Creon’s in that he also fears for his 
reputation as a king, the disgrace it would bring him if he did not lead the Achaeans 
against Troy. Yet he, too, is not sufficiently shamed by the part he plays in the 
death of his daughter. Like Creon, his responsibilities to kinship are not as strong 
as those he feels in his role as ruler. Scholars dispute whether Agamemnon had any 
other choice than to sacrifice his daughter. Is he unfairly trapped, the innocent
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victim of the gods, or morally responsible for his daughter’s death, or, finally, just 
one more tragic piece of a larger, inevitable cosmic pattern? 117 It is very 
characteristic of Aeschylus, however, to unite personal free will and the compulsion 
of necessity or external coercion in tragic situations; the characters in his dramas 
often are, paradoxically, both responsible for their decisions, and yet not altogether
t
responsible, being subjected to a necessity imposed upon them by the divine 
order. 118 Nevertheless, it becomes more clear in later scenes of the drama that 
Agamemnon is also a very ambitious man and extremely proud of his achievements 
in the Trojan war. 119 Because of his excessive pride, he fails to discern 
Clytaemestra’s deceit and is consequently murdered. These later scenes suggest as 
well that Agamemnon’s extreme ambition and concern for royal honor likely did 
play a role in his decision to sacrifice his daughter. His death was therefore 
required as atonement for his guilt in the horrible act. Because of Agamemnon’s 
vanity, his excessive and inappropriate pursuit of honor, Aristotle would say that 
Agamemnon failed to hit a mean in conduct which he describes as great-souledness 
(fj.syoi'ko\J/vxL<x—also magnanimity or high-mindedness). For, in the end 
Agamemnon plainly claims a greatness that he does not deserve; his claim is not 
matched by equal greatness in goodness of character or deed (NE IV. 3 1123a35ff).
Clytaemestra is a complicated personality and an extreme character. This 
"man-hearted" woman is an adulteress and murderer. Adultery and murder have no 
excess or deficiency in Aristotle’s ethics; they are bad in and of themselves—there is 
no right way to perform these actions (NE II. 6  1107al0-26). In the intensity of her 
hatred and revenge, Clytaemestra is completely insensitive to the pain of others. 
Overcome by her passion, she shows no remorse or shame for what she does.
Boldly defiant and deceitful, she exceeds in confidence and anger, and she lacks a
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proper sense of shame. Although we can sympathize with and understand her pain 
and resentment, Clytaemestra is an example of how one loses one’s humanity by 
responding badly to misfortune and suffering.
Chapter 5 
Moral Depth
In Sophocles’ world the gods are neutral and impersonal, neither just nor evil, 
yet they mysteriously impose standards upon the human world, obligations of right 
and wrong which are revealed in oracles and omens. The human being’s imperfect 
knowledge may mistake and misinterpret these signs of divine law and he suffers 
tragically in consequence: however, although Sophocles simply accepts the divine 
order and does not try to explain or excuse it, he also does not appear to resign 
humankind to inevitable suffering. 120 There is much in the Antigone to suggest that 
the human being is responsible for the good and evil he chooses amid this 
mysterious rule of the divine. For tragedy occurs when the human being cannot 
harmonize himself with the circumstances of life imposed both by his human world 
and the guiding order of the divine, as Sophocles demonstrates most vividly in the 
character of Creon.
Sophocle’s tragedy, therefore, offers some measure of hope that a tragic 
conflict such as Antigone’s can be avoided or rectified through true wisdom and a 
harmonious balance within the worlds of the human and the divine. This thought 
that the tragic can be avoided and the emphasis throughout the Antigone on the role 
of reasoning and deliberation in determining the deeply right thing to do call to mind 
Aristotle and his Nicomachean Ethics. In his ethics, as one should recall, Aristotle 
defines human happiness, the ultimate human good, as the completed fulfillment of 
one’s human potential through a virtuosity in being human. The human being 
prospers and flourishes when he is able to judge and choose appropriately what is
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the good and the best thing to do at any given moment. This is a life lived 
according to Aristotle’s mean, which defines the correct proportion of feeling and 
action required for living well and being good as a human being. When the human 
being functions properly he is poised flexibly between extremes of excess and 
deficiency in his feelings and actions and thus is always prepared to meet any 
contingency in life with harmony and proper proportion. Adherence to the 
Aristotelian mean in moral conduct and striving for one’s human virtuosity therefore 
functions for Aristotle very like the guiding order of the divine in Sophocles’ 
Antigone. Without regard for this essential mean in human behavior, the human 
being cannot fulfill his true function as a human being; he is thus rootless, without a 
home, or like a ship without a harbor. Unbalanced and out of control, he cannot 
guide himself to the ultimate human good; like Creon, he is vulnerable to the "great 
blows" of disaster and suffering.
Although Haemon in the Antigone did not speak in these terms of a mean 
between extremes when he spoke with his father, nevertheless, his picture of proper 
human flourishing based upon a genuine depth of wisdom and tolerant flexibility of 
mind aligns itself well with these Aristotelian values and ideals. To Haemon, and 
for the spectator, what Creon cannot see in himself is obvious, that his behavior is 
dangerously extreme. Creon’s feelings of insecurity make him stubbornly willful 
and rigid in holding absolutely to his point of view. His attitude toward his feelings 
and actions are clearly out of balance: completely unaware of himself, he is out of 
control and headed for disaster through no fault but his own failure to fulfill his 
ultimate function as a human being. In Haemon’s plea to his father to yield, to 
reflect upon, and learn the wisdom in others’ opinions, he describes the man who is 
too rigid and thinks himself alone to be wise as "empty” inside:
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ocmq y a p  avroq rj 4>povelv y.bvoq boKsl 
rj yXbiCKxav, rjv o w  aXkoq, r\ lpvxw  %X8iv, 
o v t o l  biaTTVxBsvTsq &<t>6r}crav k s v o l .
For whoever thinks that he himself alone is wise, 
or has a tongue, or a mind, which no other (has), 
these men, when opened and spread out, are seen to be empty. (707-709)
Haemon’s picturesque description becomes a vision of the human being as a
superficial caricature, a hollow shell, of little true worth and inner substance. Such
a human being lives the semblance of a life, being empty of what makes the human 
being complete and fully human. Although Haemon does not elaborate, simply
c
describing this inner substance of the human being as being "full of understanding 
{eitiarrinrfq r XeW 721), his words recall Aristotle’s discussion of practical wisdom, 
the faculty that deliberates well and discerns truth in harmony with correct desire. 
Practical wisdom guides the human being to the right means to attain his good and it 
is this which Creon has lost sight of.
Antigone, one feels, has a better grasp of the ultimate good in the 
circumstances of her brother’s death and burial, yet her inappropriately belligerent 
manner tells us that her practical wisdom is also deficient. The right means to 
achieve her goal eludes her; she has not found truth in harmony with her desire nor 
in proportion to the circumstances. Antigone seems much more determined to die 
for her cause than to try to find a way to convince Creon to do what is reverent and 
right for a member of his own family. It is also evident that neither Creon nor 
Antigone alone could have found a way to resolve their conflict, regardless how 
practically wise either one of them was. As both are at fault, both characters would 
have had to yield their stubborn convictions and, together, have chosen to reconcile 
their differences through a deliberation about what is most deeply right in their 
particular circumstance. This is, however, in life as in the tragic imitation of life,
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never as easy to accomplish as it would seem.
Using Aristotle’s criteria for human virtuosity and moral choice, it becomes 
easier to see that both Creon and Antigone are deficient in character and goodness, 
as neither act in conformity to the Aristotelian mean between extremes, or achieve 
the stability and security of the supremely happy man Aristotle requires to flourish 
as a human being. Each also, one feels, is fully responsible for choosing how he 
acts and is, in the circumstances of the play. Although Antigone is clearly more 
deeply right and in harmony with the divine order of the world in her desire to bury 
her brother, her proud and abrasive manner accentuates the human conflict; the 
manner of her behavior is out of proportion, and therefore vice, even though her 
motive is not. Creon, too, shows excess with his uncompromising stubbornness 
and autocratic attitude. Although his basic principles of kingship and concern for 
the safety of his city may be sound, in the context of the situation Creon’s reasoning 
is plainly out of bounds. After all, what real harm would have come to the city by 
burying Polyneices?
Creon does, in fact, act out of sincere moral convictions. He is trying to do 
what is right in his role as ruler of Thebes. However, as discussed previously, 
Creon’s character is flawed. He exceeds the mean in relation to his state of anger 
and he errs in regard to his sense of shame, failures that eventually lead him to 
disaster. Moreover, his hamartia also includes a failure to find the mean of justice 
(<hiKotioovvr)), a moral virtuosity which Aristotle maintains is what regulates all 
proper conduct within society, including the relations and attitudes individuals have 
with others as well as those they have towards themselves. 121 According to 
Aristotle, justice produces and preserves happiness for the political community (Ms 
V.l 1129b 15-20). It therefore requires the practice of perfect moral virtuosity to be
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displayed toward others (NE V. 1 1129b26ff). Justice seeks to promote the 
advantage of another (NE V .l 1130a5), but without a violation of proportion, or 
what is deserved in relation to the person and circumstances (NE V .l 1131bl6ff). 
Aristotle, therefore, describes the true ruler as the guardian of what is just, 
equitable, and fair. A king should labor for the benefit of others in his kingdom; 
he does not take a larger share of what is good for himself alone, otherwise he 
becomes unjust and a tyrant. For his virtuous acts, a ruler is then paid back in 
honor and privilege (NE V .6  1134a30ff).
Although Creon intends to do what is good and right, his actions are unjust; he 
does not consciously and conscientiously deliberate and choose a good that is 
beneficial to all. He is not intrinsically unjust, however, since his actions are not 
motivated by malice, but are chosen from feelings of anger and fear which prevent 
him from seeing the harm he does to himself and others. 122 With the exception of 
Clytaemestra, who does act out of malice and forethought in plotting her evil deeds, 
this could be said of the other characters discussed in these tragic dramas. They all 
err in regard to justice; unknowingly, they unjustly harm others and themselves by 
their actions and through the deficiencies of their characters. They fail to consider 
that a virtuosity in being human includes justice, attentiveness to the good one 
provides oneself by one’s proper relations to others in one’s life and society.
Throughout the play one cannot help repeatedly recalling Ismene’s question to 
her sister Antigone when she asks: "Why do you cause me these griefs when it 
brings no benefit to you (50)?" One wonders what would have happened to their 
conflict if her question had been seriously considered. Would the virtue of justice 
have then been considered and acted upon? If Antigone had responded to Ismene 
and Creon by saying calmly, but firmly: "I understand how you feel, but I must do
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this because my conscience demands that I cannot do what is base and unjust to the 
gods and my brother,” what effect might her words and demeanor have had on the 
outcome of their conflict? Similarly, if Creon had simply told Antigone: "I am 
disappointed you disobeyed my decree. Explain to me your reasons and I will 
speak with my advisors so that we can decide what is the next best thing to do," how 
might Creon and Antigone have interacted and possibly have resolved their 
differences of view? Such responses, if sincerely meant and openly received, 
would indicate characters of greater self-awareness, self-control, and flexibility than 
they reveal in the drama. They would have required the development of such 
Aristotelian virtues as justice, practical wisdom, mildness of temper, and, in the 
example of Creon, even courage, the courage it takes to acknowledge one’s 
insecurities and fear. The presence of such virtues in the characters of Antigone 
and Creon would have offered a chance that the final tragedy and its human 
suffering could have been prevented.
Antigone is often held up as an example of the faultless tragic hero who falls 
into misfortune in spite of the supreme rightness of her cause. 123 Although her 
stature may indeed be heroic and admirable in many respects, she could also be 
viewed as a moral zealot, a fanatic who blindly opposes all moral principles except 
her own. Nevertheless, one can easily imagine a superior and far more heroic 
Antigone confronting Creon in a manner which is as honorable and worthy as her 
courageous deed. At the play’s end Creon proves that he has the capacity to know 
what is truly and deeply right; therefore, perhaps, Antigone could have succeeded in 
persuading Creon to change his unholy decree, if she had approached him in just the 
right way. It also may be true that the play could end in no other way; Antigone 
had to perish so that Creon’s world would be destroyed and the divine order
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prevail. 124 And yet, no doubt as Sophocles intended, there is a feeling of 
discomfort and silent protest at hearing such a final verdict. How can it be that 
Antigone’s courageous pursuit of the deeply right must result in death and 
destruction, one asks oneself; there must be a reason and a better way. Aristotle’s 
study of ethics shows that there is indeed a reason for such evil; it results from the 
violation of the deeply right, a deeply right that is symbolized in Sophocles by the 
divine order. Moreover, although it is difficult and rare to achieve it, there is, 
indeed, a better way to pursue the deeply right in human conduct than that which 
results in an inevitable conflict between two people. It is clear that both Sophocles 
and Aristotle would agree that the solution to tragic conflict and its human suffering 
lies somehow in the striving to be the best possible human being one can be.
The deeply right thing to do, or what one ought to do in particular 
circumstances, is, according to Aristotelian standards, not something which comes 
about by chance. As we discussed earlier, Aristotle requires that the act must arise 
from a firm and stable character, from one who acts knowingly and chooses the act 
for its own sake (NE 11,4 1105a26ff). Therefore, one could do the right thing 
outwardly, such as Creon’s attempt to free Antigone, but if the act is performed out 
of fear, as in the case of Creon, or a desire for personal gain, it would only be the 
appearance of the right thing and not actually the deeply right in the purest terms. 125 
Aristotle explains this most deeply right when he says a true physician is not one 
who simply performs an operation or administers treatments, but the one who does 
so in a certain way and with a certain disposition of mind, knowing how and to 
whom and when to apply his skill and knowledge so as to effect a cure (NE V. 9 
1137a5ff). Likewise, the one who does what is deeply right would not just perform 
the act, but he would do so out of an intrinsic knowledge and deep commitment to
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what is right beyond simply his intention and performance. It also requires a 
willingness to follow through and persist in bringing about what one knows is deeply 
right, such as when a government worker exposes corruption in the government at 
the risk of losing his job and damaging his career. 126 Choosing to do what is 
deeply right, therefore, involves a choice which is characterized by moral goodness 
in its most complete sense, where manner and motive and the substance of the 
deeply right are harmoniously and appropriately united in the action of an 
individual. This is what Aristotle means when he says that choice is what 
determines a person’s character even more than his actions (NE III.2 1111 b30ff).
In Aristotle’s moral theory character is therefore primary in determining our 
right actions since character and the choices which arise from and also shape our 
character determine the quality of our action. The relationship between character 
and action is an intricate one and is not well understood by most modem moral 
philosophers. One contemporary moral philosopher, Stephen Hudson, writes that if 
we are to take the virtues (i.e. moral virtuosity) seriously, we must view our present 
categories of moral action differently and recognize that virtues, hence character- 
since virtues are the cultivation of character and its traits—are indeed, as Aristotle 
believes, a determinant of what is the morally right thing to do. 127 Moral theorists 
usually describe right action as those actions that our moral obligations and duties 
require. Hudson maintains, however, that what is morally obligatory is not the 
same as what one ought to do. He explains that these two expressions—what is 
obligatory and what ought to be done—actually represent two different dimensions of 
morality, which he names "the Requirements of Morality" and "the Counsels of 
Moral Wisdom."
Our moral obligations require, us to act in certain ways that limit our freedom
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because our actions may adversely affect the good of others. They are actions that 
are demanded of us and for which we are morally liable if we fail to perform them, 
actions such as obeying traffic laws and resolving our disputes in a court of law 
rather than through a gunfight in the street. Hudson argues that morality (as it is 
understood by modem moral theory) cannot, however, demand that we be virtuous, 
that we act with generosity, or courageously, or with good-humor or friendliness; it 
cannot require that we become persons with a particular sort of character. Modem 
moral theory refrains from telling us how to be, as its focus is primarily on how the 
human being acts. For virtuosities of character to be expressed, the counsel of our 
moral wisdom must guide and direct us to act in these ways, in the way in which, as 
Aristotle described, a virtuous person would act. Our moral wisdom tells us that 
we ought to act in this manner, but we are not required by any rules or principles of 
morality to do so. For modem moral philosophers this distinction is a complicated 
issue and they debate whether there is a conflict between our moral obligations—the 
requirements of moral conduct-and principles of human virtuosity-our demand for 
excellence in character.
Hudson reminds us that the moral worth of acts counseled by our moral 
wisdom actually derives from an appraisal of the agent and the moral worth of his 
intentions, or motives. Thus, in the dimension of the morally required, an 
obligatory act can be deemed morally praiseworthy even when done from improper 
motives, such as selfishness, or fear, as we saw in the example of Creon; while 
from the perspective of the counsel of moral wisdom, an act can have some moral 
worth when it is the wrong thing to do, but is done from a good motive. However, 
there is a danger, Hudson warns, of transforming acts of virtuosity into an 
obligation that is morally required when we say virtuous acts ought to be done,
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subsuming the function of character as the action-guiding principle to a system of 
rules that dictate our conduct. In addition, since virtuosity of character reflects 
itself in good motives, some moral theorists will tend to define virtues as 
supplementary and secondary to principles of moral obligation since they provide a 
willingness to act on principles of morality.
Hudson points out that our everyday moral experience informs us that, on the 
contrary, virtues of character do indeed guide us in making our moral decisions 
about what we ought to do. It is not unusual when faced with a moral dilemma to 
ask ourselves what kind of person ought we to be in this situation—generous, honest, 
or considerate, or even angry, assertive, or indifferent. We are in this moment 
seeking guidance from our moral wisdom, asking of it what we are to do, but the 
manner of our actions would not necessarily be what we would have to do in the 
sense of a moral obligation. We are free to choose our actions and the manner in 
which we act, however, we are then, as Aristotle might say, fully responsible for the 
quality and consequences of what we choose to do.
As we have seen, Aristotle’s treatment of moral virtuosity and character refers 
moral actions to the ideal type of person who exemplifies a particular virtue.
Hence, a courageous act is only courageous when it is of the sort a truly courageous 
person would do in similar circumstances. Hudson explains that if courage is 
described thus, as characteristic of a type of person, "it is by understanding how the 
choices, desires, values, emotions, actions, and will of that person cohere into a 
whole that we understand the virtue of courage." In these words Hudson further 
illustrates the depth and completeness which is obtained in human action when it 
derives from a character-based ethic such as Aristotle’s. It is in context of a whole 
action and the wholeness of the person performing the action that the deeply right is
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defined. Hudson distinguishes acts which are performed in accordance with virtue 
from those done from  virtue. 128 An act done in accordance with virtue is an act 
which is typical of the virtue—it has the appearance of virtuous action, but is not the 
action of a virtuous person; for example, a miser can perform a generous act, yet 
remain a miser. Such an action is right action, however, and has a certain value 
independent from the agent’s character. An act that reflects the moral worth of the 
agent is done from  virtue and it is this kind of an act which is descriptive of the 
deeply right-a characteristically motivated action which is chosen for its own sake, 
as valuable in itself, and done as a virtuous person would perform it.
Hudson concludes, in words that recall Aristotle’s ethics, that sound moral
) i
judgment of the sort needed for resolving conflicts between virtues and obligations
i
cannot be "bottled up in a system of rules and principles which will determine what 
ought to be done in any situation. " 129 Greek tragedy, as we have seen, also vividly 
depicts one’s human need for sound moral judgment, and the difficulty in attaining 
it. "What ought I to do?" is the question morality must answer, paralleling the 
question posed by tragedy "What shall I do?" and the philosophical question of 
"What is the good? " 130 In fact, this moral question of ought partakes of both 
questions asked by tragedy and philosophy. It includes both the urgency of tragedy 
in the search for the right thing to do and the desire for the good which is posited by 
philosophy. Moral truth requires that this question of what ought to be done cannot 
be independent of character-the question of what sort of person the agent ought to 
be. Hudson gives credit to Aristotle for seeing that the answers to these questions 
are interdependent and, because of this view, he states that Aristotle’s moral theory 
stands upon much firmer ground than those of most modem moral philosophers.
Aristotle also provides a sound and stable foundation for his moral theory by
integrating the purpose of the human being with the order and purpose of the 
cosmos. In the Antigone, the human being brings disaster upon himself when he 
does not consider his place in the divine world order and follow its guidance. In 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and in the Poetics there is little mention of the gods 
themselves, but the divine and the divine in man function much for Aristotle as the 
gods do in Sophoclean drama. The divine is manifested in the expression of t o  
kocK o u—the beautiful—and the thrust of all of nature to express the beautiful in a 
perfection, or completion, of being becomes the moral imperative of the universe, 
an imperative to which Aristotle anchors his moral theory and the activity of man. 
Without this anchor, Aristotle’s theory and the human being would become, as is 
poetically imaged in the "Ode to Man” in the Antigone, like a ship without a harbor, 
rootless, homeless, out of control and headed for catastrophe. Therefore, although 
Aristotle cautions against an inflexible system of rules and principles for moral 
conduct, in his ethics the human being is securely bound or obligated to some higher 
authority than himself in a way which guides and preserves him as he makes his way 
through life and the world. 131
This Aristotelian obligation to a divine imperative to do right and be morally 
good is, however, quite unusual in the fact that it is not obligatory in the sense that 
we are compelled to be good from an external source, as we would be if the 
obligation came from a duty or rule of law imposed upon us. Aristotle maintains 
that we should do the right thing just because it is right and because it also expresses 
t o  K O i\o v . A virtuous act will only be truly virtuous when this is the only 
underlying motive. Moreover, we choose to do what is right (and therefore 
beautiful) from our own free will. We are not forced to do so by anything other 
than our intrinsic desire to be morally good. The fact that the impulse to be truly
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moral must come from within and that our moral decisions are free and not 
compulsory gives the human being full and absolute responsibility for his moral 
actions and character.
This kind of total responsibility for our moral actions and the freedom to 
choose them is quite different from other moral theories that are based on external 
obligations to moral rules and principles, as indicated by Stephen Hudson’s 
argument above. In Aristotle’s moral theory we are fundamentally responsible to 
ourselves, to who we are and hope to be as human beings. In our function as 
human beings, we strive to be particular kind's of persons who desire the acquisition 
of particular human virtues (virtuosities) in order to become complete and whole, 
morally perfect. We therefore do not fail a particular moral law when we fail to be 
morally good; we fail ourselves and our capacity to be the best we can be. 
Aristotle’s theory gives us the awesome burden of complete responsibility for our 
moral choices, while at the same time the freedom to pursue them with a great deal 
of individual creativity. As long as we accomplish in our actions and feelings what 
is essentially and intrinsically right and good, we choose freely how and who to be 
throughout our lives. Although there are those who would doubt the effectiveness 
of Aristotle’s ethics for our modem world, it would seem that a moral ethic which- 
originates from within the human character and which is responsible for expressing 
what is most deeply right and good in the world and the human being has the 
greatest capacity to bring a coherency and wholeness to human morality.
Moreover, it promotes a quality of moral goodness that enobles humankind. 132
Helmut Kuhn describes the relationship between Greek tragedy and philosophy, 
specifically Platonic philosophy, as two creations which subserve a common cause, 
each being involved in three related aspects of thought: (a) "the working out of an
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antithetical vision of reality," (b) "a solution to the problem of suffering and evil," 
and (c) "a deepening of the human self-consciousness. " 133 As we have seen in 
Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, the ancient Greeks did not envision human suffering as a 
simple conflict between good and evil; reality consisted of complicated tensions 
between various antitheses. This view compelled the ancient Greeks to struggle for 
greater clarity in their contemplation of the world and human existence.
Both tragedy and philosophy address the problem of human suffering in 
different ways. According to Kuhn, when confronted with this problem, tragedy 
asks the question "What shall I do? " 134 We saw this vividly portrayed in the 
frantic anxiety of the chorus of elders in the Agamemnon. Philosophy, in contrast, 
Kuhn says, goes one step farther and asks "What is the good? " , 135 a question which 
is also often implicit in the emotional turmoil on the tragic stage. The search for 
clarity in the confusion of life we see in the action of tragedy and the rational logic 
of philosophy highlight the role played by the human agent in his suffering. In 
tragedy responsibility for human suffering is muddied; in almost the same moment 
suffering can be blamed on the "will of the gods" and then implied to be, either 
wholly or partially, caused by a "moral flaw" in the protagonist—his human frailty 
and limitation—as if the tragedy could have been foreseen and prevented if only the 
protagonist were wiser and more self-aware. Philosophy represents a development 
in thought which increasingly emphasizes this self-consciousness of the agent and his 
responsibility and freedom of choice in doing good or evil. This trend in thought 
meant that classical belief in a cosmos seen as a sacred world order, with the human 
being as a dependent part of that order, was rendered irrelevant, and as Albin 
Lesky’s study points out, the loss of this belief was the death of classical tragedy.
Kuhn argues, however, that there is an underlying harmony between the tragic
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and the philosophic points of view. This harmony lies in the idea of catharsis. As 
we saw in the hymn of Zeus in the Agamemnon, the elders experience a kind of 
catharsis; they are purged of their anxiety and confusion in a moment of 
contemplation of the wisdom of Zeus, and as they, in turn, receive some kind of 
clarification of understanding of their place as human beings in the world order their 
god represents. While the elders get no real answer to their frantic question of 
"What shall we do?," their passionate despair is answered by a calm, irrational hope 
that all may be well in their anticipation of coming evil. Kuhn calls this "catharsis 
by passion" the poetic achievement of a "unified vision of reality." Philosophy, on 
the other hand, he says, obtains a catharsis which "assuages passion in 
contemplation. " 136 The contemplation of philosophy must bravely confront the 
realization of what it means to be a human agent and the recognition of the 
inescapable antinomies of reality, and in the process somehow be soothed as were 
the elders in the Agamemnon. Both tragedy and philosophy, Kuhn implies, are 
closely connected through the harshness and unyielding barrenness of their raw 
desire, philosophy’s ceaseless yearning and want for an answer to its persistent 
questioning about the nature of man and his universe is consistent with tragedy’s 
desire for peace from the agony of suffering. 137
Other literary genres dramatize the sad and serious realities of the human 
condition, but none achieve the sort of emotional dynamic and dramatic tension that 
define the tragic sense of life that we see in classical Greek tragedy. Greek tragedy 
could have easily slipped into melodrama; in fact, a few of Euripides’ plays have 
actually been called melodramas. 138 Melodrama also depicts the nature of the 
human condition, however, it is a sentimentalized and idealized version of life which 
relies upon artificial and sensationalized plot constructions to maximize the
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emotional effect on the spectators. This type of drama is represented by the silent 
film which shows the hero rescuing in the nick of time the fair maiden who has been 
tied up on the railroad tracks by the dastardly villain. Add to this scene the musical 
accompaniment of "Hearts and Rowers," music designed to wring every possible 
ounce of emotion from the audience—everything is intended to produce tears, sighs, 
and finger-biting suspense. The characters are unambiguously portrayed as either 
villains or heroes, who live in a world where good always triumphs over evil and 
the happy ending is the rule rather than the exception. Moral issues are 
superficially explored, although their significance is greatly exaggerated in the play. 
At the opposite extreme, the medieval morality play over-emphasizes the moral and 
didactic purposes of drama in plays that allegorize the struggle between good and 
evil, with characters who are personified portraits of virtues and vices. These very 
serious plays were designed to encourage the spectator to live morally in order to be 
saved from damnation after death. Thus, the morality play symbolized a 
humankind that was constantly threatened by the dangers of its own immorality. It 
is important to note the contrast of these other dramatic genres with tragedy to 
demonstrate how unique and profound the achievement of Greek tragedy is, what a 
subtle and sophisticated expression of the human heart and mind it is, and how 
easily its significance as a meaningful commentary on human life can be destroyed.
Aristotle appeared to recognize the damage that would be done to tragedy by 
the excesses of melodrama and of too overtly moralistic and didactic intentions. In 
his Poetics he warns the tragic poet not to depend on sensational spectacles to 
achieve his tragic effects, that this is an inferior method and not appropriate to the 
purpose of tragedy (1453blff). The superior, more artistic poet achieves pity and 
fear not through extremes, but through the subtle and complex manipulations of a
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well-constructed plot which, one assumes, makes tragedy itself a much more 
effective and significant imitation of life than other dramatic genres. What we 
learned through the construction of the prologue and Parodos of Aeschylus’ 
Agamemnon was that tragedy does present a very distinctive world view and 
emotional tone—that the human being suffers in a world of uncertainty, between 
circumstances which may become good or which may result in evil; he is suspended 
unknowingly in a tension between hope and despair. Because of the skill and 
sophistication of Aeschylus’ art, his imitation of life is quite accurate in its portrayal 
of the intense confusion and anxiety the perplexity of human suffering brings to the 
human being. The experience of the power and the depth of its human anguish thus 
quickly becomes a direct confrontation with the meaning of life and the purpose of 
the human being in the world.
In the Agamemnon we see examples of unquestionable moral imperfection. 
Clytaemestra is an adulteress, and eventually she murders her husband,
Agamemnon. Agamemnon is himself responsible for the death of his daughter, 
Iphigeneia. These acts are clear excesses, well beyond the limits of the mean of 
moral virtuosity; in fact, they have no mean, adultery and murder are entirely bad 
(NE II . 6  1107a6-26). Nevertheless, Aeschylus provides his drama with complex 
contradictions and conditions which make these crimes somewhat understandable, 
yet difficult to judge absolutely. Clytaemestra is deeply hurt by the death of her 
daughter. Her desire for revenge, at least, is justified. Agamemnon struggles with 
the decision to allow the slaughter of his child, but he is caught between the will of 
two gods, knowing whatever decision he makes means disaster and the wrath of 
some divinity (211). Where Agamemnon seems to have no choice, necessity 
(apdjKrj), he implies, makes the choice for him (217). He, therefore, forfeits the
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moral responsibility for his decision, giving up his own free will and deluding
/
himself that this was the right thing for him to do. Divine decree mandated that his 
forces seek revenge against Troy for the abduction of Helen, thus, Agamemnon 
relinguishes his fatherhood in favor of military leadership. Simultaneously, along 
with the action, Aeschylus skillfully manipulates our sympathies with his poetry. 
Our minds respond to Agamemnon’s inner conflict, sympathizing with his desire to 
fulfill his duty as king and the requirements of Zeus’ will, but our hearts are made 
to feel the horror of the sacrifice of his daughter and its terrible wrong. We, like 
the chorus of elders, feel pity for these people, as we feel fear for their horrible 
crimes.
How does one choose to do what is right and best in such complex and 
contradictory circumstances? Although Aeschylus provides an extreme example in 
this play of a moral dilemma in which every choice leads to disaster, it is essentially 
no different from moral conflicts many people frequently encounter. When a co- 
worker and friend is stealing from an employer, what does one do? Confront the 
friend, hoping he will do the right thing, and return what he took, voluntarily? Or, 
go to the boss and turn the friend in? Either way, one risks losing a friend and 
being embroiled in an unpleasant controversy. Likewise, a nurse knows of an 
incident of malpractice. A highly respected physician is the cause of the death of a 
patient, but he hides this from the family, falsifying the patient’s records so that no 
one else will ever know. The nurse also knows that no one will believe her if she 
tells the truth. Should she risk her job and reputation by exposing the physician’s 
deceit? Or, finally, consider a situation in war. Should an atomic bomb be 
dropped on innocent civilians if it means the lives of thousands or millions of others 
will be saved and the war ended? How, indeed, does one choose the deeply right?
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What about the consequences of our error, if we make the wrong decision?
Agamemnon should have prevented the sacrifice of his daughter, regardless of 
the consequences for himself and the war against Troy. Creon should have listened 
to Antigone and allowed the burial of her brother. But the predicament of these 
moments in these men’s lives and the makeup of their individual characters made 
such decisions difficult for them, as they would be for anyone. Like Agamemnon 
and Creon, most people avoid the deeply right and delude themselves into thinking 
that what they do is the only right and good choice available. The choice seems too 
difficult to search more completely for what may be more truly right, the fear too 
great for the painful consequences, consequences which may include a painfully 
honest and critical self-appraisal of one’s moral responsibility and character. We 
too often choose what is immediately expedient without thinking deeply over our 
choices, without evaluating fully our motivations and the consequences of what we 
do, or whether they reflect truly and deeply who we are as individuals and our 
ultimate purpose as a human being.
Owen Flanagan’s essay suggests that because such moral decisions are difficult 
to make, morality can offer us no solutions, no guidelines or standards for our 
conduct. 139 However, the nature of morality is not easy or neat. Human nature, 
itself, is also not simple, but complex. The search for solutions to our moral 
dilemmas will therefore be as equally difficult, reflecting the complicated nature of 
the object of our perceptions and thought. Aristotle himself admits that his theory’s 
outline is rough; we must fill in the details. Aristotle’s moral theory, however, 
does give us a solution to the complexity of our moral decisions and a standard to 
which we may aspire. Aristotle’s solution is moral depth and the standard is moral 
perfection. It remains for us to find the way to fill in the details and smooth out the
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rough outlines of moral conduct.
As Kuhn remarks above, the ancient Greek’s struggle for clarity in 
understanding the problem of human suffering and the antitheses observed in reality 
corresponds with a deepening of human self-consciousness, and a greater awareness 
of moral responsibility. The chorus of elders in Aeschylus’ tragic drama 
demonstrate the process of reflection upon a difficult, even seemingly impossible, 
moral decision. They question themselves and others, they review past events and 
speculate upon the future, and they search their hearts as well as their minds for the 
appropriate response to their dilemma. As the representation of a collective 
humanity, the members of the chorus search deep into their own self-knowledge and 
experience of life, and outward into the nature of the universe. They reach toward 
a moral truth which will tell them what is the best way to feel and act in these 
particular circumstances. In this drama, the elders fail to clarify completely the 
confusion of their world, but their understanding does deepen; their response is the 
result of a deep and full consideration of what they feel, believe, and perceive to be 
true and real and good. It comes most sincerely and honestly from the depths of 
who they are. Though they find no final solution to their worry and fear, these 
elders do achieve the beginnings of the development of moral depth.
The elders however are paralyzed by their anxiety and confusion. They do not 
represent the possession of a true moral depth, the depth of moral understanding that 
comes from a complete awareness of moral responsibility and the demands of a 
higher objective moral order. Moral depth means that wise decisions can be made 
with the consideration of a whole moral truth in mind. As Susan Mendus suggests 
in her essay, for conflicts to be resolved successfully in ways that satisfy our sense 
of true justice and moral integrity, we must recognize the value of what is lost in the
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opposing claim. 140 In our reflection upon moral issues, we therefore honor the 
validity of serious claims to right and goodness, even if we must deny them a part in 
our ultimate decision, as Agamemnon would have had to deny his duties of kingship 
in order to save his child. We keep this view of a whole moral truth in mind as we 
shape our feelings and actions. A deep and wise consideration of all the particulars 
of a circumstance will therefore result in a more honest appraisal and deeper 
understanding of our moral responsibilites; our moral life will be less corrupt, our 
choices and decisions more accurate and sound, more true to the particular situation 
and to our capacity to attain moral virtuosity as human beings. With moral depth 
we regain something of high value, even if we cannot always reconcile our most 
troubling conflicts, even when we make mistakes. We live a life more free of self- 
delusion, more honest and true to ourselves as human beings, one which is, 
ultimately, more reflective of the worth of the "humanness" of our human nature. 
We allow the beautiful to shine through from our souls.
Since tragedy reaches so deeply into the heart of human experience and touches 
upon the metaphysical in its profound questionings, it can be used as a valuable tool 
for ethical reflection and insight. So often tragedy concerns itself in some way with 
human excellence, or virtue, even when it depicts "corrupted virtue," or vice.
Hence, tragedy can be looked at as a critique of human virtuosity, an assessment of 
the value and significance of particular virtues and moral ideals in a society and 
human life. Such an examination poses many difficult questions and problems; 
however, a serious and honest reflection upon the ambiguity of virtue in different 
contexts and the nature of tragic error forces one to confront the complexities 
involved in moral choice, the contemplation of which can then enhance our moral 
discernment and understanding in making moral judgments and defining moral
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responsibility. Moreover, by highlighting the problem of the relationship between 
human virtuosity and happiness, tragedy reveals how deeply embedded our moral 
beliefs are in conceptions of the good life and the fundamental purpose of human 
existence. Through tragedy, humankind’s deepest needs and aspirations are 
dramatized along with the human being’s inability to control the course of the 
world. A study and evaluation of tragedy may thus show that the tragic is an 
inescapable part of life, yet it can also teach the ability to discern where and how it 
is avoidable and how, by maintaining a critical stance toward our deepest moral 
values, we can prevent ourselves from unjustly inflicting suffering upon others. As 
we come to know our moral failures and inadequacies, however, we can also 
reaffirm the ultimate value and significance of moral virtuosity in our lives and our 
human worth. 141
Such affirmation of our moral perfection, or virtuosity in being a human being, 
in the ethical reflection upon human virtuosity and values encountered in the 
experience of the tragic sense of life is fundamentally a concern with moral depth, 
the deep understanding of what is ultimately worth caring about in the living of a 
humanly good life. We have seen how Aristotle’s ethics directs the human being 
toward this same deep understanding, for the development of moral depth is a 
natural accompaniment of the human being’s striving toward moral perfection. But 
what exactly is moral depth? John Kekes gives a very rational account of moral 
depth which is reminiscent of Aristotle’s requirements for moral perfection. 142 He 
first describes moral depth as the opposite of moral superficiality and in some way 
connected with an understanding of truth, the ability to see an underlying unity 
beneath the surface of the complex variety of phenomena in the world. More 
specifically, moral depth requires a deep understanding of how to live a good life in
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which personal satisfaction coincides with moral merit. People living a good life 
derive their satisfaction and enjoyments from activities which produce good and 
avoid evil. Moral depth, therefore, results when one achieves the rare balance 
between understanding this general ideal for a good life and an understanding of 
particular conditions in one’s own specific individual life which can guide one to a 
good life.
Kekes describes more explicitly just what these conditions of life are. From 
the point of view of reality there are some things over which the human being has 
little or no control. This reality which can be described as a kind of necessity and 
which is referred to as the "will of the gods" in Greek tragedy (the symbolic 
significance of the night sky in the watchman scene in the Agamemnon), is 
indifferent to human well-being, or morality. It includes the impersonal, 
unexplainable, and unavoidable facts such as natural disasters, susceptibility to 
disease, genetic talents and predispositions, chance meetings and accidents. From 
the human point of view, which is, in contrast, very concerned with human welfare, 
these necessities of reality are contingent, that is, dependent upon uncertain 
conditions—chance, the possible, the unforeseen, and the unpredictable. Moral 
depth requires an understanding that the human being is always vulnerable to 
calamity, while still maintaining that balance of understanding which preserves the 
goal of living a good life. A realistic understanding and acceptance of the 
contingency of life means one does not resign oneself to a fear of failure and 
disengagement from life, but instead makes the best effort to attain a good life by 
responding to misfortune with balance and control rather than emotional 
overreaction and self-destructive behavior. The understanding moral depth gives 
allows the human being to guide his actions so that he can focus on what is truly
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important in life, rather than wasting his life in trivialities, and also enables him to 
avoid potentially dangerous situations. An understanding of the contingency of life 
means, however, that unfortunately, no cosmic justice exists to right moral wrongs. 
We can only depend upon our own persistent efforts to improve the imperfect 
human justice system to correct moral injustice. Kekes concludes his discussion in 
words that echo Aristotle by stating that the development of character traits required 
for moral depth, such as balance, self-control, clear self-knowledge and 
understanding, stability and persistence, are rare and difficult to acquire, but 
nevertheless well worth pursuing, since good lives are unlikely to be achieved 
without moral depth.
In our modem life the gods do not impose mysterious standards of right and 
wrong, yet a moral standard for us is still elusive. Modem moral philosophy, in 
the main, has rejected moral perfection. There is no clear standard for moral 
goodness such as we find in Aristotle’s ethics. There is no standard for the deeply 
right, as there is no standard for good character. Modem moral philosophy is 
deeply flawed. Its methods are ineffective in providing a coherent and workable 
moral theory that can confront the moral dilemmas of our time. The confusion in 
our modem moral theories is reflected in the general chaos of modem moral life, 
particularly in our political and legal thought and the decisions of our social 
institutions. Our legal system concerns itself only with the minimal requirements of 
moral goodness. Moral law is excluded from a place in the law of our human 
community. It exists but, invisibly, above and beyond the reach of the law. As a 
result moral conduct has little worth since morality has come to mean simply how 
one finds the means to escape punishment from the law, rather than how to reflect 
our true worth as human beings. A story from Africa illustrates this distinction.
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When a man came before a group of African elders to settle a dispute about the 
division of his crops, the elders told him: "We have the power to make you divide 
the crops, for this is our law, and we will see this done. But we have not power to 
make you behave like an upright man. "143 The power of human decency originates 
from within, but human decency must first have value in a society for its truth to be 
promoted.
The influence of liberalism promotes a conception of the self that stands alone, 
apart from the self-reflection that gives meaningful self-knowledge and moral depth. 
In this conception the worth of the human being becomes somehow less, although 
this is not liberal theory’s intention. The human being becomes detached and 
empty of a complete understanding of himself and his place in the world as a 
flourishing human being. This recalls Haemon’s speech to his father where he 
describes a true human flourishing. Haemon says that flourishing comes to the 
person with a particular disposition, a character that is open to learning the wisdom 
of others. He is flexible to the unpredictable and changing circumstances of life.
s
The flourishing human being thus gains experience and knowledge; at his best he is 
"full of understanding." He therefore possesses a human wisdom that brings 
happiness and the ability to withstand or avoid the "great blows" of misfortune and 
suffering that will be met in life. Haemon’s words and the lesson of the tragedy of 
Antigone allude to Aristotle’s standards of moral conduct and successful human 
flourishing—the o-Kovboiloq, the 4>povinoq, and the svbodfiuv—examples of human 
beings who stand as a part of the cosmos, integrated and whole, at one with 
themselves as human beings and in harmony with the world, the possessors of moral 
wisdom and moral depth. They imply as well that without a moral theory which 
promotes moral perfection, hence the development of a coherent and promising
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morality that nurtures the completeness of the human being, there is little hope that a 
true human flourishing can be achieved. We risk becoming empty inside, without 
' real substance, performing our actions and living our lives without the completeness 
of their human worth.
In Plato’s Apology Socrates says that "for the human being, the unexamined 
life is not worth living (38a),” for Socrates believed, like Aristotle, that what is most 
human is to be the best one can be by developing his apenj, his human virtuosity.
In order to do this successfully one must examine oneself rigorously to find truth, 
wisdom, and justice in his actions and to pursue these ends, otherwise, life as a 
human being would have little value. Such rigorous self-examination requires ideal 
standards to which one may compare oneself. To discard the ideal of moral 
perfection, of human completion and flourishing, as unrealistic and unattainable, or 
even unattractive, therefore, diminishes and devalues what is most deeply and 
divinely human in us and threatens morality’s real meaning. Human imperfection 
may be much more usual, but it is not more human or more admirable. Without 
ideals to which we can aspire, the human being would be cast adrift into the dark 
meaningless void of the totally tragic world view. The anguished questioning and 
the painful suffering of tragedy show us that there is some expectation or standard 
for human life which is not being met; and that, although it is much more difficult 
and rare to achieve, as Aristotle repeatedly said, striving to be truly good and most 
human offer humanity its only hope for a stable and enduring happiness and a 
meaning and purpose which make life worthwhile.
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